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I. INTRODUCTION: THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE AND THE
PERSPECTIVE OF CONSTITUTIONAL LITIGATION
For quite some time now there has been extensive and ongoing
academic criticism of the Supreme Court's Establishment Clause
jurisprudence and of its decisions under that jurisprudence.' While
there are a number of different facets of the academic debate over
the proper interpretation and meaning of the Establishment
Clause,2 virtually all the commentators agree that there is
1. The amount of academic commentary on the Establishment Clause and
on the religion clauses in general has been enormous. Although the focus of this
Article is on the operation of the Establishment Clause in practice, I have
examined at least a portion of the voluminous academic commentary at some
length and have tried to obtain some understanding of the various aspects of the
academic debate. It is not my purpose in this Article to join in that debate, and
I have little interest in doing so. Nevertheless, I have cited a number of academic
writings where they seemed relevant to the discussion at hand.
2. The debate over the proper interpretation and meaning of the
Establishment Clause is often influenced, at least in part, by the particular
commentator's "separationist" or "accommodationist" agenda. The
"separationist" agenda calls for an expansive interpretation of the Establishment
Clause so as to invalidate most governmental involvements with religion. The
"accommodationist" agenda calls for a narrower interpretation of the
Establishment Clause that would uphold a broad range of governmental
involvements with religion. The "accommodationist" agenda to which I refer
should not be confused with the proposition discussed in Part II.E., infra, that
the Establishment Clause permits the government to take certain actions
designed to protect the religious freedom of individuals and religious institutions.
See Michael W. McConnell, Accommodation of Religion: An Update and a
Response to the Critics, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 685, 686-87 (1992) (discussing the
distinction between "governmental action that acknowledges or expresses the
prevailing religious sentiment of the community" and "government laws or
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something seriously wrong with the Court's approach to the
resolution of Establishment Clause issues. A common thread
running through this criticism is that the Court has failed to
develop and articulate an underlying theory as to the meaning of
the Establishment Clause and its function in our constitutional
system.'
Much of the criticism of the Court's approach to the
Establishment Clause relates to the Court's use of the "Lemon test"4
as the articulated methodology to resolve all of the Establishment
Clause issues coming before it for decision.' This criticism
policies that have the purpose and effect of removing a burden on, or facilitating
the exercise of, a person's or an institution's religion").
3. See, eg., William P. Marshall, "We Know It When We See It" The Supreme
Court and Establishment, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 495 (1986).
The Court's inconsistency pervades more than just the results of
the cases; the Court has also wavered constantly in its depiction of the
underlying theory of the Establishment Clause. At times the Court has
indicated the clause mandates a wall of separation between church and
state. At other times, the Court has stated that neutrality is required. In
still other instances, the Court has spoken of accommodation ....
It is then, no wonder that establishment jurisprudence has been
universally criticized. The Court itself has acknowledged its own
'considerable internal inconsistency,' [quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n,
397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970)] candidly admitting that it has 'sacrifice[d]
clarity and predictability for flexibility,' [quoting Committee for Pub.
Educ. and Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646, 662 (1980)] and
commentators have found the area hopelessly confused.
Id at 496-97 (footnotes omitted).
4. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971).
5. See generally Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist.,
508 U.S. 384, 389 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring) ("I agree with the long list of
constitutional scholars who have criticized Lemon and bemoaned the crooked
lines and wavering shapes its intermittent use has produced"); Allegheny County
v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 655-56 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part) (noting that "[plersuasive criticism of Lemon has emerged");
Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day
Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 346 (1987) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (noting that
"this action once again illustrates certain difficulties inherent in the Court's use
of the [Lemon] test," and that there is a "tension in the Court's use of the Lemon
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regarding the Lemon test has surfaced among members of the Court
itself.6 According to one commentator, the Lemon test is "irrelevant
or indeterminate when applied to most serious Establishment
Clause issues." 7 Another commentator argues that the broad
disagreements about the meaning and viability of the Lemon test
have rendered the test "only an imperfect tool for enforcing the
separation principle," and have "produced an area of law that is
chaotic and utterly unpredictable."8 Some commentators, relying
on Justice Kennedy's reference to "coercion" in his opinion for the
Court in Lee v. Weisman,9 went so far as to say that the Court had
replaced the Lemon test with a new "coercion" test,10 only to be
disabused of this notion by the Court in post-Lee cases in which
"coercion," or the absence thereof, played no part in the Court's
Establishment Clause analysis."
Going beyond the deficiencies in the Lemon test, another
commentator has criticized the Court's Establishment Clause
test to evaluate an Establishment Clause challenge to government efforts to
accommodate the free exercise of religion"); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 110
(1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Lemon test has "not provided
adequate standards for deciding Establishment Clause cases").
6. See supra note 5.
7. McConnell, supra note 2, at 686.
8. Steven G. Gey, Religious Coercion and the Establishment Clause, 1994 U.
ILL. L. REV. 463, 467, 469.
9. 505 U.S. 577, 592-99 (1992).
10. See Michael Stokes Paulsen, Lemon Is Dead, 43 CASE W. RES. L. REv.
795, 797 (1993); Suzanna Sherry, Lee v. Weisman: Paradox Redux, 1992 SuP. CT.
REV. 123, 131-33.
11. See Rosenberger v. University of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819 (1995); Board of
Educ. of Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687 (1994); Zobrest
v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1 (1993).
Unlike the high school commencement prayer invalidated in Lee, the
practices challenged as violative of the Establishment Clause in these cases had
no effect at all, "coercive" or otherwise, on anyone else. The absence of coercion
was irrelevant in the Court's Establishment Clause analysis; in Kiryasjoel, the
Court held that the state had violated the Establishment Clause by setting up a
special school district that encompassed the boundaries of a religious community.
See Kiryas Joel, 512 U.S. at 690.
1320
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jurisprudence as being more symbolic than substantive, so that the
Court has been less concerned with the substantive goal of limiting
certain types of governmental involvements and supports of
religion than it has been with eliminating the perception of
improper governmental action." As a result, the criticism goes,
programs with only minimally favorable religious effects may
create Establishment Clause problems while programs with highly
substantial effects may not.13
One of the most prominent Establishment Clause
commentators, Professor Jesse Choper, has recently set forth a
comprehensive theory as to the meaning of the Establishment
Clause which would reshape completely the Court's Establishment
Clause jurisprudence and redefine the function of the Establishment
Clause in terms of "securing religious liberty." Under Professor
Choper's thesis, the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise
Clause, taken together, would be interpreted in light of four
principles: the deliberate disadvantage principle, the burdensome
effect principle, the intentional advantage principle, and the
independent impact principle. 4 Applying these principles to the
Court's decided cases, Professor Choper would reach dramatically
different results from those reached by the Court, sometimes
finding an Establishment Clause violation when the Court did not,
and sometimes finding no violation when the Court did. 5
Looking at the extensive and ongoing academic criticism of the
Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence and its decisions under
that jurisprudence, an objective observer might be tempted to ask,
"How could it be that the Court has been so wrong?" The inquiry
would continue with questions such as, "Why has the Court failed
to develop an underlying theory as to the meaning of the
12. See Marshall, supra note 3, at 498. Professor Marshall contends that only
a symbolic understanding of the Establishment Clause "serves to reconcile the
otherwise unintelligible pattern of Supreme Court decisions." Id
13. See id. at 531-32.
14. SeeJESSE H. CHOPER, SECURING RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: PRINCIPLES FOR
JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF THE RELIGION CLAUSES 35 (1995).
15. See CHOPER, supra note 14 (1995).
1997] 1321
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Establishment Clause and its function in our constitutional
scheme?," "Why has the Court continued to adhere to the Lemon
test despite its obvious deficiencies?," "Why has the Court
seemingly been more concerned with symbolism than with
substance?," "Why are the Court's Establishment Clause decisions
so unintelligible and unpredictable?"16
I have a very different view of the Court's Establishment Clause
jurisprudence and its decisions under that jurisprudence. Most of
the academic commentators approach the Establishment Clause
from a truly academic perspective. They search for an underlying
theory of the Establishment Clause that would provide answers to
all Establishment Clause questions within the analytical framework
of that underlying theory and that would produce results consistent
with the premises on which the theory is based. My view of the
Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence is not based on the
search for an underlying theory or on the perceived absence of such
a theory in the Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence. Rather,
my view has been formed by my experience as a constitutional
litigator in litigating and advising on Establishment Clause issues
and in trying to bring this experience to bear in explaining the
Establishment Clause to my students.
I submit that when one looks at the Establishment Clause from
the perspective of constitutional litigation, it is indeed possible to
ascertain what may be referred to as the "law of the Establishment
Clause." The "law of the Establishment Clause" is not at all difficult
to understand or to apply to the resolution of the Establishment
Clause issues that in fact arise in practice. It is the "law of the
Establishment Clause" that is used by litigating lawyers and by the
courts-including the Supreme, Court-to litigate and resolve these
issues.
The purpose of this writing is to explain the nature and
operation of the "law of the Establishment Clause." As will be
16. Above all, "Why does the Court not heed the criticism of the academic
commentators and reformulate its approach to the Establishment Clause along
lines that will be acceptable to the academic commentators?"
1322
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demonstrated, the "law of the Establishment Clause" consists of
four elements. First, there is an overriding principle: the
Establishment Clause commands complete official neutrality
toward religion. Second, there are three operative principles, the
three prongs of the Lemon test. Third, there are a number of
subsidiary doctrines, mostly relating to the application of the
second Lembn "effect of advancing religion" prong. Fourth, and
most importantly in practice, there are the Court's precedents in
what I have identified as the five major areas of Establishment
Clause litigation: (1) religious practices in the public schools; (2)
financial aid or governmental benefits to religion; (3) governmental
action purportedly "advancing religion"; (4) "entanglement" or
governmental interference in religious matters; and (5) preference
for religion or between religions, which includes governmental
action to protect the religious freedom of individuals or
institutions.
The "law of the Establishment Clause" is found in the
Establishment Clause cases decided by the Supreme Court and in
the Court's opinions setting forth its reasons for deciding those
cases as it did. As in other areas of constitutional law, the "law of
the Establishment Clause" has developed in a line of growth
through the process of constitutional litigation.17 Because the
process of constitutional litigation consists of case-by-case
adjudication of specific issues, it is not a process that readily lends
itself to the development of a comprehensive underlying theory or
broad, general propositions. 8  Rather, in its case-by-case
17. See Terrance Sandalow, Constitutional Interpretation, 79 MICH. L. REv.
1033, 1054-55 (1979) (discussing the development of constitutional law in a line
of growth); see also Robert A. Sedler, The Legitimacy Debate in Constitutional
Adudication" An Assessment anda Different Perspective, 44 OHIo ST. L.J. 93, 118-
20 (1983).
18. In their demand that the Supreme Court formulate a comprehensive
underlying theory and promulgate broad, general propositions of constitutional
law, academic commentators may sometimes lose sight of the fact that the
Court's constitutional jurisdiction is limited to deciding the "case or
controversy" before it, and that the Court is supposed to decide constitutional
issues on the "narrowest possible ground." As the Court has stated, a
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adjudication of specific Establishment Clause issues, the Court has
promulgated principles and doctrines and has established
precedents. These principles, doctrines, and precedents are applied
in subsequent cases, where they may undergo some degree of
refinement and modification. The precedents build on each other
and form a "cluster of precedents" in the different Establishment
Clause areas. These "cluster of precedents" are drawn upon
whenever a new issue arises in a particular area; and the precedents,
supplemented when necessary by applicable principles and
doctrines, provide the parameters for the resolution of the new
Establishment Clause issue before the Court.
The "law of the Establishment Clause," as it exists today, has
been developing for almost fifty years.19 During this time, a large
number of specific Establishment Clause issues have been resolved
by the Court, "clusters of precedents" have been created in all of the
major areas of Establishment Clause litigation, and principles and
doctrines have been promulgated, refined, and applied in a number
of contexts. As a result, the "law of the Establishment Clause" may
be considered to be fairly settled, and the new Establishment Clause
issues that arise are litigated and resolved within the analytical
framework of the existing precedents, doctrines, and principles.
I will illustrate this point by discussing two Sixth Circuit cases
that I litigated for the American Civil Liberties Union of Michigan.
Both cases presented Establishment Clause issues that were
ultimately resolved by the Supreme Court in later cases. The first
case, ACLU v. City of Birmingham,0 involved the display of a
constitutional ruling should not be formulated "in broader terms than are
required by the precise facts to which the ruling is to be applied." Rescue Army
v. Municipal Court, 331 U.S. 549, 569 (1947). Thus, in an Establishment Clause
case coming before the Court, the Court's focus is properly on the resolution of
the particular Establishment Clause issue presented rather than on the
formulation of a comprehensive underlying theory or the promulgation of
broad, general principles of Establishment Clause jurisprudence.
19. The Court's modem Establishment Clause jurisprudence is considered
to have begun with Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
20. 791 F.2d 1561 (6th Cir. 1986).
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Nativity Scene on public property during the Christmas holiday
season, and so was the precursor to Allegheny County v. A CLU.21
The second case, Stein v. Plainwell Board of Education,2 involved
prayers at a high school commencement, and so was the precursor
to Lee v. Weisman.23
In Birmingham, the plaintiffs challenged the city of
Birmingham's display of an unadorned nativity scene on the city
hall front lawn.24 While that case was pending before the District
Court, the Supreme Court decided Lynch v. Donnelly, 2 where it
held that the inclusion of a nativity scene display within a larger
display containing a Santa Claus, Christmas trees, toy animals, and
other secular symbols of Christmas, did not violate the
Establishment Clause. Lynch then became the controlling precedent
in Birmingham, and that case was litigated by both sides almost
entirely within the confines of Lynch. In Lynch, Chief Justice
Burger's opinion for the Court emphasized that the Nativity Scene
display occurred only once a year and was an appropriate "public
acknowledgment" of the significance of the Christmas holiday.26 It
was evident that the inclusion of the secular symbols of Christmas
in the display was not important to the Chief Justice and the three
other Justices who unqualifiedly joined in the Burger opinion, and
that these four Justices would have upheld an unadorned nativity
scene display against Establishment Clause challenge.27 However,
21. 492 U.S. 573 (1989).
22. 822 F.2d 1406 (6th Cir. 1987).
23. 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
24. See Birmingham, 791 F.2d at 1561-62.
25. 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
26. See id at 678-85.
27. This was the position of four dissenting Justices in Allegheny County,
including then Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice White, who had joined the
Burger opinion in Lynch. As did the Burger opinion in Lynch, Justice Kennedy's
dissent in Allegheny County argued that there was no Establishment Clause
violation when a governmental body made use of a nativity scene display to
acknowledge the public celebration of the Christmas holiday. See Allegheny
County v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 663-67 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part).
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the inclusion of the secular symbols of Christmas in the display was
crucial to Justice O'Connor, who provided the fifth vote for the
majority. For this reason, the "no endorsement of Christianity"
rationale of her concurrence became the basis of the Court's
holding in Lynch as the narrowest ground of agreement among the
Justices in the majority.28
The litigation in the Birmingham case, therefore, centered
around the application of the "no endorsement of Christianity"
rationale of the O'Connor concurrence in Lynch to Birmingham's
display of the unadorned nativity scene.29 The lawyer for
Birmingham argued that the unadorned nativity scene displayed
during the Christmas season was not an endorsement of
Christianity, but was merely the city's public acknowledgment of
the significance of the Christmas season. This being so, he
contended that under Lynch, the display was constitutionally
permissible." I argued to the contrary, that the nativity scene
standing alone-unlike the inclusion of a nativity scene in a larger
display with the secular symbols of Christmas as in Lynch-did
indeed amount to an endorsement of Christianity, and was
therefore, under the Lynch holding, unconstitutional.3' The District
Judge and two of the three Sixth Circuit judges agreed with my
position. When the identical issue came before the Supreme Court
in Allegheny County, the Court's analysis likewise revolved around
the application of the Lynch holding to the display of an unadorned
nativity scene.32 Five of the Justices took the position that the
28. "When a fragmented Court decides a case and no single rationale
explaining the result enjoys the assent of five Justices, 'the holding of the Court
may be viewed as that position taken by those Members who concurred in the
judgment on the narrowest grounds.'" Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193
(1977) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 n.15 (1976)). It does not
matter that the "narrowest position" is that taken by a single Justice, as per
Justice O'Connor's concurrence in Lynch.
29. See generally Birmingham, 791 F.2d 1561.
30. See id at 1564.
31. See id
32. See id
1326
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unadorned nativity scene was an endorsement of Christianity,33
while four Justices took the position that it was not.s4
This example clearly illustrates how the "law of the
Establishment Clause" operates in actual litigation. First, the
starting point for analysis-by the lawyers, by the lower courts, and
by the Supreme Court itself-is the Supreme Court precedent or
precedents that are most applicable to the resolution of the
particular issue now before the court. Because the issue presented
in Lynch was substantially the same as the issue presented in
Birmingham and Allegheny County, the argument and analysis did
not need to go beyond the application of Lynch. To the extent that
more general principles or doctrines were relevant, it was only as
those principles and doctrines had been applied by the Court in
Lynch. Second, the Sixth Circuit and the Supreme Court decided
only the relatively narrow issue presented in the case. The
precedential effect of the decision would not go much beyond the
constitutional permissibility of governmentally-sponsored displays
of religious symbols." At most, the decision might have some
peripheral relevance to the resolution of other issues in the area of
governmental action purportedly "advancing religion."
The Stein case, like Lee, involved the constitutionality of a once-
a-year prayer at a high school commencement.36 Neither case, it
must be emphasized, raised any question about the constitutionality
of officially sponsored school prayer in other circumstances, such
as the classroom setting. While so-called "voluntary" prayer-usually
meaning officially-sponsored prayer in the classroom setting, from
which objecting students may be excused-is an important political
33. The five Justices were Justice O'Connor and the four Lynch dissenters,
Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens.
34. Those four were Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice White, who were
part of the Lynch majority, and Justices Scalia and Kennedy, who were not on
the Court when Lynch was decided.
35. See infra notes 320-29 and accompanying text (discussing the display of
religious symbol cases).
36. See Stein v. Plainwell Community Schs., 822 F.2d 1406 (1987); Lee v.
Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
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issue, there is no question that under current constitutional
doctrine and precedent, any officially-sponsored prayer in the
classroom setting is unconstitutional. It would still be
unconstitutional even if the Supreme Court had upheld the
constitutionality of prayer at high school commencement in Lee. In
Stein and Lee, the lawyers for the school board argued that prayer
at commencement was very different from prayer in the
classroom.38 They argued that while under the Court's precedents,
prayer in the classroom was deemed to have the effect of
"advancing religion," and as a result was unconstitutional, prayer at
commencement had the secular effect of solemnizing a formal
occasion and, therefore, was constitutionally permissible.39 The
lawyers for the plaintiffs argued that "prayer was prayer," and that
all officially-sponsored prayer, whether in the classroom or at
commencement, had the effect of "advancing religion" and was
unconstitutional.'
The issue presented in Stein and Lee, like the issue presented in
Birmingham and Allegheny County, was a relatively narrow one: did
prayer at a high school commencement have the constitutionally
permissible secular effect of solemnizing a formal occasion, or did
it have the constitutionally impermissible effect of "advancing
religion"?41 The resolution of that issue depended in no small part
on the Court's evaluation of the particular circumstances
surrounding the saying of prayers at a high school commencement
and the impact of the prayer on the audience. It was obviously a
close question, and the Court divided five-four in its resolution. 2
The point that I want to emphasize is that the case was about
prayer at commencement, not about school prayer in any other
context, and the resolution of that issue depended on the
application of the Court's precedents and settled doctrine to the
37. See Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
38. See Stein, 822 F.2d at 1408; Lee, 505 U.S. at 595.
39. See Stein, 822 F.2d at 1407-08; Lee, 505 U.S. at 588-89.
40. See Stein, 822 F.2d at 1408; Lee, 505 U.S. at 590-93.
41. See Stein, 822 F.2d at 1407; Lee, 505 U.S. at 580.
42. See Lee, 505 U.S. at 579.
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facts surrounding this kind of prayer.
The litigation perspective that I have tried to bring to the
Court's decisions in Allegheny County and Lee may be helpful in
understanding all of the Court's Establishment Clause decisions in
recent years. I will illustrate this point by a consideration of the
four Establishment Clause cases decided by the Court after Lee in
the years 1993-1995.' 3 The issues presented in these cases were also
relatively narrow issues, and their resolution, like the resolution of
the issues presented in Allegheny County and Lee, depended on the
Court's application of its precedents and settled doctrine to the facts
of the particular case. Among most members of the Court, there
appeared to be no disposition to question the soundness of those
precedents and doctrines or to cast about for "new doctrine" or for
a broad underlying theory of the meaning of the Establishment
Clause and its function in our constitutional scheme.
In the first of these cases, Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School
District,44 the Court held, five-four, that a school district which
provided sign-language interpreters for hearing-impaired students
in its schools was not precluded by the Establishment Clause from
43. The Court did not decide any Establishment Clause cases during its 1995
Term. In the Court's 1996 Term, the Court decided an important Establishment
Clause case involving the constitutional permissibility of governmental aid to
students attending parochial schools. Agostini v. Felton, 117 S. Ct. 1997 (1997).
Although this article had been substantially completed some considerable time
before Agostini was decided, I have incorporated a discussion of that decision
into the relevant portions of this Article. Although, as will be discussed, the
Court in Agostini overruled two prior decisions involving governmental aid to
students attending parochial schools, the Court emphasized that those decisions
had been eroded by subsequent decisions and were "inconsistent with [the
Court's] current understanding of the Establishment Clause." Id at 2017. The
issue in Agostini-whether Title I remedial services could be provided by public
school employees to parochial students in parochial school classrooms-was
resolved within the parameters of settled Establishment Clause principles,
doctrines, and precedents, notwithstanding that the Court concluded that two
earlier precedents were inconsistent with subsequent precedents and with the
application of relevant Establishment Clause principles and doctrines in the later
cases.
44. 509 U.S. 1 (1993).
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providing a sign-language interpreter for a hearing-impaired student
who transferred to a parochial school.45 The issue in that case
involved the application of a doctrine, first promulgated in Everson
v. Board of Education,' that while the Establishment Clause
generally precludes the state from providing financial assistance to
parochial schools, it permits the state to provide certain benefits
that it provides to children attending public schools to children
attending parochial schools.4' The application of that doctrine in
Zobrest interacted with another doctrine, that the government may
not act in such a way as to create a symbolic union between
government and religion. Applying the latter doctrine, the Court
had previously held that a school board may not provide remedial
services to parochial school students in parochial school
classrooms.4" In Zobrest, the majority took the position that the
presence of a school board-supplied interpreter for the hearing-
impaired student in the parochial school classroom did not create
a symbolic union between government and religion.49 The
dissenters took the opposite position. Again, in light of applicable
doctrine and precedent, the issue presented in Zobrest was a close
one, and the members of the Court disagreed on the application of
that doctrine and precedent to the resolution of this issue. And
again, the issue was a narrow one, and the precedential effect of the
Court's holding in the case is relatively limited.
In Board of Education of Kiryas Joel Village School District v.
Grumet,5 0 the Court was faced with a highly unusual situation in
which the state created a school district embracing only the
boundaries of a specific religious community. The state's purpose
in creating this district was to enable the district to provide
45. See id. at 13-14.
46. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
47. See Zobrest, 509 U.S. at 8.
48. See Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985). Aguilar was subsequently
overruled. See supra note 43.
49. See Zobrest, 509 U.S. at 13.
50. 512 U.S. 687 (1994).
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remedial education for the children of the religious community."M
These children attended sectarian schools operated by the
community, and the community had objected to their being
required to receive remedial education in a public school district.52
While different members of the Court majority were not in full
agreement as to why the creation of the school district violated the
Establishment Clause, the common thread running through the
various opinions was that the state's action had the purpose and
effect of benefiting the religious community. 3 The dissenting
Justices saw this as a constitutionally permissible effort to
accommodate the religious needs of the children living in the
district.14
Capitol Square Review and Advisory Board v. Pinette5 and
Rosenberger v. University of Virginia56 both involved the question
of whether the government's exclusion of religiously-based private
speech from a benefit provided to other similarly-situated private
speech could be justified by a need to comply with the
Establishment Clause. If the government's inclusion of religiously-
based private speech in the granting of a benefit provided to other
similarly-situated private speech did not violate the Establishment
Clause, then the exclusion of such speech would in turn violate the
First Amendment's free speech guarantee. In both cases the Court
held that the inclusion of religiously-based private speech and the
benefit provided to other similarly-situated private speech did not
violate the Establishment Clause. 7
In Capitol Square, the state of Ohio had dedicated Capitol
Square, the statehouse plaza, as a public forum. 8 The Ku Klux Klan
sought to display a Latin Cross in Capitol Square during the
51. Seeid at 693.
52. See id at 692.
53. See id at 702-05, 716-18 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
54. See id at 743-48.
55. 515 U.S. 753 (1995).
56. 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
57. See Capitol Square, 515 U.S. at 770; Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 845-46.
58. See Capitol Square, 515 U.S. at 757.
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Christmas holiday season." The state denied the request on the
ground that to allow the display would be violative of the
Establishment Clause; this was the only question before the
Supreme Court in Capitol Square.' The Court held, seven-two, that
allowing the display would not violate the Establishment Clause,
and this being so, the First Amendment's equal access principle
required the state to allow the display.6' However, the rationale of
the four Justice plurality-Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices Kennedy and Thomas-differed considerably
from that of Justices Souter, O'Connor, and Breyer, who joined to
form the majority.62 The two dissenting Justices, Justices Stevens
and Ginsburg, agreed with Justices Souter, O'Connor, and Breyer
on the rationale but disagreed with their application of that
rationale to the facts of the case. 3
Approaching this case from the perspective of constitutional
litigation, we start off with the applicable precedents. One
precedent was Allegheny County, where, as discussed previously, the
Court held that the display of an unadorned nativity scene on
public property violated the Establishment Clause because it had
the effect of "advancing religion." 64 In determining whether the
display had the effect of "advancing religion" in Allegheny County,
the Court majority invoked what I refer to as a subsidiary
Establishment Clause doctrine: when a governmental practice has
the effect of endorsing religion over non-religion or creating a
symbolic union between government and religion, that practice has
the effect of "advancing religion" and so is unconstitutional. The
majority concluded that the display of an unadorned nativity scene
on public property had the effect of endorsing Christianity and so
had the constitutionally impermissible effect of "advancing
59. See id at 758.
60. See id at 759-60.
61. See id at 770.
62. See id at 757-94.
63. See id at 797-818.
64. See generally Allegheny County v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989).
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religion.""5 Another set of precedents involved the access of
religiously-based speech to the public forum. In these cases,
involving a public university and public schools, the Court had
held that allowing religiously-based speech equal access to these
public forums did not amount to endorsement of religion over non-
religion and so did not have the constitutionally impermissible
effect of "advancing religion."6"
The lawyer for the Ku Klux Klan invoked the equal access line
of cases to support the argument that the state did not violate the
Establishment Clause by allowing the Ku Klux Klan to display the
Latin Cross in Capital Square during the Christmas holiday
season.Y The lawyer for the state distinguished that line of cases by
invoking Allegheny County and arguing that a display of a religious
symbol on public property, even by a private organization, would
have the effect of endorsing religion because the display would be
perceived by an "objective observer" as being state-sponsored.
In the three separate opinions that were filed in this case, all of
the Justices approached the resolution of the issue with reference to
the Allegheny County precedent and the equal access precedents.
That is, all of the Justices agreed that if the effect of the state's
allowing the display was an endorsement of Christianity, the state
could not allow it. What they disagreed about was the proper
method for determining whether the state allowing the display had
this constitutionally impermissible effect. The four Justices joining
the Scalia plurality opinion disagreed with the three other Justices
making up the majority and the two dissenters. The Scalia plurality
rejected the "perception of an objective observer" test, insisting
instead that so long as the display was sponsored by a private entity
65. See id at 598-602.
66. See Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S.
384 (1993); Board of Educ. of Westside Community Schs. v. Mergens, 496 U.S.
226 (1990); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
67. See Qpitol Square, 515 U.S. at 759-60.
68. See ia at 764-65. In Allegheny County, the Court majority had defined
"endorsement" with reference to the perception of an objective observer. See
Allegheny County, 492 U.S. at 593-97.
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and took place in a public forum open to all on equal terms, there
could be no governmental endorsement of religion.69 The other five
Justices continued to adhere to the "perception of an objective
observer" test,70 and so this test remains as the test to be applied to
determine whether a particular display on governmental property
has the constitutionally impermissible effect of endorsing religion.
Applying that test, Justices O'Connor, Souter, and Breyer
concluded that the particular display did not have the effect of
endorsing Christianity,1 while Justices Stevens and Ginsburg
concluded that it did.72 Thus, seven Justices ended up taking the
position that the city allowing the particular display to take place
on public property did not have the effect of endorsing
Christianity, and so was constitutionally permissible.
In Rosenberger, the University of Virginia authorized payments
from the Student Activities Fund, supported by student fees, to
contractors outside of the University to subsidize publication
printing costs incurred by a variety of student groups.'3 It refused
to authorize payment for the printing costs of a religiously-oriented
student publication on the ground that to do so would violate the
Establishment Clause.74 The lawyer for the student publication
invoked the equal access line of cases, arguing that there was no
difference between a public university permitting a religiously-
oriented student organizatioft to use university facilities7' and a
public university paying the printing costs of a religiously oriented
student publication.76 The lawyer for the university argued that the
state's use of public funds to pay for the printing of a religiously-
69. See Capitol Square, 515 U.S. at 763-69.
70. See id at 773-78 (O'Connor, J., concurring), 785-92 (Souter, J.,
concurring).
71. See id at 772-83 (O'Connor, J., concurring), 783-94 (Souter, J.,
concurring).
72. See id at 797-815 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
73. See Rosenberger v. University of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819, 822-23 (1995).
74. See id
75. See id This had been upheld against the Establishment Clause challenge
in Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
76. See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 827-28.
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oriented student publication was impermissible under the long line
of precedents prohibiting the use of public funds for religious
purposes' 7 '
In a five-four decision, the Court held that the university's
payment of the printing costs of a religiously-oriented student
publication, along with the printing costs of other student
publications, did not violate the Establishment Clause.7 This being
so, the university's refusal to pay the printing costs of the
religiously-oriented student publication violated the First
Amendment's equal access principle. 9 The Court's opinion,
authored by Justice Kennedy and joined in by Chief Justice
Rehnquist, Justice O'Connor, Justice Scalia, and Justice Thomas,
took the position that the governmental program here was neutral
toward religion, in that the program was for the benefit of all
student publications.8' According to Justice Kennedy, "The
neutrality of the program distinguishes the student fees from a tax
levied for the direct support of a church or group of churches.""
Justice Kennedy went on to say that just as it does not violate the
Establishment Clause for a public university to grant access to its
facilities on a religion-neutral basis to a wide spectrum of student
groups, including those that use the facilities for religious purposes,
it does not violate the Establishment Clause for the university to
pay outside printers to print student publications, including those
which are religiously-oriented. The dissent, authored by Justice
Souter and joined in by Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer,
77. See id. at 831-37. The case was argued by two law professors, Professor
Michael W. McConnell of the University of Chicago for the plaintiffs, and
Professor John C. Jeffries, Jr., of the University of Virginia for the university.
The Fourth Circuit had held that while the university had discriminated against
religious speech on the basis of its content, the discrimination was justified by
the "compelling interest in maintaining strict separation of church and state." Id
at 828.
78. See id at 842-46.
79. See id at 835.
80. See id at 840-41.
81. Id at 840.
82. See id at 842-46.
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contended that the Establishment Clause prohibited a public
university from paying for the printing of any religious message,
and that the impermissibility of this form of aid to religion was not
obviated by the fact that the message was that of a student group
and that the university paid for the printing of non-religious
messages by other student groups. 3
Most relevant to my thesis of understanding the Establishment
Clause from the perspective of constitutional litigation is the
concurring opinion of Justice O'Connor.' Injustice O'Connor's
view, this was a "hard case" because "it lies at the intersection of the
principle of government neutrality and the prohibition on state
funding of religious activities.""5 As she further explained:
When two bedrock principles so conflict,
understandably neither can provide the definitive answer.
Reliance on categorical platitudes is unavailing. Resolution
instead depends on the hard task of judging-sifting through
the details and determining whether the challenged program
offends the Establishment Clause. Such judgment requires
courts to draw lines, sometimes quite fine, based on the
particular facts of each case."
Looking to the particular facts of this case, Justice O'Connor
upheld the payment of funds to outside printers on the grounds
that (1) the student organization was completely separate from the
university, (2) the funds were paid directly to the outside printer
and so could only be used for printing the publication, and (3) there
could be no perception of governmental endorsement of the
publication's religious message, as fifteen other publications were
supported by the university in the same manner.u' Thus, she
concluded that there was no danger in this case of an impermissible
83. See id at 876-99.
84. See id at 846-52.
85. Id at 847.
86. Id
87. See id at 846-52.
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use of public funds to endorse the publication's religious message."
My point here is that the Court's four recent Establishment
Clause cases demonstrate how Establishment Clause cases are
litigated and resolved within the parameters of settled
Establishment Clause principles, doctrines, and precedents. The
issues in these cases were relatively narrow, and as the O'Connor
concurrence in Rosenberger makes clear, their resolution depended
to some degree on the precise facts of the particular case. It is
obvious that there is sharp disagreement among some members of
the current Court in Establishment Clause cases. Looking to their
votes and their opinions, Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia
and Thomas may be said to have an "accommodationist" agenda 9
and tend to reject Establishment Clause challenges. At the other
end of the spectrum, Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer
may be said to have a "separationist" agenda and tend to uphold
Establishment Clause challenges. Here, as in a number of other
areas of constitutional law, Justices O'Connor and Kennedy appear
to be the "swing" Justices, and except for Allegheny County, have
voted together in every recent Establishment Clause case to make
up the Court majority upholding or rejecting the particular
Establishment Clause challenge.91
88. See id. at 848-52.
89. See generally supra note 2.
90. See id
91. Justice O'Connor provided the fifth vote for upholding the
Establishment Clause challenge in Allegheny County, while Justice Kennedy
dissented in that case. Both were a part of the five-four majority upholding the
Establishment Clause challenge in Lee and rejecting the Establishment Clause
challenge in Zobrest and Rosenberger. They also voted together to form a part of
the Court majority that upheld the Establishment Clause challenge in KiryasJoel
and rejected it in Capitol Square. In the Court's most recent Establishment Clause
case, Agostini v. Felton, 117 S. Ct. 1997 (1997), Justice O'Connor and Justice
Kennedy, in an opinion by Justice O'Connor, joined Chief Justice Rehnquist
and Justices Scalia and Thomas to hold that the Establishment Clause did not
prohibit the state from using public school employees to provide Title I remedial
services to parochial school students in parochial school classrooms. See id. at
2016. Justices Souter, Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer dissented.
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However, the apparent conflict between the
"accommodationist" and "separationist" wings of the Court, with
Justices O'Connor and Kennedy casting the "swing" votes, has been
played out within the parameters of settled Establishment Clause
principles, doctrines, and precedents. The "accommodationists"
tend to apply the principles, doctrines, and precedents in such a
way as to lead to the rejection of the Establishment Clause
challenge in the particular case, while the "separationists" tend to
apply them in such a way as to lead to the upholding of the
Establishment Clause challenge. Justices O'Connor and Kennedy
tend to apply them in a more "balanced" way, putting more
emphasis on the facts of the particular case. But all of the Justices are
utilizing the same tools. And it is these tools that are utilized by the
lower courts in deciding the great run of Establishment Clause cases
that never reach the Supreme Court."
II. TBE STRUCTURE OF THE "LAW OF THE ESTABLISHMENT
CLAUSE"
As stated at the outset, there are four components to the law of
the Establishment Clause: (1) an overriding principle; (2) three
operational principles; (3) a number of subsidiary doctrines; and (4)
the Court's precedents in the five major areas of Establishment
Clause litigation.
A. The Overriding Principle: Complete Official Neutrality
The overriding principle of the Establishment Clause is that the
Establishment Clause commands complete official neutrality
92. The fact that the cases coming before the Supreme Court are seemingly
difficult for the Court to resolve should not obscure the fact that the great run
of Establishment Clause cases, which end up being decided by the federal courts
of appeal and the state courts, are much easier for those courts to resolve. This
is because those cases are less likely to involve the application of conflicting lines
of authority, so to speak, and are more likely to be controlled by the Supreme
,Court's precedents in the five major areas of Establishment Clause litigation.
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toward religion. The government cannot favor religion over non-
religion, and it cannot favor one religion over another. 3 The
overriding principle of complete official neutrality toward religion
has replaced the earlier concept of the Establishment Clause as
creating a "wall of separation between church and state." 94 The
problems with the "wall of separation" concept were pointed out
by Justice Douglas in Zorach v. Clauson? Justice Douglas noted
that while the First Amendment "reflects the philosophy that
Church and State should be separated," "[it] does not say that in
every and all respects there shall be a separation of Church and
State."96 Rather, "it studiously defines the manner, the specific
ways, in which there shall be no concert or union or dependency
one on the other."'7 The neutrality principle furthers the
"philosophy of separation," 98 by precluding the government from
favoring religion, but at the same time, it does not require the
government to be hostile to religion.99 Because the Establishment
Clause does not require the government to be hostile to religion,
the government can include religious institutions in the services it
provides to the public generally, such as police and fire
93. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 60 (1981).
94. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947) (quoting Reynolds v.
United States, 98 U.S. 146, 164 (1878)). In Everson, the first modem
Establishment Clause case, Justice Black, writing for the Court, stated, "In the
words of Jefferson, the clause against establishment of religion by law was
intended to erect a 'wall of separation' between church and State." Id at 16
(quoting Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 164).
95. 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
96. Id at 312.
97. Ia
98. The Court emphasized the "philosophy of separation" in Engel v. Vitale,
370 U.S. 421 (1962), when it noted that "a union of government and religion
tends to destroy government and degrade religion." Id at 431.
99. As the Court noted in Everson: "[The First] Amendment requires the
state to be a neutral in its relations with groups of religious believers and non-
believers; it does not require the state to be their adversary. State power is no
more to be used to handicap religions than it is to favor them." Everson, 330 U.S.
at 18.
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protection;' °° and likewise, the government can include religious
institutions among recipients of governmental funding to provide
secular services."0 In addition, as we have seen in our discussion of
Capitol Square and Rosenberger, the Court has also held that the
principle of complete official neutrality is not necessarily breached
when the government provides religious organizations with equal
access to governmental facilities, such as access to a public forum. 2
This being so, when the provision of equal access for religious
organizations to a public forum does not violate the Establishment
Clause, such equal access is required by the First Amendment's
equal access principle. 3
The overriding principle of complete official neutrality toward
religion is as close as the Court is likely to come in formulating an
underlying theory as to the meaning of the Establishment Clause
and its function in our constitutional system. In view of this
overriding principle, the Court has in effect said that the function
of the Establishment Clause in our constitutional system is to
promote complete official neutrality toward religion. In theory, the
constitutionality of any governmental action involving religion
depends on whether or not that action is consistent with this
overriding principle.' ° This overriding principle, of course, does
100. As Professor Laycock has noted, police and fire protection are such a
universal part of our lives that they have become part of the baseline, and to
deny them to churches would "put religion outside the protection of the law."
Douglas Laycock, Formal, Substantive, and Disaggregated Neutrality Toward
Religion, 39 DEPAUL L. REV. 993, 1005 (1990).
101. See, e.g., Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589 (1988) (adolescent
counseling); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971) (college-level secular
education); Bradfeld v. Roberts, 175 U.S. 291 (1899) (hospitals).
102. See Capitol Square Review and Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753
(1995), supra text accompanying notes 58-72; Rosenberger v. University of
Virginia, 515 U.S. 819 (1995), supra text accompanying notes 73-88.
103. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
104. The overriding principle of complete official neutrality toward religion
means that "religious belief and practice are insulated even from government
persuasion." Douglas Laycock, The Benefits of the Establishment Clause, 42
DEPAuLL. REv. 373, 373 (1992). Professor Laycock goes on to observe that "[i]n
terms of history, in terms of comparative law, and in terms of what the rest of
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not provide much guidance in determining whether or not a
particular governmental practice involving religion violates the
Establishment Clause. This is the function of the other components
of the "law of the Establishment Clause." Nonetheless, the
development and application of the other components of the "law
of the Establishment Clause" are informed by the overriding
principle of complete official neutrality toward religion."'5
the world does, the Establishment Clause is an extraordinary protection." Id. at
379.
However, the principle of complete official neutrality is not breached when,
so to speak, "religion tries to persuade government." Again, as Professor Laycock
notes,
Questions of morality, of right conduct, of proper treatment of our
fellow humans, are questions to which both church and state have
historically spoken. They are questions within the jurisdiction of both.
In a democratic society, the state will ultimately decide these questions
at least to the extent of deciding what conduct will be subject to legal
sanctions. But these are also questions on which churches are absolutely
entitled to speak.
Id. at 381.
Therefore, a constitutional objection to a law, such as a prohibition on
abortion or sodomy, cannot be made simply because the law is grounded on and
serves to implement religious principles. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186
(1986); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980). In this vein, Professor Marshall has
argued that the search for truth is a fundamental value of the religion clauses and,
this being so, "there is value in religious ideas similar to that found in
nonreligious ideas." William P. Marshall, Truth and the Religion Clauses, 43
DEPAUL L. REV. 243, 266 (1994). As he states, "If there are to be limitations on
the role of religion in the public sphere, those restrictions must be based on
something other than the substance of religious ideas." Id at 267. Likewise, as
Professor Garvey notes that not only does the Establishment Clause not forbid
"public officials to act on beliefs that [have] religious origins," "but... the Free
Exercise clause positively encourages it." John H. Garvey, The Pope's Submarine,
30 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 849, 872 (1993). And as most people rely on authority to
decide moral questions, "there is no reason to disqualify religious authorities."
Id at 876. See also, John H. Garvey, A Comment on Religious Convictions and
Lawmaking, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1288 (1986).
105. There has been considerable academic discussion about the meaning of
"neutrality." In an important article on the subject, Professor Douglas Laycock
draws a distinction between what he calls "formal neutrality" and "substantive
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neutrality." He maintains that "substantive neutrality" is more consistent with
religious liberty than "formal neutrality," so that the overriding principle of
complete official neutrality toward religion should mean "substantive" rather
than "formal" neutrality. See Laycock, supra note 100, at 1011-18. He defines
"substantive" neutrality as meaning that "the religion clauses require government
to minimize the extent to which it either encourages or discourages religious
belief or disbelief, practice or non-practice, observance or nonobservance." Id. at
1001. Under "substantive" neutrality, the government may make certain
exemptions from laws of general applicability for religious practices, such as the
exemption for sacramental wine during Prohibition. (He would say that such an
exemption is required by the Free Exercise Clause.) See id. at 1003. Laycock
criticizes the Court's decision in Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985), as being
inconsistent with "substantive" neutrality. There the Court held that the state
providing remedial instruction for parochial school students in the school itself
violated the Establishment Clause because it created an impermissible "symbolic
union" between church and state. See id. at 414. Laycock says that the result in
Aguilar is inconsistent with "substantive" neutrality because the state was
providing the same remedial instruction to parochial school children as it was
providing to public school children, and the effect of the Court's decision was
to increase the cost of providing remedial education to parochial school children
and so, possibly, to reduce the number of parochial school children receiving the
benefit. See Laycock, supra note 100, at 1007-8. The Supreme Court has now in
effect accepted Professor Laycock's view of substantive neutrality in this context
by overruling Aguilar in Agostini and, in so doing, emphasizing, as Professor
Laycock has done, that the state was providing the same remedial instruction to
parochial school children as it was providing to public school children. See
Agostini v. Felton, 117 S. Ct. 1997, 2014 (1997). The Court was also very
concerned about the increased cost of providing remedial education for parochial
school students and the impact of the increased cost on the children receiving the
benefit. See id. at 2005-06.
However, even though the result in Agostini may see the Court
demonstrating a more consistent understanding of "neutrality" as Professor
Laycock sees it, in neither Agostini nor in Aguilar did the Court use the
overriding neutrality principle as the analytical basis for deciding the issue before
it. Instead, as we have said, the Court relies on the other components of the
Establishment Clause to determine whether a particular governmental practice
is consistent with this underlying principle. In both cases, the Court was
applying the Lemon operative principles and specific doctrines, such as symbolic
union, that the Court uses to inform its application of those principles. It merely
reached a different conclusion in its application of those principles and doctrines
in Agostini than it did in Aguilar. As the Court stated in Agostini,
To be sure, the general principles we use to evaluate whether
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B The Operational Principles: The Lemon Test
We now turn to the much-criticized Lemon test. Under the
Lemon test, in order for governmental action to be upheld under
the Establishment Clause, (1) the action must have a secular
legislative purpose, (2) its principal or primary effect may be neither
to advance nor inhibit religion, and (3) it may not foster "excessive
government entanglement with religion."'0 6 From the perspective
of constitutional litigation, the Lemon test is best understood as
comprising three operational principles reflecting "the cumulative
criteria developed by the Court over many years." 07 When
understood from this perspective, the Lemon test is not a talismanic
test or even a comprehensive mode of analysis that by itself can be
used to resolve all Establishment Clause issues arising in practice.
The Lemon test simply sets forth three operational principles,
which serve as a point of departure for Establishment Clause
analysis. In Establishment Clause litigation, the application of the
Lemon principles (as we shall now refer to them) incorporates the
subsidiary doctrines that have emerged from the Court's decisions
in the major areas of Establishment Clause litigation.108 The
government aid violates the Establishment Clause have not changed
since Aguilar was decided. ... What has changed since we decided Ball
and Aguilar is our understanding of the criteria used to assess whether
aid to religion has an impermissible effect.
Id. at 2010.
Similarly, the exemption for sacramental wine during Prohibition does not
violate the Establishment Clause. This is because, as will be discussed
subsequently, an exemption from a law of general applicability that is precisely
tailored to protect the religious freedom of individuals and religious institutions
is not considered to have the effect of advancing religion and so does not violate
the Establishment Clause.
106. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971).
107. Id at 612. Professor Van Alstyne says that the first two Lemon prongs
were taken from School District v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963), and that the
third prong was taken from Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U.S. 664 (1970). See
William Van Alstyne, What Is "An Establishment ofReligion"? 65 N.C. L. REV.
909, 909 n.2 (1987).
108. In every post-Lemon case, save one, the Court has expressly (although
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widespread academic dissatisfaction with the Lemon test, in my
opinion, results from the failure of most academic commentators
to understand or accept the limited scope of the test in actual
litigation. In litigation the test does nothing more than set forth
three operational principles that interact with subsidiary doctrines
and precedents to provide the parameters for the resolution of the
particular Establishment Clause issue before the Court.0 9
with some disagreement by particular Justices) applied the Lemon test to the
resolution of the Establishment Clause issue before it. The sole and glaring
exception is Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983), where the Court employed
a strictly historical "framers' intent" interpretation and concluded that the
framers did not intend that the Establishment Clause prohibit legislative prayer.
The Court's aberrational "framers' intent" interpretation of the Establishment
Clause in Marsh means that Marsh will have little if any extendibility as a
precedent. See, e.g., North Carolina Civil Liberties Union Legal Found. v.
Constangy, 947 F.2d 1145 (4th Cir. 1991) (distinguishing legislative prayer from
courtroom prayer and holding that a judge opening the court with prayer
violated the Establishment Clause).
109. One of the few academic commentators who sees utility in the Lemon
test is Professor Daniel 0. Conkle, who states as follows:
Whatever-its precise formulation, the essence of Lemon is a context-
specific inquiry that requires the exercise of judgment. The Court must
examine the government's purpose and the effect of its action, as well
as the resulting relationship between religion and government. It must
consider the degree to which the government is engaged in favoring or
endorsing particular religious beliefs and the degree to which this action
might harm religious or irreligious minorities. Lemon does not provide
a categorical, bright line rule. Through its applications of Lemon, of
course, the Supreme Court creates precedents that control the
resolution of particular questions, thereby giving context-specific
guidance to lower courts and to other governmental officials. But
Lemon itself provides no more than a general standard or "helpful
signpost," for evaluating Establishment Clause challenges.
Daniel 0. Conkle, Lemon Lives, 43 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 865, 870 (1993).
In a recent article, Professor Kent Greenawalt contends that the Court has
now abandoned the Lemon test as a "constitutional test," that is, as a "standard
of adjudication that is used by courts to determine whether a practice is
constitutional or unconstitutional." Kent Greenawalt, Quo Vadis: The Status and
Prospects of "Tests" Under the Religion Clauses, 1995 SUP. CT. REV. 323, 328.
Professor Greenawalt goes on to say that courts and lawyers should now,
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1. The "Religious Purpose" Principle
Under the "religious purpose" principle, any governmental
action taken solely for the purpose of advancing religion is
unconstitutional. Whenever the government takes action solely for
the purpose of advancing religion, the existence of this improper
purpose alone renders the governmental action unconstitutional.1
Thus in Wallace v. Jaffree,"' a "moment of silence" law that was
found to have been adopted for the purpose of encouraging school
prayer was unconstitutional, even though a "moment of silence"
law, not found to have been adopted for this purpose, would be
constitutionally permissible."'
It will be a rare case, however, where the "religious purpose"
principle will control the outcome of an Establishment Clause
challenge. This is because whenever a governmental action has been
undertaken for a religious purpose, it will usually also have the
effect of advancing religion, and so will be unconstitutional under
the second Lemon principle. Insofar as the "religious purpose"
instead, "focus on narrower principles relevant for particular circumstances,
drawing these principles partly from the very Supreme Court cases decided
under the Lemon test." Id. at 361. My position is that the Court never applied the
Lemon test as a "constitutional test" in the sense that Professor Greenawalt is
using that term, and that the results in Establishment Clause cases depended on
the Court's application of the "principles and precedents" of which Professor
Greenawalt speaks.
110. See the discussion of this point in Wallace v. Jafflee, 472 U.S. 38, 56
(1985).
111. 472 U.S. 38 (1985).
112. See Gary J. Simson, The Establishment Clause in the Supreme Court:
Rethinking the Court'sApproach, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 905, 909 (1987). Professor
Simson notes that this principle is defensible insofar as it recognizes that a law
adopted for a purpose inconsistent with the Establishment Clause should be
struck down, even though the law would be unassailable if adopted for valid
reasons. See also Ira C. Lupu, Which Old Witch?A Comment on ProfessorPaulsen's
Lemon Is Dead, 43 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 883, 886 (1993). Professor Lupu says
that the principle is nothing more than a particularization of the general
obligation that legislation be designed to pursue constitutionally permissible
ends.
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principle has surfaced in cases other than Wallace v. Jaffree, it has
been primarily to counter the state's contention that the challenged
governmental action had a religiously neutral effect."' From the
standpoint of the litigating lawyer mounting an Establishment
Clause challenge, there is no utility in undertaking the burdensome
task of proving "religious purpose" when the challenge will succeed
by making a showing of "religious effect." In practice then, the first
Lemon principle will be invoked only in a rare case such as Wallace
v. Jaffree, where the challenged governmental action, divorced from
its "religious purpose," would not have the constitutionally
impermissible effect of "advancing religion."
2. The "Advancing Religion"Principle
The second Lemon principle is that governmental action with
the primary effect of advancing or inhibiting religion is
113. Thus, in Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968), the historical context
of the enactment of the Arkansas anti-evolution law belied the contention that
the law had the effect of advancing religiously neutral educational objectives. The
Court noted, "It is clear that fundamentalist sectarian conviction was and is the
law's reason for existence." Id at 107-08. Likewise, in Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S.
39 (1980) (per curiam), the state tried to justify the required posting of the Ten
Commandments in public school classrooms on the ground that the Ten
Commandments were the basis of the legal code of western civilization and the
American common law. The Court rejected this proffered justification as
pretextual. In the same vein, in Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987), the
clear religious purpose behind the enactment of Louisiana's law requiring that
"creation science" be taught along with evolution rendered pretextual the
contention that the law had the effect of promoting "academic freedom."
These cases, along with Wallace v. Jaffree, are discussed in Abner S. Greene,
The Political Balance of the Religion Clauses, 102 YALE LJ. 1611 (1993). Professor
Greene says that these cases stand for the following proposition: "For a law to
be upheld against an Establishment Clause challenge, the law's dominant express
purpose must be secular, and any expressly religious purpose for the law must
be no more than ancillary and not itself dominant." Id at 1624. While this
statement is accurate, the fact remains that if the law's dominant express purpose
is secular, but the law has the effect of advancing religion, it will be held
unconstitutional under the second Lemon "advancing religion" principle.
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unconstitutional. Where governmental action has this effect, the
government has, whether it intended to do so or not, violated the
overriding principle that the Establishment Clause commands
complete official neutrality toward religion. The "advancing
religion" principle represents the Court's value judgment in favor
of an expansive interpretation of the Establishment Clause and to
this extent, may be seen as promoting a "separationist" agenda.
In a number of contexts, the matter of a "purpose" test versus
an "effects" test is of crucial importance in determining the scope of
a particular constitutional provision. For example, the Court has
used an "effects" test to determine the constitutionality of state
regulation and taxation of interstate commerce. By holding that the
negative aspect of the Commerce Clause invalidates state regulatory
and tax laws that have" a "discriminatory effect" on interstate
commerce, without regard to a showing of "discriminatory
purpose," the Court has made negative Commerce Clause
challenges fairly easy to sustain and, in so doing, has gone a long
way in preventing any form of "state protectionism. " 114 On the
other hand, the Court has held that laws that advance a racially
neutral purpose are not subject to constitutional challenge on the
ground that they have a "racially discriminatory" effect. By so
holding, the Court has severely limited the circumstances in which
racial minorities can mount a successful constitutional challenge to
laws and governmental actions that have the foreseeable effect of
disadvantaging racial minorities.1 '
Under the "advancing or inhibiting religion" principle, any
governmental involvement with religion is readily subject to
constitutional challenge on the ground that it has a constitutionally
impermissible "religious" effect. The government's demonstration
of a secular purpose for its action, which is not at all difficult for
114. See generally Robert A. Sedler, The Negative Commerce Clause as a
Restriction on State Regulation and Taxation: An Analysis in Terms of
Constitutional Structure, 31 WAYNE L. REV. 885, 895-912 (1985).
115. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976); Robert A. Sedler, The
Constitution and the Consequences of the Social History ofRacism, 40 ARK. L. REV.
677, 687-96 (1987).
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the government to satisfy, thus becomes completely irrelevant.
Stated simply, by adopting an "effects" test for Establishment
Clause challenges, the Court has come down strongly on the side
of "separation," and this is reflected in the large number of decisions
invalidating governmental involvements with religion under the
Establishment Clause.
However, the "advancing or inhibiting religion" principle,
standing alone, is very difficult to apply in a dispositive way to
resolve most Establishment Clause issues. Most governmental
involvements with religion have the effect of "advancing or
inhibiting religion" to some degree. Some involvements, such as
school prayer or bible reading, appear not to have any other
significant effect. But many governmental involvements with
religion also advance some secular objective as well and, thus, will
have a "secular effect" in addition to the "religious effect." The
classic example of a "dual effect" is governmental financial aid to
parochial schools. Such aid has the effect of "advancing religion"
because it supports the religious side of parochial school education.
However, it also has the secular effect of "advancing education," as
it supports the secular side of parochial school education as well and
relieves the public schools from the obligation of educating
parochial school children. In this situation, it is not possible to say
which effect is "primary." Government financial aid to the
parochial schools advances both effects in equal measure.
Because this is so, in applying the "advancing or inhibiting
religion" principle, the Court necessarily has had to develop
subsidiary doctrines that assist in determining whether a particular
governmental involvement has the effect of "advancing or
inhibiting religion." The Court's determination is also influenced
by the Court's precedents in the different areas of Establishment
Clause litigation. While the court expressly applies the "advancing
or inhibiting religion" principle in many Establishment Clause
cases, in only a limited number of cases will the principle itself be
a useful analytical tool in enabling the Court to resolve the
particular Establishment Clause issue before it. The result in most
of the "advancing or inhibiting religion" cases then will depend on
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the Court's application of subsidiary doctrines and relevant
precedents to determine whether the particular governmental
action has the primary effect of "advancing or inhibiting religion."
3. The "cExcessive Entanglement" Principle
Under this principle, governmental action that fosters
"excessive entanglement" with religion violates the Establishment
Clause. The "excessive entanglement" principle originated in older
cases" 6 involving controversies between church officials and
disputes over church property. In those cases, the Court held that
the Establishment Clause precluded the civil courts from becoming
involved with matters of religious doctrine or policy, and that the
courts must defer to the resolution of those issues by the highest
tribunal of a hierarchial church authority. The "excessive
entanglement" principle in its current form was articulated and
applied by the Court in Lemon to hold unconstitutional a state
program supplementing the salaries of parochial school teachers of
secular subjects.117 To ensure that the teachers receiving the
supplements taught only secular subjects, the state imposed
restrictions on the teachers and required the submission of financial
data and the examination of school records. 8 The continuing state
surveillance of the parochial schools under the program was held to
violate the Establishment Clause because it would result in an
"excessive and enduring entanglement between state and church." 9
The result in Lemon reflects an interaction between the
"advancing or inhibiting religion" principle and the "excessive
entanglement" principle. The salary supplement program
invalidated on "excessive entanglement" grounds in Lemon included
the monitoring features in an effort to avoid the invalidation of the
program under the "advancing or inhibiting religion" principle.
116. See, ag., Gonzalez v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila, 280 U.S.
1 (1929); Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679 (1871).
117. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 619 (1971).
118. See id. at 619-21.
119. Id. at 619.
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Supplementing the salaries of parochial school teachers of secular
subjects obviously would have the effect of "advancing religion"
unless the state could ensure that these teachers would not include
any religious teaching in their classes. However, the monitoring
provisions by their very nature rendered the program violative of
the "excessive entanglement principle."20
In more recent years, religious organizations have invoked the
"excessive entanglement" principle, along with the Free Exercise
Clause, to obtain a constitutionally-required exemption from
governmental regulation that is claimed to interfere improperly
with their religious operations. In this circumstance, the application
of the "excessive entanglement" principle seems to focus more on
120. In Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U.S. 664 (1970), decided the year before
Lemon, the Court appeared to apply the "excessive entanglement" principle "in
reverse," so to speak, to uphold against Establishment Claiise challenge the
inclusion of property used for religious purposes in a general property tax
exemption for non-profit institutions. The Court noted that the inclusion of
property used for religious purposes in the general tax exemption promoted
"benevolent neutrality" toward religion and avoided the "entanglement"
problems that could result from governmental valuation of church property for
tax purposes and enforcement of the tax against church property. See id at 669.
In retrospect, however, it is clear that the basis of the Court's holding in Walz
was "benevolent neutrality" rather than "non-entanglement." As will be
discussed subsequently, the result in Walz was based on the Court's application
of the subsidiary doctrine of the non-discriminatory inclusion of religion. Under
this doctrine, the government may, in at least some circumstances, include the
religious with the secular in the receipt of governmental benefits; and in Walz,
the Court held that this applied to property tax exemptions for non-profit
institutions. The "entanglement" that was avoided by exempting church
property from the tax would not justify an exemption for church property
alone, and this would be unconstitutional as a preference for religion over non-
religion. See Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1 (1989) (holding an
exemption from the state sales tax law for religious periodicals alone violative of
the Establishment Clause). In other words, the property tax exemption in Walz
did not violate the Establishment Clause because it was included in a property
tax exemption for all non-profit institutions. The avoidance of "entanglement"
problems by the exemption, in retrospect, was not necessary to the decision and
would not justify an exemption for church property alone. See also infra notes
268-76 and accompanying text.
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the extent of governmental oversight of religious matters, while the
free exercise claim seems to focus more on the extent to which the
particular regulation interferes with the ability of the religious
organization to carry out its religious purpose. In resolving the
constitutional question in the particular case, the Court is likely to
take both elements into account and to base its decision on both
clauses.'
C. Subsidiary Doctrines
A number of subsidiary doctrines have emerged from the
Court's Establishment Clause decisions over the years. Some of
these doctrines, such as "endorsement/symbolic union," have been
articulated and expressly applied by the Court. Others, such as
"accommodation for religious freedom," represent my explanation
of results that the Court has reached in a number of Establishment
Clause cases. However derived or explained, these doctrines, which
sometimes overlap or interact, are in fact applied by the Court in
actual cases, and so comprise an element of the "law of the
Establishment Clause." As stated previously, in practice the Court
uses these subsidiary doctrines to determine whether or not a
particular governmental involvement with religion amounts to
"advancing or inhibiting religion," and if so, invalidates the action
under that principle.
1. Primary Effect and Incidental Benefit
Where the primary effect of a governmental action is to advance
a secular purpose, that action does not violate the Establishment
Clause merely because it provides an "incidental benefit" to
religion. This subsidiary doctrine relates directly to defining the
meaning of the "advancing or inhibiting religion" principle. The
crucial question in each case is whether the governmental action
effectively advances a secular purpose and provides no more than
121. See infra Part Ml.D.
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an "incidental benefit" to religion. Obviously, whether the
governmental action provides no more than an "incidental benefit"
to religion is a matter of degree, and the Court must weigh the
government's interest in advancing the secular purpose by the
means chosen against the resulting "benefit" to religion.
The court articulated this subsidiary doctrine and applied it in
the pre-Lemon case of McGowan v. Maryland," where it upheld the
constitutionality of a state Sunday closing law.1" The court justified
the law, regardless of its historic origins, as providing for a uniform
day of rest and, therefore, having a secular purpose within the
meaning of the first Lemon principle.124 Because the law effectively
advanced that secular purpose-the great majority of employees
would have Sunday off-the court deemed that the law did not have
the effect of "advancing religion," notwithstanding that the choice
of that day coincided with the Christian sabbath and therefore
provided an "incidental benefit" to religion. The "primary effect
and incidental benefit" doctrine also explains why it is
constitutionally permissible for the government to include religious
institutions as recipients of governmental funding to provide
secular services." Providing funding to these organizations
effectively advances the secular purpose for which the funding is
provided, and consequently, any "incidental benefit" for the
religious mission of these organizations from the funding is deemed
to be tolerable. Finally, this doctrine explains, at least in retrospect,
why it is constitutionally permissible for the state to provide
certain benefits, such as bus transportation1 26 and secular
textbooks,12 to parochial school students. The provision of bus
transportation, for example, advances the secular purpose of getting
children to school safely, and because this is so, the Establishment
Clause has been held to tolerate this "incidental benefit" to the
122. 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
123. See id at 452.
124. See id at 450.
125. See supra note 101.
126. See Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
127. See Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
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parochial schools." 8
2. Secular Deism
Proponents of an "accommodationist" interpretation of the
Establishment Clause sometimes draw an analogy to the references
to God in governmental ceremonies and activities, such as the
reference to "One Nation Under God" in the official Pledge of
Allegiance; the national motto of "In God We Trust" placed on
American currency, official documents, and public buildings; and
the traditional opening of federal court sessions with "God Save the
United States and this Honorable Court." They also cite the fact
that historically religious holidays such as Thanksgiving and
Christmas are celebrated as national holidays. Therefore, they argue
by analogy that because these practices assumedly do not violate the
Establishment Clause, other governmental involvements with
religion, such as a display of a nativity scene on public property, do
not violate the Establishment Clause either.129
The definitive answer to this argument by analogy lies in the
principle of secular deism. These official references to God and
related practices do not violate the Establishment Clause because
through long usage in a secular context, they have lost their
religious significance.130 Because they have lost their religious
128. InAgostini v. Felton, 117 S. Ct. 1997 (1997), the Court focused entirely
on the secular purpose of providing remedial instruction for the children
attending parochial schools and on the fact that Title I funds could not be used
to supplant the remedial instruction and guidance counseling already provided
in the parochial schools. See id at 2013; supra note 43.
129. Chief Justice Burger appeared to be advancing this argument in Lynch
v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
130. See School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (Brennan, J.,
concurring). Justice Brennan has referred to these practices as having been
"interwoven... so deeply into the fabric of our civil policy that [their] present
use may well not present the type of involvement which the First Amendment
prohibits." Id at 303; see also Allegheny County v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 602-03
(1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring) Gustice Blackmun's discussion of this point);
CHOPER, supra note 14, at 108-12 (discussing the "American Civil Religion,"
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significance, they do not have the effect of advancing religion and,
therefore, do not violate the second Lemon principle. As Justice
Douglas noted many years ago, "We are a religious people whose
institutions presuppose a Supreme Being." 3' Precisely because this
has been so, it should not be surprising that these practices have
become a part of official life. For this reason they are now deemed
to have a secular meaning and, therefore, are constitutionally
unobjectionable. Furthermore, whatever religious significance
Thanksgiving and Christmas may retain, it cannot seriously be
questioned that they are celebrated by large segments of the public
as secular holidays. Thanksgiving is about family reunions, turkey
dinners, and football. Christmas is the national holiday of gift-
giving. The principle of secular deism means then that these official
references to God and the celebration of secular holidays that have
a religious origin do not violate the Establishment Clause.'32 It also
referring to "secular political statements that fall within the category of 'widely
shared and basically noncontroversial public values'").
131. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313 (1952).
132. Separationist groups recently brought an Establishment Clause
challenge to the use of the national motto, "In God We Trust," and its
reproduction on United States currency. See Gaylor v. United States, 74 F.3d 214
(10th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1830 (1996). The court rejected the
challenge stating, "The motto's primary effect is not to advance religion; instead,
it is a form of 'ceremonial deism' which through historical usage and ubiquity
cannot be reasonably understood to convey government approval of religious
belief." Id at 216. The court also cited two earlier cases where the use of the "In
God We Trust" motto on American currency had been upheld against
Establishment Clause challenge. See id (citing O'Hair v. Murray, 588 F.2d 1144
(5th Cir. 1978); Arenow v. United States, 432 F.2d 242 (9th Cir. 1970)); see also
Sherman v. Community Consol. Sch. Dist. 21, 980 F.2d 437 (7th Cir. 1992), cert
denied, 508 U.S. 950 (1993) (rejecting the contention that the inclusion of the
words "under God" in the Pledge of Allegiance rendered the Pledge an
impermissible religious prayer). In his concurring opinion in Schempp, Justice
Brennan noted that:
The reference to divinity in the revised pledge of allegiance, for
example, may merely recognize the historical fact that our Nation was
believed to have been founded 'under God.' Thus reciting the pledge
may be no more of a religious exercise than the reading aloud of
Lincoln's Gettysburg Address, which contains an allusion to the same
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means that the argument by analogy to support an
"accommodationist" interpretation of the Establishment Clause is
structurally unsound.
3. Endorsement/Symbolic Union
Under this subsidiary doctrine, governmental action violates the
Establishment Clause when it would be perceived by an objective
observer as constituting a governmental endorsement of religion or
as creating a symbolic union between government and religion.
When governmental action would be perceived in this manner, it
has the effect of advancing religion and therefore violates the second
Lemon principle.
The endorsement/symbolic union doctrine provides a doctrinal
explanation of why the display of an unadorned nativity scene on
public property is unconstitutional,' while the inclusion of a
nativity scene as a part of a larger holiday season display is not.3 4
The Court found that the former display constituted an
endorsement of Christianity while the latter did not. 3 5 Although
there may be considerable disagreement with the soundness of such
a distinction (both on and off the Court), the results produced by
this distinction illustrate the operation of the
endorsement/symbolic union doctrine in practice. The Court also
applied this doctrine to hold unconstitutional a grant to churches
of a veto over the issuance of a liquor license in proximity to a
church. 3
6
historical fact.
Schempp, 374 U.S. at 304.
133. See Allegheny County v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989).
134. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
135. See Allegheny County, 492 U.S. at 574; Lynch, 465 U.S. at 668.
136. See Larkin v. Grendel's Den Inc., 459 U.S. 116 (1982). In SchoolDistrict
of City of GrandRapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985), and Aguilar v. Felton, 473
U.S. 402 (1985), the Court concluded that the presence of public school
employees in a parochial school classroom amounted to a symbolic union
between government and religion. On this basis, it held unconstitutional the use
of public school employees to teach secular subjects or to provide remedial
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4. Accommodation for Religious Freedom, but Not for Religion
An essential tenet of the "accommodationist" position is that
the Establishment Clause should permit some accommodation for
religion in public life. 1 7 Despite expressions of this view by some
Justices in various contexts, 138 the Court has not upheld
services to parochial school students in parochial school classrooms. In Agostini
v. Felton, 117 S. Ct. 1997 (1997), the Court took the position that the presence
of public school employees in a parochial school classroom, without more, does
not "create the impression of a 'symbolic union' between church and state," and
overruled the holdings in Ball and Aguilar. See id. at 2016.
137. This tenet was recently expressed by Ninth Circuit Judge O'Scannlain,
reluctantly concurring in Separation of Church and State Committee v. City of
Eugene, 93 F.3d 617 (9th Cir. 1996), where the Ninth Circuit held
unconstitutional a city's display of a large Latin cross.
[T]he Supreme Court in the last half-century has constructed and
zealously policed a "wall of separation" between church and state that
was unknown and, indeed, unthinkable at the time of the framing....
Further, the practices that were prevalent and accepted during the
early history of this Nation lead to the conclusion that, even as to the
national government, the Establishment Clause was not intended to
erect a "wall of separation" between church and state. Rather, the
accommodation of religion was not only permitted but encouraged. For
instance, our national government has, throughout its history,
manifested an abiding belief in the value of prayer.
Id at 620-22.
Professor Michael W. McConnell has carefully distinguished this view of
"accommodation" from an "accommodation for religious freedom," which he
strongly advocates.
I must stress at the outset that this Article's conception of
accommodation does not include government action that acknowledges
or expresses the prevailing religious sentiments of the community such
as the display of a religious symbol on public property or the delivery
of a prayer at public ceremonial events. Such acknowledgments do not
leave the decision about religious practice to the individual or group,
but rather serve as a social or collective expression of religious ideas.
McConnell, supra note 2, at 687.
138. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 673-78 (1984) (Chief Justice
Burger's opinion).
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government action favoring religion on the ground that it reflected
a permissible "accommodation" for religion. Thus, in Estate of
Thornton v. Caldor, Inc.,139 the Court held unconstitutional a law
that entitled an employee to take off work on the day that the
employee observed as the Sabbath.' 40 The effect of the law was to
advance religion because the only employees who could choose a
day off were employees who wanted to observe a day as their
Sabbath.' 4' For the Court to hold that it was constitutionally
permissible for the government to make an "accommodation" for
religion would be inconsistent with the overriding Establishment
Clause principle of complete official neutrality toward religion, as
the effect of such an "accommodation" would be to prefer religion
over non-religion.
The overriding principle of complete official neutrality toward
religion, however, has not been seen by the Court as precluding the
government from taking action in some circumstances to protect
the religious freedom of individuals and religious institutions. It is
here that the Court's interpretation of the Establishment Clause
takes account of the Free Exercise Clause and the common purpose
of both clauses to secure religious freedom. The doctrine that has
emerged from the Court's decisions in this area is that the
government may take action that is precisely tailored to protect the
religious freedom of individuals and religious institutions. It is for
this reason that the Establishment Clause is not violated by Title
Vl's religious employee exemption for religious institutions, 42 or
its requirement that an employer make a reasonable
accommodation for an employee's religious beliefs. 43 Likewise, an
139. 472 U.S. 703 (1985).
140. See id. at 710-11.
141. See id. at 709-10.
142. See Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ
of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987).
143. See Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63 (1977); see also
infra notes 413-17 and accompanying text. This requirement, however, has been
construed very narrowly in order to avoid possible Establishment Clause
problems.
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exemption from military service limited to those whose opposition
to war is based on religious or moral beliefs, as opposed to political
beliefs, has been assumed to be consistent with the Establishment
Clause. 1" The same is true of an exemption for sacramental wine
during Prohibition, and for the use of peyote in the religious
ceremonies of the Native-American church.145
5. The Non-discriminatory Inclusion ofReligion
Because the overriding principle of the Establishment Clause is
one of complete official neutrality toward religion, the
Establishment Clause does not require that the government be
hostile to religion. As discussed earlier, this means that the
government can include religious institutions in the services it
provides to the public generally, such as police and fire protection,
can include religious institutions which provide secular services as
recipients of governmental funding, and can provide religious
organizations with equal access to governmental facilities.' 46 The
Court, however, has gone further and has held that, at least in some
circumstances, the government does not violate the Establishment
Clause when it includes the religious with the secular in the receipt
of governmental benefits. Under this doctrine, the Court has held
that the Establishment Clause is not violated by tax exemptions for
religious, charitable, and educational organizations 47 or by allowing
parents to take tax deductions for educational expenses,
notwithstanding that most of the deductions will be taken for
tuition payments made by parents who are sending their children
to parochial schools.44 The non-discriminatory inclusion of
religion doctrine was also the basis for the Court's holding that it
was constitutionally permissible for a blind student to use state
payments provided to such students for educational purposes to
144. See infra note 418.
145. See infra note 425 and accompanying text.
146. See supra notes 101-03 and accompanying text.
147. See Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
148. See Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983).
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attend a religiously-affiliated college for the purpose of pursuing a
religious vocation. 149
It may be possible to identify other subsidiary doctrines from
the Court's Establishment Clause decisions, but I think that I have
succeeded in identifying the subsidiary doctrines that are most
frequently applied in practice. As stated above, in practice these
subsidiary doctrines relate primarily to determining whether or not
a particular governmental involvement with religion amounts to
"advancing or inhibiting religion" and so, is invalid under the
second Lemon principle.
D. The Precedents
In actual Establishment Clause litigation, lawyers and judges are
not likely to approach the Establishment Clause as an
undifferentiated whole. Rather they are likely to approach it in
terms of different areas of Establishment Clause law and to focus on
the applicable precedents in each of the different areas. The
precedents are more important than the operational principles and
subsidiary doctrines, discussed previously, because they are more
directly relevant to the analysis of the particular governmental
action that is at issue. I have previously discussed this matter in the
context of challenges to nativity scene displays on public property
and prayers at high school graduation. As I pointed out then, the
result in the successful challenge to the display of an unadorned
nativity scene on public property in Allegheny County50 depended
on the analysis of the differences between the effect of such a
display and the inclusive display that the Court had upheld in
Lynch.' Likewise, the result in the successful challenge to
graduation prayers in Lee. depended on the analysis of the
149. See Witters v. Washington Dep't of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481
(1986).
150. Allegheny County v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989).
151. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984); see supra notes 25-34 and
accompanying text.
152. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
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similarities between graduation prayers and the classroom prayers
and other religious practices in the public schools that the Court
had invalidated in previous cases."53
The Court's precedents have been the primary factor in the
development of each of the different areas of Establishment Clause
law. Nowhere is this phenomenon more evident than in the area of
aid to parochial schools. Aid to parochial schools first came before
the Court in Everson v. Board of Education,"5 4 which is also the
seminal case in the development of the Court's modem
Establishment Clause jurisprudence. At issue in that case was the
constitutionality of New Jersey's policy reimbursing parochial
schools for the cost of student bus transportation. A sharply
divided Court held, five-four, that the state's provision of bus
transportation for parochial school students did not violate the
Establishment Clause. 55
In setting forth the "classic meaning" of the Establishment
Clause in Everson, Justice Black stated that, "No tax in any amount,
large or small, can be levied to support any religious activities or
institutions, whatever they may be called, or whatever form they
may adopt to teach or practice religion."" 6 However, the Court had
held many years before Everson that the Establishment Clause was
not violated by a governmental grant of funds to a religiously-
affiliated institution, such as a hospital, in order to enable it to
provide secular services. 157 It is obvious that in a parochial school
there is a complete admixture of the secular and the religious.
Parochial schools provide children with instruction in the secular
subjects, but they do so from a completely religious perspective,
which is why those parents who choose to send their children to
parochial schools do so.
To the dissenting Justices in Everson, the admixture of the
secular with the religious in parochial schools precluded any form
153. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
154. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
155. See id. at 18.
156. Id. at 16.
157. See Bradfeld v. Roberts, 175 U.S. 291 (1899).
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of governmental aid to parochial schools because such aid would
inevitably advance the schools' religious function.'58 The majority
did not dispute this point, but avoided its implications by drawing
a distinction between aid to the school, which was constitutionally
impermissible, and aid to the child, which the majority said was
permissible. Because the provision of bus transportation to the
parochial school was considered aid to the child and advanced the
state's important interest in securing the child's safety, the majority
concluded that transportation assistance did not violate the
Establishment Clause."5 9
Constitutional law, as previously noted, develops in a line of
growth. Under the Everson precedent, it would be constitutionally
permissible for the state to provide aid to the child,
notwithstanding that its provision of such aid would also result in
some "incidental" benefit to the parochial school. Taking their cue
from Everson, some states tried to assist parochial schools in
meeting the increasing expenses of education by providing benefits
in the form of "aid to the child." Applying the Everson precedent,
the Court held that a state could loan parochial school students the
same textbooks for secular subjects that it loaned to public school
students."W The Court also held that states c6uld provide diagnostic
services in which state employees tested individual children for
particular health and educational problems in the parochial
schools.'6'
However, the Everson precedent precluded the state from
providing any form of direct aid to the parochial schools because
this would advance the religious purpose of the schools. 62 Thus,
158. See Everson, 330 U.S. at 49-53 (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
159. See id at 16-18.
160. See Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
161. See Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 241-44 (1977).
162. In Lemon itself, an effort to avoid this part of the Everson precedent, by
state supplementation of the salaries of teachers of secular subjects in parochial
schools, foundered on the "excessive entanglement" principle. Even assuming
that this state salary supplementation would not otherwise violate the
Establishment Clause, ( think that it would because it took the form of a direct
1997] 1361
THE WAYNE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 43:1317
whenever a state undertook to provide some form of assistance to
parochial schools, the analysis of the constitutional issue depended
on whether the court characterized the particular form of assistance
as "aid to the child" or "aid to the school." Although the Court had
held the loan of textbooks as constitutionally permissible "aid to
the child," the court held that the loan of instructional materials,
such as recording equipment, laboratory, and maps, fell on the side
of "aid to the school" and, thus, was constitutionally
impermissible. 63 Likewise, although Everson permitted the state to
reimburse the schools for bus transportation, this did not extend to
transportation for field trips by parochial students. 14 The Everson
precedent remains viable, and its effect is to allow state assistance to
parochial school education only when the particular form of
assistance is held to fall on the side of "aid to the child" rather than
"aid to the school." 6 '
Now let us consider the impact of a different outcome in
Everson on the constitutional permissibility of state assistance to
parochial school education. If the views of the dissenting Justices in
Everson had prevailed, the state could not provide bus
transportation or any assistance at all to parochial school education,
notwithstanding that the particular form of assistance might be
financial subsidy to the parochial school, enabling it to carry out its religious
purpose more effectively.) the supplementation was nonetheless constitutionally
impermissible because the program also provided for state monitoring of the
teaching of secular subjects in order to ensure that the teaching was free of
religious content.
163. See Wolman, 433 U.S. at 248-51.
164. See id at 252-55.
165. See supra text accompanying notes 44-49; see also Zobrest v. Catalina
Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1 (1993). In Zobrest, a sharply divided Court held
five-four that where a school district provided sign-language interpreters for deaf
students in the public schools, the Establishment Clause did not preclude it from
providing a sign-language interpreter for a student who transferred to a parochial
school. See id at 13-14. And in Agostini, the Court, again sharply divided, held
five-four that remedial instructional programs for low-income students could be
provided to parochial school students in parochial school classrooms. See
Agostini v. Felton, 117 S. Ct. 1997, 2016 (1997).
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characterized as "aid to the child."" As a constitutional matter, the
issue would be closed. But, the views of the dissenting Justices in
Everson fell one vote short of prevailing.
However, if the Court had held aid to parochial schools as
being constitutionally permissible, there would have been a very
different outcome, with very positive consequences for the
parochial schools. Suppose that the Court had focused on the fact
that parochial schools perform a secular function by providing
children with instruction in the secular subjects. The Court's much
earlier precedent had held that the Establishment Clause permits
the government to grant funds to a religiously-affiliated institution
in order to enable it to provide secular services."' Under the
rationale of this precedent, the state could, consistent with the
Establishment Clause, grant funds to parochial schools to assist
them in the secular function of providing children with instruction
in the secular subjects. Because there is a complete admixture of the
secular and the religious in the parochial schools, the state would be
constitutionally required to advance the secular purpose without
assisting the parochial schools in advancing their religious purpose.
This could be accomplished, consistent with the Establishment
Clause, by a reasonable apportionment of funding. The state would
grant the parochial schools an amount of funding that was less than
the funding of public education, say a 50% reimbursement of per
student costs. In other words, for every dollar spent on public
school students, the state would be spending fifty cents on parochial
school students.
Under this apportionment analysis, the reimbursement of
transportation costs in Everson would have been unconstitutional
because there was no apportionment. However, the state could
revise the funding for bus transportation to accord with a
166. This would not preclude the state from including parochial school
students in school lunch programs or immunizations. In this circumstance, the
parochial school is merely the conduit for the distribution of a governmental
benefit to children, and there would be no question of aid to the parochial
school.
167. See Bradfeld v. Roberts, 175 U.S. 291 (1899).
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reasonable apportionment formula and, more importantly, under
this kind of formula, could provide general funding for parochial
schools. While the parochial schools prevailed in Everson, the result
of Everson was detrimental to the long-range interests of parochial
schools because the rationale of Everson renders unconstitutional
any general funding for parochial schools and most other forms of
parochial school aid. But, if the Court had adopted an
apportionment analysis in Everson, there would be no
constitutional objection to the government providing very
substantial aid to parochial schools.168
The Court, however, did not adopt an apportionment analysis
in Everson. Instead, it held that the Establishment Clause is violated
by governmental aid to parochial schools, but is not violated when
the government funding takes the form of "aid to the child."169 As
a result of the Everson precedent, the constitutionality of every
governmental effort to aid parochial school education depends on
whether the Court characterizes the particular form of aid as "aid
to the child" or "aid to the school." The end result has been to limit
severely the ability of the government to provide aid to parochial
school education.
I see Establishment Clause litigation, and thus the Court's
Establishment Clause precedents, as falling into five general areas:
(1) religious practices in the public schools; (2) financial aid and
governmental benefits to religion; (3) governmental action
purportedly "advancing religion"; (4) entanglement and
governmental interference in religious matters; and (5) preference
for religion or between religions, which includes actions designed
to protect the religious freedom of individuals and religious
168. See CHOPER, supra note 14, at 174-86. Professor Jesse Choper argues
that because parochial schools perform a secular function, the Establishment
Clause policy of prohibiting taxation for religious purposes is not controverted
by governmental aid to parochial schools. His position is that the government
may generally expend the same amount on parochial school students as it
expends on public school students and may apportion the funds allocated to the
parochial schools on the basis of time spent on secular subjects. See id.
169. See Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947).
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institutions.70 The discussion of the application of the law of the
Establishment Clause in the next part of this Article will be
organized into these five areas.
III. THE APPLICATION OF THE LAW OF THE ESTABLISHMENT
CLAUSE
This part of the Article will read somewhat like a "restatement."
It will discuss the results that the Supreme Court has reached in its
application of the law of the Establishment Clause in the five areas
of Establishment Clause litigation. The discussion will include some
of the more recent lower court cases, primarily those of federal
courts of appeals. I hope to demonstrate that most of the major
questions arising under the Establishment Clause have now been
settled, and that much of Establishment Clause litigation today
involves peripheral issues that can be resolved by the application of
relevant Supreme Court precedents.1 71
170. Some other commentators have also organized the Establishment
Clause cases into different areas. See Marshall, supra note 3, at 540-41. Professor
Marshall uses the following three areas: (1) religion in the public schools, (2)
governmental practices and regulatory programs, and (3) aid to parochial schools.
See id.; see also Matthew S. Steffey, Redefining the Modern Constraints of the
Establishment Clause: Separable Principles of Equality, Subsidy, Endorement, and
Church Autonomy, 75 MARQ. L. REV. 903 (1992) [hereinafter Redefining the
Modem Constraints]. Professor Steffey uses the following four areas: (1)
classifications that impose burdens or distribute benefits on a religious basis, (2)
governmental subsidies of religious activities, (3) limits on religious exhortations
by government, and (4) government intrusion into certain central church affairs.
See id, at 904-05; see, e.g., Matthew S. Steffey, The Establishment Clause and the
Lessons of Context, 26 RUTGERS LJ. 775 (1995). Professor Steffey maintains that
when the Court's Establishment Clause decisions are seen as "enforcing four
essentially different proscriptions directed at four basically different forms of
government behavior, it becomes much easier to focus on underlying principles
and themes." Id at 779.
171. See supra Parts I, II. Some of the Supreme Court cases discussed or
referred to in this part of the Article have been discussed in more detail in the
first two parts of the Article. They are included again here in order to maintain
continuity and to put them in the context of the different areas of Establishment
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A. Religious Practices in the Public Schools
The Supreme Court has declared unconstitutional all state-
sponsored religious practices in the public schools. These include a
released time program in which religious groups sent teachers to
provide religious instruction in public school classrooms for
students who wished to receive it,"7 school-sponsored prayers and
Bible reading' s the posting of a copy of the Ten Commandments
in public school classrooms, 4 and school-sponsored prayers at a
school commencement.17 ' The Court has also declared
unconstitutional a state law prohibiting the teaching of evolution
in the public schools,176 a state law requiring the teaching of
"creation science" where the school teaches evolution, 177 and a state
law mandating a moment of silence, which the Court found was
adopted for the purpose of encouraging school prayer.178 With the
exception of the moment of silence case, which was based on the
religious purpose element of Lemon, all of the cases were based on
the advancing or inhibiting religion element of Lemon.17
Clause litigation.
172. See McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
173. See Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962); School Dist. v. Schempp, 374
U.S. 203 (1963).
174. See Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980).
175. See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
176. See Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968).
177. See Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987).
178. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985); supra notes 110-13 and
accompanying text.
179. In Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952), the Court held that the
public schools could "accommodate religion" by providing a "released time"
program under which students could leave the school for a specified period of
time during the school day to receive religious instruction in non-school
facilities. The result in Zorach is inconsistent with later-decided cases, such as
Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703 (1985), which hold that the
government cannot favor religion over non-religion on the ground that it is
making an "accommodation" for religion. The only permissible
"accommodation" that the government can make is one that is precisely tailored
to protect the religious freedom of individuals and religious institutions. The
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The cases involving religious practices in the public schools that
have come before the lower courts in recent years have shown a
slightly different pattern of results. Some of these cases have
involved practices that clearly have the effect of advancing religion,
and the courts have held them unconstitutional. These include the
distribution of Gideon Bibles to students in the schools,180 the
display of a portrait of Jesus Christ in a public school- hallway,18'
and the policy of a school district that had been providing remedial
services to Orthodox Jewish children to employ only male drivers
on bus routes transporting the children." The Seventh Circuit also
has held unconstitutional a state law requiring that the public
schools be closed on Good Friday."83 The court found that the law
singled out a religious holiday for special treatment, and rejected
the state's proffered secular justifications, such as the law was
necessary because large numbers of students would be absent that
day or the law was an effort to provide a "spring weekend" for the
students.' 4
Other cases, however, have seen the courts uphold the
particular practice against Establishment Clause challenges. The
courts have held that the Establishment Clause does not prevent
school choirs from singing religious songs as a part of a secular
music program because much of choral music is religious."8 ' In
addition, while there is much controversy about Christmas
Court has had no occasion to reconsider Zorach in more recent years, as these
kinds of "released time" programs have pretty much disappeared from the
educational scene. In any event, Zorach has no precedential significance, and if
it survives, it is limited to its precise facts.
180. SeeBergerv. Rensselaer Cent. Sch. Corp., 982 F.2d 1160 (7th Cir. 1993).
181. See Washegesic v. Bloomingdale Pub. Schs., 33 F.3d 679 (6th Cir. 1994).
182. See Bullenbach v. Board of Educ., 659 F. Supp. 1450 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
183. See Metzl v. Leininger, 57 F.3d 618 (7th Cir. 1995).
184. See id at 621-24.
185. See Doe v. Duncanville Indep. Sch. Dist., 70 F.3d 402 (5th Cir. 1995)
(holding that there was no Establishment Clause violation in a choir's use of a
religious song as its theme song); Bauchman v. West High Sch., 906 F. Supp.
1483 (D. Utah 1995) (holding that there was no Establishment Clause violation
in a choir's performing at religious sites as part of its tour).
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observances in the public schools, especially the singing of
Christmas carols, these observances are likely to be upheld against
Establishment Clause challenge. Analogous to the Christmas
holiday season display upheld in Lynch v. Donnelly,8 6 these
observances mix the religious with the secular, and are sufficiently
secular in overall impact so that they will not have the
constitutionally impermissible effect of endorsing religion.'V
Finally, the efforts of objecting parents to relate the public schools'
teaching of witchcraft or the schools' celebration of Halloween to
"promoting religion" have been unavailing. The courts have not
considered witchcraft or Halloween to be "religion" for purposes
of the Establishment Clause and so, have rejected the Establishment
Clause challenges to these practices."'
186. 465 U.S. 668 (1984); see supra notes 25-28 and accompanying text.
187. See, e.g., Florey v. Sioux Falls Sch. Dist., 619 F.2d 1311 (8th Cir. 1980);
Clever v. Cherry Hill Township Bd. of Educ., 838 F. Supp. 929 (D.N.J. 1993).
188. See Kunselman v. Western Reserve Local Sch. Dist., 70 F.3d 931 (6th
Cir. 1995) (school district's use and display of "Blue Devil" as school mascot);
Fleischfresser v. Directors of Sch. Dist. 200, 15 F.3d 680 (7th Cir. 1994) (reading
series that included readings on wizards and witchcraft); Guyer v. School Bd.,
634 So. 2d 806 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994); cf Malnak v. Yogi, 592 F.2d 197 (3d
Cir. 1979) (holding public school course in transcendental meditation to be
essentially religious in nature and violative of the Establishment Clause).
Members of traditional religious faiths sometimes contend that by not
including religious values in the public school curriculum, the public schools are
teaching the "religion of secularism." This contention ignores the difference
between the schools teaching "irreligion" and the schools taking a purely secular
approach to education. See also Stanley Ingber, Religious Children and the
Inevitable Compulsion ofPublic Schools, 43 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 773 (1993). As
Professor Ingber has observed:
Regardless of any distinction between the religious and the secular,
public schools surely cannot proselytize atheism. Consequently, I
contend a further distinction must be drawn between irreligious
secularism, which is opposed or hostile to religion (defined as a belief
system based on the existence of the sacred or divine), and a nonreligious
secularism, for which the existence of religion is irrelevant. State
promotion of irreligious secularism would be unconstitutional; support
of nonreligious secularism would not be.
Id at 781-82. In addition, Professor Lupu has stated:
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One remaining controverted issue involving religious practices
in the public schools has resulted from a Fifth Circuit decision
interpreting Lee v. Weisman1" as permitting nonsectarian prayer at
a high school commencement if the decision to have prayer at the
commencement was made by the students themselves rather than
by the school officials. When the students make the decision, said
the court, the saying of prayers would not be perceived as an
official endorsement of religion. 90 In a recent en banc nine-four
decision, the Third Circuit reached a contrary result, concluding
that under Lee, the school's delegation of an aspect of the ceremony
Parents may choose private religious schooling or public schooling;
when they choose the latter, they should feel as safe as possible that no
one is condemning their religion or indoctrinating their children in
some alternative faith. While it is impossible for children to attend
public school in a pluralistic society without some competition from
secular norms, and exposure to alternative religious ideas, it is consistent
with the constitutional structure for administrators, teachers and courts
to minimize the competition between family and state on matters of
religious choice.
Lupu, supra note 112, at 898-99.
189. 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
190. SeeJones v. Clear Creek Tndep. Sch. Dist., 977 F.2d 963 (5th Cir. 1992).
The court stated as follows:
The practical result of our decision, viewed in light of Lee, is that
a majority of students can do what the State acting on its own cannot
do to incorporate prayer in high school graduation ceremonies. In Lee,
the Court forbade schools from exacting participation in a religious
exercise as the price for attending what many consider to be one of life's
most important events. This case requires us to consider why so many
people attach importance to graduation ceremonies. If they only seek
government's recognition of student achievement, diplomas suffice. If
they only seek God's recognition, a privately sponsored-baccalaureate
will do. But to experience the community's recognition of student
achievement, they must attend the public ceremony that other
interested community members also hold so dear. By attending
graduation to experience and participate in the community's display of
support for the graduates, people should not be surprised to find the
event affected by community standards. The Constitution requires
nothing different.
Id at 972.
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to a student vote did not constitute an absence of the school
officials' control over the graduation, and that regardless of whether
the school officials or a majority of the students made the decision,
objecting students were no less coerced into participating in the
ceremony.'91 At the present time, this issue has not been resolved
by the Supreme Court.
This issue is rather peripheral to the matter of religious practices
in the public schools, and for this reason, the Fifth Circuit's
holding on this issue has little capability for extension and has been
limited in the Fifth Circuit itself. In a subsequent case, the Fifth
Circuit held that a school district's practice of allowing its
employees to supervise and participate in student prayers during
basketball games and practice sessions violated the Establishment
Clause. 92 More significantly, perhaps, the Fifth Circuit struck
191. See ACLU v. Black Horse Pike Reg'l Bd. of Educ., 84 F.3d 1471 (3d Cir.
1996). The court stated as follows:
We find no difference whatsoever between the coercion in Lee and the
coercion here.
Here, the hypothetical dissenter in Lee is replaced by 140 students
who voted not to have a formal prayer at their high school graduation.
Students here either had to either conform to the model of worship
commanded by the plurality or absent themselves from graduation and
thereby forego one of the most important events in their lives. This is
an improper choice to force upon dissenting students.
Id at 1480; see also Harris v. Joint Sch. Dist. No. 241, 41 F.3d 447 (9th Cir. 1994),
vacated as moot, 515 U.S. 1154 (1995). While this case later became moot as a
result of the last plaintiff's graduation from high school, the Ninth Circuit read
Lee in the same way as the Third Circuit and concluded that because the school
bore the responsibility for the high school commencement program, it was
constitutionally irrelevant whether the decision to include prayer was made by
the students themselves rather than by the school. See id
192. See Doe v. Duncanville Indep. Sch. Dist., 70 F.3d 402 (5th Cir. 1995).
In distinguishingJones, the court stated as follows:
Jones II upheld a school resolution which permitted high school
students to choose whether to have a student volunteer deliver a non-
sectarian and non-proselytizing invocation and benediction during high
school graduation. In concluding that this resolution did not violate the
Establishment Clause, we emphasized that high school graduation is a
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down as violative of the Establishment Clause a Mississippi statute
that authorized "student-initiated voluntary prayer," not only at
commencements but also at all school-related events, such as
assemblies and athletic events.193 The court found that the statute
violated all three of the Lemon elements.194 It concluded that the
evidence showed that the statute was intended to advance religion,
and that it had the effect of advancing religion because it gave
preferential treatment to religion over other activities. 9 ' The court
also decided that there was impermissible entanglement because
school officials were allowed to lead the students in prayer and
would be determining what prayers were permissible' 96 It is now
clear that the only religious practice in the public schools that the
Fifth Circuit will uphold as constitutionally permissible is student-
initiated non-sectarian prayer at a high school commencement.
The question of whether or not this practice is constitutionally
permissible illustrates the point that most of the unsettled
Establishment Clause issues that are likely to arise in the foreseeable
significant, once-in-a-lifetime event that could be appropriately marked
with a prayer, that the students involved were mature high school
seniors, and that the challenged prayer was to be sectarian and non-
proselytizing. [citation omitted] Here, we are dealing with a setting that
is far less solemn and extraordinary, a quintessentially Christian prayer,
and students of twelve years of age (the age at which Jane Doe first
encountered basketball team prayers). These facts place the prayer at
issue here in a materially different position than the one we permitted
in Jones fI.
Id at 406-07.
193. See Ingebretsen v. Jackson Pub. Sch. Dist., 88 F.3d 274 (5th Cir. 1996),
cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 388 (1996).
194. See id at 278-80.
195. See id at 279.
196. See id
197. The court in Ingebretsen specifically declined to reconsider the holding
in Jones. See Ingebretsen, 88 F.3d at 281. A petition for rehearing en banc was
denied. In dissenting from the denial of the petition, Judge Jones, who authored
the opinion in Jones, strongly attacked the Fifth Circuit's post-Jones decisions and
barely stopped short of attacking the Supreme Court's Establishment Clause
decisions as well. See id at 281-88.
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future are rather peripheral. A little more than thirty years ago, it
had not yet been decided whether school prayers and Bible reading
in the classroom were constitutionally permissible. Today, the only
unanswered question in regard to school prayer involves student-
initiated non-sectarian prayer at a high school commencement.
More significantly, the Supreme Court has declared
unconstitutional all state-sponsored religious practices in the public
schools. Following Supreme Court precedent, the more recent
lower court cases have also declared state involvement with religion
in the public schools unconstitutional, except where the particular
practice, such as singing religious songs in the school choir or
including Christmas carols in Christmas programs, is sufficiently
secular in nature that it is not considered to have the effect of
advancing religion.198 As Professor Marshall has observed, in the
context of religion and the public schools, "[t]he Court's
perspective has been that of the ardent separationist. "199
B. Financial Aid and Benefits to Religion
The cases in this area involve the question of whether the
government may, consistent with the Establishment Clause,
provide financial aid or other benefits of a financial nature to
religious institutions or to individuals who use them for a religious
purpose. In Everson, Justice Black stated a core meaning of the
Establishment Clause: "No tax in any amount, large or small, can
198. See supra notes 185-87 and accompanying text.
199. Marshall, supra note 3, at 541. He agrees with this result and concludes
that, "In short, separation in the public schools has become the governing
symbol. Any governmental action benefitting religion in the public schools,
then, should be upheld only under extraordinarily narrow circumstance." Id. at
54144; cf. CHOPER, supra note 14, at 140-52. Professor Choper would draw a
distinction between practices that are "inherently compulsive" and those that are
not. Under Professor Choper's "inherently compulsive" approach, school prayer
and released time programs should be held unconstitutional, but a ban on the
teaching of evolution, the required teaching of "creation science" along with
evolution, the posting of the Ten Commandments in the classroom, and a
moment of silence law designed to encourage prayer would not be. See idL
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be levied to support any religious activities or institutions, whatever
they may be called, or whatever form they may adopt to teach or
practice religion." O° Professor Jesse Choper has observed, "There
is broad consensus that a central threat to the religious freedom of
individuals and groups-indeed, in the judgment of many, 'the most
serious infringement upon religious liberty'-is posed by 'forcing
them to pay taxes in support of a religious establishment or
religious activities. '"'2 1 However, it is abundantly clear that every
form of financial aid or other benefits of a financial nature provided
by the government to "religion" does not violate the Establishment
Clause. In Everson itself, the Court held that the state did not
violate the Establishment Clause by providing free bus
transportation for parochial school students. 2 Justice Douglas'
observation in Zorach that the Establishment Clause "does not say
that in every and all respects there shall be a separation of Church
and State[,]... [but] [rlather it studiously defines the manner, the
specific ways, in which there shall be no concert or union or
dependency one on the other," 3 is a particularly apt description of
the constitutional permissibility of governmental financial aid or
benefits to religion. Broadly speaking, the constitutional result
depends on the purpose for which the financial aid or benefit is
given, the particular form that the aid or benefit takes, and on
whether, in the circumstances presented, the aid or benefit creates
a preference for religion over non-religion. °4 Looking to the
200. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1947).
201. CHOPER, supra note 14, at 16 (quoting Paul G. Kauper, Church and
State: Cooperative Separatism, 60 MICH. L. REV. 1, 9 (1961)).
202. See Everson, 330 U.S. at 17.
203. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 312 (1952).
204. See, e.g., Lamont v. Woods, 948 F.2d 825 (2d Cir. 1991). This Second
Circuit case involved the application of the Establishment Clause to the
expenditure of federal foreign aid funds in foreign countries. The federal
taxpayers' suit contended that the Establishment Clause was violated by the use
of federal foreign aid funds to support sectarian schools in foreign countries. The
Second Circuit held that the Establishment Clause applied to such expenditures,
and that once it was determined that the activities of a particular recipient of the
funds were pervasively sectarian, the government should "be permitted to
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Supreme Court's precedents in this area, it is helpful to divide the
cases into three categories: (1) secular function, (2) aid to religious
schools and students, and (3) equal treatment of religion.
1. Secular Function
In 1899, in what appears to be one of the first Establishment
Clause cases coming before the Supreme Court, the Court saw no
possible Establishment Clause objection to Congress providing
funding to a Washington, D.C. charitable hospital that was
operated by a religious order.05
The funding was provided pursuant to a contractual
arrangement by which the hospital agreed to devote two-thirds of
its patient capacity for indigent District of Columbia residents.2"6
The hospital incidentally had been incorporated by an act of
Congress and had its own governing board. Because the hospital
essentially operated like any other hospital and performed a secular
function, the Establishment Clause was no obstacle to the federal
government's contracting with the hospital in regard to its
performance of that secular function.207
Whenever the government provides funding to a religiously-
affiliated institution in order to enable that institution to perform
a secular function, the funding has a secular purpose (the first
Lemon principle) and does not have the effect of advancing religion
(the second Lemon principle). Thus, the funding does not violate
the Establishment Clause. In Bowen v. Kendrick, °8 the Court held
that the government could include a religiously-affiliated
organization in a program of grants to private organizations to
provide counseling for the prevention of adolescent sexual relations
demonstrate some compelling reason why the usually unacceptable risk
attendant of funding such an institution should, in the particular case, be borne."
Id at 842.
205. See Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 U.S. 291 (1899).
206. See id at 294.
207. See id at 299-300.
208. 487 U.S. 589 (1988).
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and care for pregnant adolescents and adolescent parents.209 The
grant was challenged on the ground that the organizations would
use the grants to advance their religious views on adolescent sexual
relations.2 0 The Court disagreed, saying that there was no reason
to assume that the organizations would not carry out the secular
function "in a lawful, secular manner,"21 and that if a particular
organization used the grant in an improper manner, the grant could
be revoked.
The proposition that the government can provide funding to
religiously-affiliated institutions in order to enable them to perform
a secular function was relied on by the Supreme Court to uphold
federal assistance to church-affiliated colleges and universities.
Crucial to this holding was the Court's "constitutional finding of
fact" that most church-affiliated colleges and universities are
sufficiently similar to secular colleges and universities in their
educational operation, so that providing them with governmental
209. See id at 617.
210. See id at 611.
211. Id at 612.
212. See id at 611-18; see also Ira G. Lupu, Reconstructing the Establishment
Clause: The CaseAgainst DiscretionaryAccommodation ofReligion, 140 U. PA. L.
REV. 555 (1991). Professor Lupu suggests that the holding in this case reflects a
doctrine of formal equality which could require that religious institutions be
included in governmental aid programs. He states, "So long as government
decision makers are not motivated by a covert desire to aid religion qua religion,
or to aid a particular religion, religious institutions should be eligible for the
same kind and degree of assistance as other institutions serving the same purpose
in a nonreligious setting." Id at 594.
I think that Professor Lupu is reading too much into the Court's holding in
Bowen. I see nothing in the Court's opinion to indicate that the neutrality
principle requires that religiously-affiliated institutions be included in
governmental aid programs. All the case holds is that the decision of the
government to include a religiously-affiliated institution in a particular program
designed to accomplish secular objectives does not, as such, violate the
Establishment Clause. The government could, consistent with the neutrality
principle, make the determination that the danger of the funds being used for
religious purposes in the particular circumstances is sufficient to justify limiting
the funds to secular institutions.
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funding will not have the effect of "advancing religion."
Nonetheless, the particular funding program involved in these cases
did not take the form of a general grant to the institution, but was
targeted for specific secular purposes and upheld on that basis."'
Where a church-affiliated college or university operates a distinctly
sectarian program, such as a divinity school, an unrestricted grant
would presumably violate the Establishment Clause because it
would have the effect of supporting, to some degree, the
institution's sectarian program. And where a particular church-
affiliated college or university is found by the court to be a
primarily sectarian institution, any governmental aid to that
institution, of course, violates the Establishment Clause.214
2. Aid to Religious Schools and Institutions
In Everson, the Supreme Court made it clear that the
213. See Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736 (1976) (involving
grants to defray part of expense of educating students in private colleges and
universities, including grants to religiously-affiliated institutions that had given
"adequate assurance that funds would be used for a secular purpose"); Hunt v.
McNair, 413 U.S. 734 (1973) (involving state-issued revenue bonds that could be
used by church-affiliated colleges and universities to borrow funds to finance
construction of facilities used for secular purposes); Tilton v. Richardson, 403
U.S. 672 (1971) (involving federal construction grants to church-affiliated colleges
and universities for buildings and facilities used exclusively for secular purposes).
Because these church-affiliated colleges and universities are considered to be
essentially secular institutions, there is no Establishment Clause problem when
the government provides financial assistance to students attending such colleges.
See, e.g., Americans United for Separation of Church and State v. Blanton, 433
F. Supp. 97 (M.D. Tenn. 1977), affd, 434 U.S. 803 (1977); Smith v. Board of
Governors, 429 F. Supp. 871 (W.D.N.C. 1977). As indicated by Witters v.
Washington Department of Services for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986), an
Establishment Clause problem arises only when the financial assistance is
provided to a student attending an admittedly sectarian institution. See generally
infra notes 278-79 and accompanying text.
214. See, e.g., Habel v. Industrial Dev. Auth., 400 S.E.2d 516 (Va. 1991)
(holding that Jerry Falwell's Liberty University was a sectarian institution so
that the city's issuance of construction bon& for educational facilities at the
university violated the Establishment Clause).
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Establishment Clause prohibits any form of direct governmental
financial aid to sectarian elementary and secondary schools,
commonly referred to as parochial schools.21 Unlike most
religiously-affiliated colleges and universities, which are primarily
secular in operation, in the parochial schools there is a complete
admixture of the religious and the secular. While parochial schools
provide children with instruction in the secular subjects, they
dsignedly do so from a religious perspective. This is precisely why
parents choose to send their children to such schools. Thus, it is not
possible for the government to target funds to the parochial schools
to be used exclusively for secular purposes, as it can do when it is
providing funds for religiously-affiliated colleges and universities.
Because of the necessary admixture of the religious and secular in
parochial school education, the Court's assumption in Everson was
that any form of direct governmental aid to parochial schools
would be unconstitutional because this would advance the religious
purpose of the schools.216
In the earlier discussion of Everson, I suggested that the Court
could have taken a very different approach to the constitutional
permissibility of governmental financial aid to parochial schools."'
The Court could have recognized that parochial schools perform a
secular function as well as a religious one and, therefore, could have
permitted the state to assist the parochial schools in the
performance of their secular function by providing them with a
reasonable apportionment of state funding.21 8 The Court, however,
did not adopt such an approach in Everson. Instead, it held that the
Establishment Clause is violated when the government provides
direct financial aid to the parochial school, but is not violated when
the governmental funding takes the form of "aid to the child."219
While this distinction has been criticized by a number of academic
commentators as focusing on the form of the aid rather than on its
215. See Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
216. See id at 14-16.
217. See supra note 167 and accompanying text.
218. See id
219. See Everson, 330 U.S. at 18.
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substance and effect,2 ° the distinction has been followed and
applied by the Court in determining the constitutional
permissibility of governmental aid to parochial schools.
In Everson, the Court upheld a state provision of free bus
transportation to parochial school students.22 Applying the Everson
precedent, the Court has held that a state could loan parochial
school students the same textbooks in secular subjects that it loaned
to public school students.m The Court has also held that the state
could provide diagnostic services in which state employees tested
individual children for particular health and educational problems
in the parochial schools.' In the more recent case of Zobrest v.
Catalina Foothills School District, 4 a sharply divided Court held,
five-four, that where a school district provided sign-language
interpreters for deaf students in the public schools, the
Establishment Clause did not preclude it from providing a sign-
language interpreter for a student who transferred to a parochial
school.' And in its most recent holding, Agostini v. Felton, 2 6 the
220. See, e.g., William P. Marshall, Toward a Nonunifying Theory of
Unconstitutional Conditions: The Example ofthe Religion Clauses, 26 SAN DIEGO
L. REV. 243, 246-47 (1989); Simson, supra note 112, at 924-27.
221. See Everson, 330 U.S. at 17-18.
222. See Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
223. See Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977); see also Lemon v.
Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 616 (1971) (discussing school lunches). Providing these
services to children on an individual basis in the parochial schools is no different
from including parochial school students in school lunch programs or
immunizations. In this circumstance, the parochial school is merely the conduit
for the distribution of a governmental benefit to children.
224. 509 U.S. 1 (1993).
225. See id The point that divided the majority and the dissent was whether
the presence of the state-provided interpreter in the parochial school classroom
created an impermissible symbolic union between government and religion; the
majority held that it did not. See id at 13; see also Russman v. Sobol, 85 F.3d 1050
(2d Cir. 1996) (holding that a public school district's provision to a disabled
student of an on-site teaching aide and consultant teacher at a parochial school,
which it found to be required by the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act,
did not violate the Establishment Clause).
226. 117 S. Ct. 1997 (1997).
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Court, again sharply dividing five-four, held that remedial
instructional services for low-income students could be provided to
parochial school students in parochial school buildings. 7
On the other hand, the Court has held unconstitutional
virtually every governmental effort to provide direct financial aid
to parochial schools, and has invalidated some purportedly "aid to
the child" efforts as being, in effect, "aid to the school." This
pattern of results begins with Lemon, where the. Court held
unconstitutional a state program supplementing the salaries of
parochial school teachers of secular subjects.28 The Court based its
decision on the excessive entanglement principle.29' In an effort to
227. See id. at 2016. It was assumed prior to Agostini that remedial
instructional programs for low-income students constituted aid to the child
rather than direct aid to the parochial school. In Agostini, the Court majority
emphasized that remedial instructional programs, like the provision of a sign-
language interpreter in Zobrest, did not impermissibly finance religious
indoctrination. Both kinds of programs made aid available only to eligible
recipients in the school of their choice, and no funds ever reached the coffers of
parochial schools. See id at 2010-14.
The notion of "aid to the child," of course, is subject to the other constraints
of the law of the Establishment Clause, such as the endorsement/symbolic union
doctrine. In Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985), the Court had held that
because of "symbolic union" concerns, the state could not provide remedial
programs for parochial school students in the schools themselves. See id at 412-
14. In Agostini, relying on its holding in Zobrest, the Court majority-which was
the same in both cases-overruled Aguilar on this point. Agostini, 117 S. Ct. at
2014-16. Also effectively overruled on this point is that part of Meek v. Pittenger,
421 U.S. 349, 370-72 (1975), holding that the state cannot provide therapeutic
programs for parochial school students in the schools themselves.
Until Aguilar was overruled .by Agostini, these remedial programs were
provided off-premises, usually in mobile facilities parked on the parochial school
grounds. As the Court noted inAgostini, because this practice was assumed to be
constitutional in Aguilar (it was upheld by lower courts, see e.g., Walker v. San
Francisco Unified Sch. Dist., 46 F.3d 1449 (9th Cir.1995)), there could be no
claim that the provision of remedial programs for parochial school students
amounted to an impermissible subsidy for the parochial schools. SeeAgostini, 117
S. Ct. at 2014.
228. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 606-07 (1971).
229. See id at 619.
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ensure that the teachers receiving the supplements were not
including religious with secular instruction, the state imposed
restrictions on the teachers and required the submission of financial
data and the examination of school records.230 The continuing state
surveillance of the parochial schools under the program was held to
violate the Establishment Clause because it would result in an
"excessive and enduring entanglement between church and state.""'
The Court has also held that the Establishment Clause prohibits
the state from paying for the transportation of parochial school
students on field trips, 2' and from loaning parochial schools
instructional materials, such as recording equipment, laboratory
materials, and maps.23 Similarly, the state may not grant funds for
230. See id at 607-08.
231. Id. at 619. The state was in effect caught in a "catch 22" dilemma
between the second and third Lemon elements. See also Jesse H. Choper, The
Establishment Clause andAid to Parochial Schools-An Update, 75 CAL. L. REV. 5
(1987). As Professor Choper explains,
The Court began with a critical premise: the mission of church related
elementary and secondary schools is to teach religion, and all subjects
either are, or carry the potential for being, permeated with religion.
Therefore, if the government were to help fund any subjects in these
schools, the effect would aid religion unless public officials monitored
the situation to see to it that those courses were not infused with
religious doctrine. But if public officials did engage in adequate
surveillance-this is the other horn of the dilemma-there would be
excessive entanglement between government and religion, the image
being government spies regularly or periodically sitting in the classes
conducted in parochial schools.
Id at 6.
232. See Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977).
233. See id; see also Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975) (holding that the
unconstitutionality of such a loan was not obviated by the fact that the state
purportedly loaned the materials directly to the students instead of to the
schools). But see Walker v. San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist., 46 F.3d 1449 (9th
Cir. 1995). In a two-one decision, the Ninth Circuit took the position that
subsequent Supreme Court decisions "have rendered untenable the thin
distinction between textbooks and other instructional materials," and that the
loaning of instructional materials to parochial schools was now constitutionally
permissible. See id at 1465-70. While agreeing with the majority's conclusion that
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the maintenance and repair of parochial school buildings. 4 All that
the Court has permitted by way of direct financial assistance to
parochial schools has been reimbursement to the parochial schools
for expenses incurred in complying with state law requirements
designed to ensure that parochial school students are receiving an
adequate secular education, such as expenses incurred in connection
with administering state-mandated standardized educational tests
and in record-keeping.3'
However, in Agostini, the Court, overruling its prior decision
in School District of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 6 in effect retroactively
upheld the constitutionality of a "shared time" program under
which public school teachers went into the parochial schools and
taught certain "enrichment" secular subjects that were designed to
supplement the "core curriculum" of the parochial schools. Agostini
merits additional discussion at this juncture, not only because it is
the Court's most recent holding on the constitutional permissibility
of aid to parochial schools, but because it is likely to be read too
broadly both by proponents and opponents of aid to parochial
schools. Agostini was a case about where secular supplemental and
remedial services could be provided to parochial school children."'
the distinction was not tenable, the dissenting judge reluctantly insisted that only
the Supreme Court itself could abolish the distinction and that it had not yet
done so. See id at 1470. It may be noted, however, that unlike secular textbooks
or remedial services, instructional materials could also be used to teach religion.
234. See Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
235. See Committee for Pub. Educ. and Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S.
646 (1980); Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977). But see Levitt v. Committee
for Pub. Educ., 413 U.S. 472 (1973) (holding that the state may not provide the
parochial schools with an unrestricted lump-sum grant, purportedly designed to
reimburse the parochial schools for the expenses mandated by state law).
236. 473 U.S. 373 (1985); see Agostini v. Felton, 117 S. Ct. 1997,2016 (1997).
237. In Ball, the Court held that the "shared time" program, while avoiding
the entanglement problem of Lemon, since only public school teachers were
involved and since it clearly advanced the secular purpose of providing
instruction in secular subjects, was nonetheless unconstitutional under the
second Lemon principle in that it had the impermissible effect of advancing
religion. Ball, 473 U.S. at 397. As the Court in Agostini explained it, the Court
in Ball found this impermissible effect for the following three reasons: (1) the
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Precisely because the "shared time" program effectively upheld in
Agostini was supplemental to the "core curriculum" of the parochial
school, it would fall on the side of "aid to the child" rather than
"aid to the parochial school."
The Court in Agostini specifically found that the program did
not impermissibly finance religious indoctrination by subsidizing
the primary religious mission of the school. The Court noted, "We
have departed from the rule relied on in Ball that all government
aid that directly aids the educational function of religious schools
is invalid."23 The Court also noted, looking to Zobrest and Witters,
that the benefits in question were made available without regard to
the sectarian nature of the school attended and were provided as a
teachers participating in the program could become involved in intentionally or
inadvertently inculcating particular religious beliefs because the services were
dispensed on the parochial schools premises in "an atmosphere dedicated to the
advancement of religious belief," (2) the presence of public school teachers in the
parochial school classrooms created a constitutionally impermissible symbolic
union between church and state and would convey a message of endorsement of
religion, and (3) the program impermissibly financed religious indoctrination by
"subsidizing the primary religious mission of the school." Agostini, 117 S. Ct. at
2008-09. Under this rationale, the Court also invalidated the provision of
remedial services to parochial school children in parochial school buildings in
Aguilar. See id at 2009-10.
The Court inAgostini took the position that these assumptions of the Court
in Ball were undermined by "our Inore recent cases." Id. at 2010. Looking
especially to Zobrest, the Court said that "we have abandoned the presumption
erected in Meek and Ball that the placement of public employees on parochial
school grounds inevitably results in the impermissible effect of state-sponsored
indoctrination or constitutes a symbolic union between government and
religion." Id. Rather, as in Zobrest, it would be assumed, in the absence of
evidence to the contrary, that the public employee would faithfully perform his
or her duties and would not engage in any religious indoctrination. Similarly, the
Court said that Zobrest implicitly rejected the notion "that the presence of a
public employee on private school property creates an impermissible 'symbolic
link' between government and religion." Id. at 2011. Because the first two
assumptions on which Ball rested had been undermined, the decision could no
longer be justified on that basis. See idat 2010-12. The third assumption relating
to the matter of subsidization is discussed in the text.
238. Agostini, 117 S. Ct. at 2011.
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result of the independent choice of the individual involved. 2 9 At
this point,'the Court turned its attention to the Title I funds for
remedial instruction that were directly involved in Aguilar. It
pointed out that by law, Title I services are supplemental to the
regular curricula and that no Title I funds ever reached the "coffers
of religious schools."240 Because the remedial services provided by
the program did not supplant the remedial instruction and guidance
counseling already provided by the parochial schools, they did not
"'reliev[e] sectarian schools of costs they otherwise would have
borne in educating their students,' 24' and did not "have the effect
of advancing religion by creating a financial incentive to
undertake" 42 sectarian education. The same rationale would apply
to the "supplemental secular instruction" provided under the
"shared time" program in Ball, and for this reason, the Court
overruled the "shared time" holding in Ball along with the holding
in Aguilar.243
The effect of Agostini then is to allow the state to provide
remedial services and "supplemental secular instruction" to
parochial school students in the parochial schools themselves. But
Agostini does not alter in any way the proposition that the
government cannot provide direct financial aid to parochial
schools. The Court in Agostini was very careful to maintain the
fundamental Everson distinction between constitutionally
impermissible direct governmental financial aid to parochial schools
and constitutionally permissible aid to the child. While the Court
said that government aid is not necessarily unconstitutional merely
because it directly aids the educational function of religious
schools,244 it emphasized that the aid must be, in substance, aid to
the child rather than aid to the school, that the aid must advance a
239. See id at 2011-12.
240. Id. at 2013.
241. Id. (quoting Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1, 12
(1993)).
242. Id. at 2014.
243. See id. at 2016.
244. See id at 2011.
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clearly secular purpose which is supplemental to the religious
purpose of the school,245 and that the aid cannot be so substantial or
of such a nature as to create a significant financial incentive for
parents to choose a parochial school education for their children4 6
In regard to the permissibility of aid to religious schools then, the
impact of Agostini is fairly limited.
A form of indirect aid to parochial schools involves the state's
giving tax benefits to parents who send their children to parochial
schools. Presumably, this form of aid reduces the costs of parochial
school education and therefore provides a financial incentive for
parents to send their children to parochial schools. In Committeefor
Public Education and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist,247 the Supreme
Court held unconstitutional the state's grant of a tax credit for
school tuition paid by parents whose children were attending
private or parochial schools.24 The Supreme Court reasoned that
by lowering the cost of parochial school education for these
parents, the government was subsidizing parochial school
education.249  The Court held this subsidization to be
unconstitutional.' However, in Mueller v. Allen,"' the Court held
that there was no violation of the Establishment Clause when the
state allowed parents to take a tax deduction for educational
expenses, notwithstanding that most of the deductions were taken
for parochial school tuition. 2
Some academic commentators are troubled by the implications
of the Mueller decision, especially insofar as it indicated that the
Establishment Clause is not violated simply because the tax
deduction made it easier for parents to exercise a private choice to
245. See id. at 2014.
246. See id.
247. 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
248. See id at 794.
249. See id
250. See id
251. 463 U.S. 388 (1983).
252. See id at 402.
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send their children to parochial schools.253 There is no doubt that
the Court could have held that the tax deduction in Mueller, like
the tax credit in Nyquist, violated the Establishment Clause because
the practical effect of the deduction was to subsidize parochial
school education. However, as this Article will discuss shortly, the
Court has consistently held that the Establishment Clause is not
necessarily violated by the inclusion of the religious with the secular
in the provision of a governmental financial benefit, such as a tax
exemption.' The facial neutrality of the tax deduction in Mueller
enabled the Court to distinguish Nyquist and to bring the case
within the scope of its inclusion precedents. 5
The Court's precedents in the area of financial aid to parochial
schools reveal that the state may constitutionally provide certain
forms of aid to children attending parochial schools, such as bus
transportation to school,"5 the loan of secular textbooks,"' and
remedial and supplemental education services.2 s However, any
form of direct financial aid to parochial schools, whether in cash or
253. See Simson, supra note 112. Professor Simson says that the tax deduction
has a substantial effect of supporting religion with public funds....
Although a tax deduction is not an expenditure of public funds in form,
it plainly is so in fact. Moreover, by relieving parents of a tangible part
of the cost of educating their children in public schools, this deduction
materially increases the likelihood that parents contemplating sending
their children to parochial school will decide to do so.
Id at 926; see also Choper, supra note 231, at 9-10. Professor Choper says that
Mueller is indistinguishable from Nyquist. In both instances, the state was trying
to provide some financial relief to parents who sent their children to private
schools, including parochial schools. See id at 8. He contends that it should not
matter that the law in Mueller was facially neutral, while the law in Nyquist
expressly favored religion, as the record showed that 96% of the tax deductions
under the law were taken for parochial school payments. See id at 9. He
concludes that the decision in Mueller "opened a large window for aid to
parochial schools." Id at 11.
254. See infra notes 268-77 and accompanying text.
255. See Mueller, 463 U.S. at 402.
256. See Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
257. See Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
258. See Agostini v. Felton, 117 S. Ct. 1997 (1997).
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in kind, has been held unconstitutional, except for reimbursement
for services mandated by the state. The state may provide tax
benefits for parents of all schoolchildren, notwithstanding that
most of the tax benefits are claimed by parents of children attending
parochial schools.29
Another area of dispute involves whether school voucher
programs are constitutionally permissible. This question has been
much discussed by legal commentators and others,260 but at the
259. A useful table, listing the Court's decisions in this area as of 1985, can
be found in John H. Garvey, Another Way ofLooking at SchoolAid, 1985 Sup.
CT. REV. 61, 66-67.
Many academic commentators are highly critical of the Court's decisions in
the area of financial aid to parochial schools. See, e.g., Choper, supra note 231, at
6 ("It is fair to say that subsequent decisions [since Lemon] have produced a
conceptual disaster area."). Here Professor Choper criticizes what he sees as the
inconsistencies regarding government funding for private schools. See id He finds
incongruities in permitting government funding of bus transportation to the
school but not for field trips, in distinguishing between loaning textbooks and
loaning instructional materials, and in distinguishing (subsequently eliminated
in Agostini) between the provision of remedial services inside the school and off-
premises. See id But see Garvey at 63-92. Professor Garvey sees the Court's
decisions in this area quite differently. Professor Garvey compares the Court's
decisions in this area with the anti-discrimination principle applied by the courts
and agencies in the administration of Title IX of the Civil Rights Act, which
prohibits sex discrimination in educational programs receiving federal assistance.
See id- at 63-65. He concludes as follows:
I have shown that the anti-establishment and anti-discrimination
principles in school aid cases are both ultimately concerned with
preventing the government from causing improper effects by giving
financial assistance to private institutions. The agencies and courts
implementing Title IX have developed elaborate and fairly consistent
rules for determining how and when such effects occur. Perhaps it
should not be surprising that those effects rules work in nearly the same
way when applied to the problem of parochial school aid. But it is
reassuring, in a way, that the Supreme Court-acting in an ad hoc
fashion over a period of nearly 40 years-has worked out an architecture
for the Establishment Clause that matches up so well, point for point,
with a statutory and regulatory system designed as a coherent whole.
Id at 92.
260. See generally George W. Dent, Jr., Of God and Caesar: The Free Exercise
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present time, and probably for the foreseeable future, it is rather
academic. No state has enacted a voucher program, and Congress
has made no provision for vouchers in federal education
programs.26 The extent of voucher programs appears to be limited
to a few efforts to subsidize the attendance of some low-income
children at parochial schools, 262  which have been held
unconstitutional in state court challenges.263
Right of Public School Students, 43 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 707, 749-52 (1993)
(summarizing the debate over the constitutional permissibility of vouchers).
261. See, e.g., Adam Nagourney, Dole Backs School Choice Through Use of
Vouchers, N.Y. TMES, July 19, 1996, at A8. In the 1996 Presidential election,
Republican candidate Bob Dole proposed a $5-billion-a-year federal "school
choice" program that would provide vouchers for parents of four million low-
and middle-income children that the parents could use to send their children to
private or parochial schools. See id; see generally Saying No to Private Schools at
Public Cost, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 28, 1996, at B6. A recent Phi Delta Kappa/Gallup
poll showed that the public rejects 610/6-36%, the idea of letting students and
their parents choose a private school at public expense, and that 54% of the
respondents opposed voucher programs under which the government would pay
part or all of the tuition at private and parochial schools. See id
262. See Kimberly J. McLarin, Ohio Paying Some Tuition for Religious School
Students, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 28, 1996, at B6. Ohio has provided $5.2 million for
a two-year pilot program under which up to 2000 low- and moderate-income K-3
children receive state funding to pay tuition at private schools, including
parochial ones. Wisconsin has a pilot program for low-income K-12 children in
Milwaukee, under which up to 15,000 receive state funding to pay tuition at
private schools, including parochial ones. See id
263. See Simmons-Harris v. Goff, No. 96APE08-982, No. 96APE08-991,
1997 Ohio App. LEXIS 1776, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. May 1, 1997); State of
Wisconsin ex rel Thompson v. Jackson, 546 N.W.2d 140 (Wis. 1996). In
Simmons-Harris, an Ohio appellate court struck down the Ohio pilot program
as violative of both the Establishment Clause and the state constitution religion
clause. The court found that the program provided "substantial nonneutral
governmental aid directly to sectarian schools," and that it was irrelevant that the
government did so "by passing the aid through the hands of private individuals
en route to the sectarian institution." Simmons-Harris, 1997 Ohio App. 1776, at
*26-27. Thompson involved a challenge to the extension of the Milwaukee
voucher program to parochial schools. See Thompson, 546 N.W.2d at 142. The
lower court had issued a preliminary injunction against the extension. See id The
Wisconsin Supreme Court was divided three-three on the question, so the
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There are two basic kinds of proposed voucher programs. This
Article will refer to them as the "big voucher" program and the
"little voucher" program. Under the "big voucher" program, a
state's elementary and secondary education would be completely
restructured to give all parents the "freedom of choice" as to where
to send their children to school. The state would give each parent
a voucher, for instance worth $5000, which the parent could use for
educational purposes. The parent could exchange the voucher for
admission to a public school or could use the voucher to pay for or
offset the tuition at a private or parochial school. A "little voucher"
program would be similar to the programs in Milwaukee and
Cleveland. The state would provide money for a limited number of
low- and moderate-income children to attend private schools,
including parochial schools.2"
I submit that under applicable Supreme Court doctrine and
precedent, both the "big voucher" program and the "little voucher"
program should be held unconstitutional. The "big voucher"
program involves a complete restructuring of the system of
elementary and secondary education in the state. The government
would now be providing substantial financial assistance to the
parochial schools, and tax dollars clearly would be used for the
benefit of a religious institution. As we have seen, the Court's
precedents preclude any direct form of financial aid to parochial
schools, in cash or in kind. The Court has also held some aid
programs purportedly taking the form of "aid to the student"
unconstitutional. The fact that massive governmental aid would be
filtered to the parochial schools by way of a voucher to the parents,
and would result from the parents' "private choice," does not alter
the fact that the government would thereby be providing massive
injunction remained in effect. See id Three judges took the position that the
extension violated the state constitution. See id Three judges took the position
that the challengers had not shown beyond a reasonable doubt that the extension
violated the state constitution or the Establishment Clause. See id They based
their decision on the fact that the extension, like the original program, was
"limited and experimental." Id at 142 n.2.
264. See supra note 262.
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financial aid to parochial schools. The Establishment Clause forbids
this.26
5
The "little voucher" program suffers from the same
constitutional infirmity because the government would, in effect,
be paying the tuition at parochial schools for a number of children
who otherwise would not be attending parochial schools. There is
a clear difference between the government allowing a tax deduction
for educational expenses, including tuition at parochial schools as
in Mueller,26 and the government itself paying a student's tuition at
a parochial school. Again, the fact that the government's payment
of tuition would be the result of the parents' "private choice" does
not alter the fact that it is the government that is paying the tuition,
thereby providing direct financial aid to the parochial schools.
Should the question ever arise, I predict that under existing doctrine
and precedents, the courts would hold a "little voucher" program,
like a "big voucher" program, unconstitutional.
265. InAgostini, the Court emphasized that under the programs at issue, "no
public funds ever reach the coffers of religious schools," and, citing Zobrest v.
Catalina Foothills SchoolDistrict, 509 U.S. 1 (1993), stated that the services do not
"relieve sectarian schools of costs they otherwise would have borne in educating
their students." Agostini v. Felton, 117 S. Ct. 1997, 2013 (1997). Finally, the
Court stated that the eligibility criteria under the program did not "have the
effect of advancing religion by creating a financial incentive for students to
undertake sectarian education," or "[c]reate a financial incentive for parents to
choose a sectarian school." Id. at 2014. This is exactly what voucher programs are
designed to do by giving parents a "choice" between public schools and religious
schools. Without the financial incentive of vouchers, it is assumed that parents
are less likely to make the "choice" in favor of religious schools.
266. Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983).
267. See Choper, supra note 231, at 13; John H. Garvey, All Things Being
Equal..., 1996 BYU L. REV. 587, 599. Professor Choper fears that the Supreme
Court's decision in Witters v. Washington Department ofServicesfor the Blind, 474
U.S. 481 (1986), coupled with the holding in Mueller, support the
constitutionality of vouchers. See Choper, supra note 231, at 13. He appears to
be referring to what I have described as a "little voucher" program, although he
does not draw that distinction. In Witters, the Court held that a blind student,
using state payments provided to blind students for educational purposes to
attend a sectarian college in order to pursue a religious vocation, did not violate
the Establishment Clause. See Witters, 474 U.S. at 489. Professor Choper cites the
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3. Equal Treatment ofReligion
The Supreme Court has held that because the Establishment
Clause does not require governmental hostility to religion,
including the religious with the secular in the receipt of a
following language in Mueller, repeated in the Powell concurring opinion in
Witters: "'state programs that are wholly neutral in offering educational
assistance to a class defined without reference to religion do not violate the
second part of the Lemon v. Kurtzman test, because any aid to religion results
from the private choices of individual beneficiaries.'" Choper, supra note 231, at
13 (quoting Witters, 474 U.S. at 490-91). Professor Choper states that this
language "clearly describe[s] a situation that includes vouchers: the aid goes to the
parents who have children in schools-public, private, and parochial; if the
vouchers are cashed at parochial schools, that is the product of private choice."
Id Professor Garvey also maintains that as a doctrinal matter, Witters settles the
constitutionality of vouchers because a voucher program would be neutral in
that it "would not influence the direction of people's religious choices." Garvey
at 599.
I disagree with Professors Choper's and Garvey's forebodings on this score.
Mueller involved a tax deduction, and Witters involved the "private choice" of a
handicapped person to use a state grant to pursue a religious vocation by
attending a sectarian college. These are very different from the state subsidizing
parochial schools by using state funds to pay tuition at those schools. Because the
state cannot constitutionally give direct financial assistance to parochial schools,
it cannot use state funds to pay the tuition of children attending those schools,
notwithstanding that it does so by the use of vouchers. In the context of state
payment of tuition at parochial schools, so-called "private choice" is
constitutionally irrelevant. Indeed, as Professor Garvey observed with respect to
the deductions upheld in Mueller.
One approach to justifying the practice [of deductions for
educational expenses] has been to emphasize that (as with Social
Security) the benefit to an institution is "ultimately controlled by the
private choices of individual parents." That will not work. The
government knows exactly what parents will take the deduction for
(tuition); the only question is whether they will take it. The real
explanation for these cases is not that the school is not a "recipient" but
that tax deductions for contributors-like tax exemptions for the
schools-do not count as "financial assistance."
Garvey, supra note 259, at 71-72. For the same reason, I submit that Witters'
decision to use his grant to attend a sectarian college does not count as "financial
assistance" to the sectarian college.
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governmental benefit does not necessarily violate the Establishment
Clause. The leading case on this subject is Walz v. Tax
Commission,26 where the Court held that a property tax exemption
for non-profit institutions, including churches, did not violate the
Establishment Clause.269 The inclusion of church property in the
exemption promoted "benevolent neutrality" toward religionV and
avoided the "entanglement" problems that could result from
governmental valuation of church property for tax purposes and
enforcement of the tax against church property.2 '
Nonetheless, the property tax exemption for church property
conferred a very valuable financial benefit on churches, and like any
other tax exemption, effectively subsidized the churches' activity.'
The effect of Walz is to allow the state to provide a financial benefit
to religion through a tax exemption when it could not provide such
a benefit through a direct grant. Crucial to the Court's holding in
Walz is the matter of inclusion. The tax exemption was for non-
profit institutions. Therefore, churches qualified for the grant, not
because they were churches, but because they were included within
the class of non-profit institutions. As one commentator put it,
"those institutions shared a relevant nonreligious attribute with
secular institutions." 3 There is no doubt that a property tax
268. 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
269. See idL at 680.
270. See id- at 669, 671-73.
271. See id at 674-76; see also supra note 120 (noting that the "entanglement"
that was avoided by exempting church property from the tax would not justify
an exemption for church property alone).
272. See Marshall, supra note 3. Professor Marshall notes that the tax
exemption in Walz provided a more significant benefit to religion than any
other, so that the result is inconsistent with the Establishment Clause objective
of prohibiting financial aid to religion. See id at 500-01; see also CHOPER, supra
note 14. Professor Choper also attacks the result in Waz as endangering religious
liberty because the effect of the exemption is to allow tax funds to be expended
for religious purposes. See id at 37.
273. Greene, supra note 113, at 1627. Professor Greene also lists Everson as
an inclusion case and states as follows:
In both Everson and Walz, there was no indication that the program
was enacted to advance the tenets of a particular religious faith. Rather
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exemption for churches alone would violate the Establishment
Clause as a preference for religion, notwithstanding that such an
exemption would avoid the "entanglement" problems that the
Court identified in Walz. This point is demonstrated by Texas
Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock,2 4 where the Court held unconstitutional
an exemption from the state sales tax law for "[p]eriodicals that are
published or distributed by a religious faith and that consist wholly
of writings promulgating the teaching of the faith and books that
consist wholly of writings sacred to a religious faith."7 5 In other
words, it is the matter of the inclusion of the religious with the
secular that marks the distinction between the constitutionally
permissible equal treatment of religion and the constitutionally
impermissible preference for religion.7 6
Because the inclusion of the religious with the secular in the
receipt of a governmental benefit does not necessarily violate the
Establishment Clause, an Establishment Clause violation would
only occur when the inclusion in the particular benefit is
inconsistent with a specific Establishment Clause principle or
doctrine. In a series of cases, the Supreme Court has held that
providing religious groups with equal access to public facilities for
purposes of expression does not violate the Establishment Clause.
these cases involved general legislative programs that were not related
to religion, but that included religious institutions incidentally because
those institutions shared a relevant nonreligious attribute with secular
institutions.
Id
274. 489 U.S. 1 (1989).
275. Ia at 5 (quoting TEx. TAX CODE ANN. S 151.312 (1982)).
276. See Michael W. McConnell, Religious Freedom at a Crossroads, 59 U.
CHI. L. REv. 115, 184 (1992). As Professor McConnell has observed-
When the government provides no financial support to the nonprofit
sector except for churches, it aids religion. But when the government
provides financial support to the entire nonprofit sector, religious and
nonreligious institutions alike, on the basis of objective criteria, it does
not aid religion. It aids higher education, health care, or child care; it is
neutral to religion.
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Such access, standing alone, does not have the effect of advancing
religion; it does not create a symbolic union between government
and religion, nor does it constitute governmental endorsement of
the religious group's message. At this point, the freedom of
expression component of the First Amendment comes into play.
Under the First Amendment public forum doctrine, whenever the
government designates public property or facilities as a public
forum, it must provide all groups equal access to the property for
the purpose of expression. Since providing equal access to religious
groups for purposes of expression does not violate the
Establishment Clause, the government is constitutionally required
to provide such access under the First Amendment public forum
doctrine.2
277. See Capitol Square Review and Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753
(1995) (statehouse plaza dedicated as a public forum); Lamb's Chapel v. Center
Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384 (1993) (after-school use of school
facilities by private groups); Board of Educ. of Westside Community Schs. v.
Mergens, 496 U.S. 226 (1990) (facilities of public schools available for use by
student groups); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981) (facilities of state
university available for use by student groups); see also supra notes 55-56 and
accompanying text. See generally Garvey, supra note 267, at 588-92 (discussing the
interaction between the Establishment Clause, the First Amendment public
forum doctrine, and the content neutrality principle in this situation).
For applicable lower court cases see Hsu v. Roslen Union Free Sch. Dist.
No. 3, 85 F.3d 839 (2d Cir. 1996) (holding that where facilities of public school
were available for use by student groups, school could not exclude student Bible
club that required its officers to be Christians); Church on the Rock v. City of
Albuquerque, 84 F.3d 1273 (10th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 360 (1996)
(holding that where city-owned senior center was designated as a limited public
forum, city could not prohibit sectarian instruction and religious worship);
Grossbaum v. Indianapolis-Marion County Bldg. Auth., 63 F.3d 581 (7th Cir.
1995) (holding that where city-county building was opened up for "seasonal
displays," religious seasonal displays, such as a Chanukah menorah, could not be
excluded); Fairfax Covenant Church v. Fairfax City Sch. Bd., 17 F.3d 703 (4th
Cir. 1994) (holding that school board's policy of charging religious groups higher
rental rates than other non-profit groups for after-school use of school facilities
violates the First Amendment); Hawley v. City of Cleveland, 24 F.3d 814 (6th
Cir. 1994) (holding that the city's lease of airport facilities to Catholic Diocese
for use as an airport chapel, free of charge, in the same manner as airport facilities
1997] 1393
THE WAYNE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 43:1317
Likewise, in three other cases, the Court has found that the
inclusion of the religious with the secular in the particular benefit
did not violate the Establishment Clause, even though the effect of
the inclusion provided a substantial financial benefit to religious
institutions. In Witters v. Washington Department of Services for the
Blind,V the Court unanimously held that the Establishment Clause
was not violated when a blind student used state payments,
provided to such students for educational purposes, to attend a
clearly sectarian college for the purpose of pursuing a religious
vocation. In retrospect, as indicated by the unanimous holding, the
result in Witters is not inconsistent with Establishment Clause
doctrine. The program in Witters was designed to enable
handicapped students to receive an education so that they could
acquire marketable skills, and the student in question wanted to
pursue a religious vocation. The most logical place for him to
acquire the necessary training was at a sectarian college. The state's
payment of his tuition at the college advanced the secular purpose
of providing this handicapped person with marketable skills, and
in this sense, he was treated equally with other handicapped
students who received benefits under the program. In these,
circumstances, the benefit to the student justified the state's
payment of his tuition at a sectarian college, which ordinarily the
state cannot constitutionally do.279
are leased to other non-profit organzations, did not violate the Establishment
Clause); Good News/Good Sports Club v. Sch. Dist., 28 F.3d 1501 (8th Cir.
1994), cert denied, 515 U.S. 1173 (1995) (holding that where school district
opened school facilities after hours for use by the Scouts and athletic groups, it
was required to also open them for use by non-denominational religious group).
In a similar vein, a recent Ninth Circuit case, involving the religious speech
of public employees, held unconstitutional a governmental regulation
prohibiting "religious advocacy" and the display of religious materials outside
employees' cubicles or offices. Because the ban was not necessary to avoid an
Establishment Clause violation by the state, the ban violated the First
Amendment's content neutrality principle. Tucker v. State of California Dep't
of Educ., 97 F.3d 1204 (9th Cir. 1996).
278. 474 U.S. 481 (1986).
279. See supra notes 260-67 and accompanying text (discussion regarding the
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The other two cases, Mueller v. Allen2s and Rosenberger v.
University of Virginia,281 are more difficult, as evidenced by the fact
that they were both five-four decisions. Mueller was discussed
earlier in connection with aid to parochial schools. 2s2 At this point,
Mueller is relevant because it illustrates how far the Court has
carried the inclusion of the religious with the secular in the benefit.
The Court had previously held unconstitutional the state's grant of
a tax credit for school tuition paid by parents whose children were
attending private or parochial schools.33 By lowering the cost of
parochial school education for these parents, the government was
subsidizing parochial school education, and the Court held this
subsidization to be unconstitutional.2 4 The same kind of
subsidizatiori for parochial school education resulted when the state
allowed parents to take a tax deduction for educational expenses in
Mueller, as most of the deductions were taken for tuition payments
by parents who were sending their children to parochial schools. 285
A majority of the Court took the position that this was
constitutionally irrelevant because the deduction was facially
inclusive in that it was available for all educational expenses, and it
could be claimed by parents whose children were attending public
and non-sectarian private schools. But in reaching this conclusion,
the Court had to ignore the fact that in actual operation, the
primary effect of the deduction was to benefit parochial school
education. If the Court had gone beyond the facial neutrality of the
deduction, it would have been compelled to hold that the deduction
had the impermissible effect of advancing religion, thereby
unconstitutionality of voucher programs).
280. 463 U.S. 388 (1983).
281. 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
282. See supra text accompanying notes 251-52.
283. See Committee for Pub. Educ. and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413
U.S. 756 (1973).
284. See id
285. See Mueller, 463 U.S. at 405 (Marshall, J., dissenting). As Justice
Marshall pointed out in his dissent, 95% of the 90,000 students who were in
private schools were in sectarian schools. See id
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violating the second Lemon principle.286
Mueller is at the opposite end of the spectrum from Witters. In
Witters, the program benefitted all handicapped students by
providing them with training for their vocation. Additionally, the
state's payment of the student's tuition at a sectarian college enabled
him to obtain the same kind of training for his vocation as secular
school students would obtain for their vocation.287 Mueller is also
far removed from Walz because in Walz, the property tax
exemption benefitted all non-profit entities, of which churches
were only a part.288 Thus, Mueller stands for the proposition that as
long as the religious is included with the secular in a benefit
program, the program is deemed not to have the effect of advancing
religion for constitutional purposes, notwithstanding that it may
realistically have this effect in actual operation.2"
The Rosenberger case has been discussed at length previously.2 '
In a five-four decision, the Court held that a public university's
payment of the printing costs of a religious-oriented student
publication, along with the printing costs of other student
286. See generally Choper, supra note 231, at 10 (arguing that when the
"effect" element of Lemon stood in the way of a result that the Court wanted to
reach, the Court "simply ignored any realistic application of its doctrine"); Van
Alstyne, supra note 107, at 909 n.2 (citing Mueller as a case where the "Lemon
test" was not followed at all).
287. See Witters v. Washington Dep't of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481
(1986).
288. See Rosenberger v. University of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819 (1995) (noting
that all the other student groups at the university received the benefit).
289. See supra notes 260-67 and accompanying text (the rationale of Mueller
does not authorize voucher programs). Mueller was decided in 1983, the same
year that the Court decided Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983), where the
Court explicitly-and aberrationally-employed a strict historical analysis to
uphold the constitutionality of legislative prayer. See also infra text
accompanying notes 342-45. In 1984, the Court decided Lynch v. Donnelly, 465
U.S. 668 (1984), in which it upheld the inclusion of a nativity scene in a holiday
season display. It would appear that at this point in time, a majority of the Court
took a more "accommodationist" view of the Establishment Clause than it had
taken both previously and subsequently.
290. See supra notes 50-72 and accompanying text.
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publications, did not violate the Establishment Clause. This being
so, the university's refusal to pay the printing costs of the
religiously-oriented student publication violated the First
Amendment's equal access principle. However, unlike the earlier
equal access cases,29' the claim of the religious group in Rosenberger
did not involve access to public facilities, but to public funds. The
Supreme Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence is hostile to
the notion that the government can directly provide funding for
religious groups to use for religious purposes. In all of the cases
discussed above, the governmental benefit program did not involve
the direct grant of funds to religious groups. Walz involved a tax
exemption that included religious groups, Mueller involved a tax
deduction that was used primarily by parents of children attending
parochial schools, and Witters involved a tuition payment to a
sectarian college for training to a blind student to enable him to
pursue his chosen vocation 9 While some academic commentators
contend that the practical effect of a governmental subsidy is no
different from that of a direct grant,293 that distinction has been
very important in the Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence.
The payment of funds for the printing of the religiously
oriented student publication sharply divided the Court in
Rosenberger. The four dissenting Justices contended that the
Establishment Clause prohibited a public university from paying
for the printing of a religious message, and that the impermissibility
of this form of aid to religion was not obviated by the fact that the
university paid for the printing of non-religious messages.294 This
fact also troubled Justice O'Connor, who cast the deciding vote to
uphold the constitutional permissibility of the payment. Justice
O'Connor stated that this was a hard case because "[it] lies at the
intersection of the principle of government neutrality[295 ] and the
291. See supra note 66.
292. See supra notes 268-89 and accompanying text.
293. See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 876-85.
294. See id at 876-99.
295. The principle of complete official neutrality toward religion is, as we
have said, the overriding principle of the Establishment Clause, and it permits
1997] 1397
THE WAYNE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 43:1317
prohibition on state funding of religious activities. ""' She then took
the position that "[w]hen two bedrock principles so conflict," the
Court can only resolve the conflict by "draw[ing] lines, sometimes
quite fine, based on the particular facts of each case."297 Here, Justice
O'Connor drew the line on the side of the permissibility of the
expenditure by emphasizing three facts: (1) the student organization
was completely separate from the university; (2) the funds were
paid directly to the outside printer and so could only be used for
printing the publication; and (3) there could be no perception of
governmental endorsement of the publication's religious message,
as fifteen other publications were supported by the university in the
same manner.
298
Justice O'Connor's reliance on the fact that the funds could
only be used for printing the publication, a point that was also
made in the majority opinion,299 indicates that the Court might
have reached a different result if the university had provided a cash
grant to all recognized student organizations. Because the cash grant
would be a direct payment that could be used by the religious
organization for religious activity, a Court majority might conclude
that this was too severe a breach of the prohibition on state funding
of religious activities. However, it might not. All that can be said
is that should this question come before the Court, it will be even
harder for the Court to resolve than the question decided in
Rosenberger.
We see then that the Court has gone quite far in holding that
the inclusion of the religious with the secular in the receipt of a
governmental benefit does not necessarily violate the Establishment
Clause. Indeed, in all of the cases coming before it, the Court,
although sometimes sharply divided, has managed to come up with
the inclusion of the religious with the secular in a governmental benefit program.
The principle of government neutrality, in this case toward the content of
expression, is also the basis of the First Amendment's equal access principle.
296. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 847.
297. Id
298. See id at 848-52.
299. See id at 84244.
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a majority to hold that providing a particular benefit to the
religious as well as the secular was constitutionally permissible.
Again, none of the cases have involved a direct grant of financial aid
to a religious entity, and this may be the point at which the Court,
if ever presented with the question, will draw the line. In the
meantime, it can be said that as a general proposition, the
Establishment Clause permits the government to include the
religious with the secular in the receipt of a governmental benefit.
C. GovernmentalAction Purportedly Advancing Religion
The cases discussed in this section involve the application of the
second Lemon principle, advancing or inhibiting religion, and the
subsidiary doctrines implementing that principle. In my analysis of
Establishment Clause litigation, there are comparatively few
Supreme Court cases in this area. Most of the Supreme Court cases
fall into the other areas that I have identified. However, there are
a number of recent lower court cases in this area.
An important subsidiary doctrine in this area is that of primary
effect and incidental benefit. Where the primary effect of a
governmental action is to advance a secular purpose rather than a
religious one, that action does not violate the Establishment Clause,
although it provides an incidental benefit to religion. This doctrine
was articulated and applied in the pre-Lemon case of McGowan v.
Maryand,"° where the Court upheld the constitutionality of state
Sunday closing laws against Establishment Clause challenge.
Regardless of their historic origins, these laws could be justified as
advancing the secular purpose of providing employees with a
uniform day of rest? 1 Because these laws effectively advanced this
secular purpose, it did not matter that the day chosen coincided
with the Christian Sabbath and so provided an "incidental benefit"
to religion. 02
300. 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
301. See id. at 444-45.
302. See id at 445.
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The result reached in the application of this doctrine may
depend on whether it is reasonably possible to find a secular
purpose for the law in question. This is illustrated by two federal
court of appeals cases involving state-mandated Good Friday
closings. The Ninth Circuit held that Hawaii's declaration of Good
Friday as a state holiday did not violate the Establishment Clause
because it had the secular purpose of providing Hawaiians with an
additional holiday.3 Once the court found that the law had this
secular purpose, it concluded, in reliance on McGowan, that the law
did not have the effect of advancing religion merely because the day
chosen for the additional holiday coincided with a day that many
state employees would choose to be absent from work for religious
reasons °4 In contrast, the Seventh Circuit held unconstitutional a
state law requiring school closures on Good Friday." 5 The court
rejected the state's proffered justifications, such as that the law was
necessary because large numbers of students would be absent that
day or that the law was an effort to provide a "spring weekend" for
the students." 6 Because the law was not found to have a clear
secular purpose, its singling out a religious holiday for special
treatment violated both the first and second Lemon principles." 7
The Supreme Court's holiday season display cases involve the
Court's application of both the primary effect and incidental
303. See Cammack v. Waihee, 932 F.2d 765 (9th Cir. 1991).
304. See id at 775-78.
305. See Metzl v. Leinnger, 57 F.3d 618 (7th Cir. 1995).
306. See id at 621-23.
307. See id In the recent case of Granzeier v. Middleton, 955 F. Supp. 741
(E.D. Ky. 1997), the court found that a county's closing of the courthouse on
Good Friday, which had been of very-long standing, was intended to be part of
a "spring holiday" and so was constitutionally permissible. The case was
apparently prompted by a county official posting a sign in April 1996,
announcing that the courthouse would be closed that Friday "for observance of
Good Friday" and including a picture of a four inch high crucifix with an image
of Christ on it. The sign was removed as soon as the suit was brought. The court
found that the sign display was unconstitutional and issued an injunction against
such displays in the future. The one-time posting of this sign, however, was
found not to alter the overall secular purpose and effect of the closure.
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benefit doctrine and the endorsement/symbolic union doctrine. In
Lynch v. Donnelly°8 the Court held, five-four, that the inclusion of
a nativity scene in a governmentally-sponsored Christmas holiday
season display, containing a Santa Claus, Christmas trees, toy
animals, and the other secular symbols of Christmas, did not violate
the Establishment Clause."° The Burger plurality opinion
illustrates the application of the primary effect and incidental
benefit doctrine. Burger saw the primary effect of the display to be
the celebration of the Christmas season by the display of its
traditional symbols, such as a nativity scene.31 The first part of the
Burger opinion seemed to be saying that as long as the symbol used
was a traditional one, even if purely religious in nature, the display
did not have the primary effect of advancing religion and that any
benefit to religion was "incidental." 311 It is clear from the first part
of the opinion that Chief Justice Burger and the other Justices who
joined in it would have upheld the constitutionality of the display
of a nativity scene, standing alone.
The crucial fifth vote to uphold the constitutionality of the
display was cast by Justice O'Connor. In her concurring opinion,
Justice O'Connor set forth what was subsequently to become the
"endorsement" part of the endorsement/symbolic union doctrine.
The question for her was whether the display would be perceived
by an objective observer as sending a message of endorsement of
Christianity. She concluded that the display would not be
perceived as sending a message of endorsement because the
inclusion of the nativity scene along with all the secular symbols of
Christmas did no more than acknowledge the historically religious
origin of what had now become a secular holiday.1 4 The second
part of the Burger opinion likewise emphasizes the fact that the
308. 465 U.S. 668 (1984); see supra notes 25-28 and accompanying text.
309. See id. at 671, 685.
310. Seeid at 680-81.
311. Seeid at 673-78.
312. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
313. See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 687-89.
314. See id at 692-95.
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nativity scene was included as a part of a larger holiday season
display and that in that context, it was an acknowledgment of the
historical origin of the holiday.315
A reader of the Burger and O'Connor opinions would probably
conclude that Burger would vote to uphold the constitutionality of
a nativity scene display standing alone, while O'Connor would
probably find the unadorned display unconstitutional. 6 When that
question came before the Court in 1989 in Allegheny County v.
American Civil Liberties Union,317 O'Connor joined with the four
Lynch dissenters. The Court held, in another five-four decision, that
the display of an unadorned nativity scene would send a message of
endorsement of Christianity, thus violating the
endorsement/symbolic union doctrine and the advancing or
inhibiting religion principle.318 However, in line with the holding
in Lynch, the Court in Allegheny County also held that the inclusion
of a Chanukah menorah as part of a "salute to liberty" display, next
to a large Christmas tree and a "Salute to Liberty" sign, did not
send a message of endorsement of Christianity and so was
constitutionality permissible.1
The result of the Court's decisions in Lynch and Allegheny
315. See id. at 680-87.
316. In ACLU v. City of Birmingham, 791 F.2d 1561 (6th Cir. 1986), I
argued that the Court's holding in Lynch had to be based on the O'Connor
opinion, and that under her "endorsement" test, the display of the nativity scene,
standing alone, would be perceived by an objective observer as sending a message
of endorsement of Christianity. See supra notes 24-32 and accompanying text.
317. 492 U.S. 573 (1989).
318. See id. at 616-21.
319. See id at 616-18, 632-37, 663-67. See Marshall, supra note 3, at 514-17.
Professor Marshall's discussion of the Court's institutional behavior in Lynch is
equally applicable to the Court's institutional behavior in Allegheny County. See
id He notes that all members of the Court in Lynch agreed that some official
acknowledgment of religion by the government did not violate the
Establishment Clause. Rather, the question was whether the particular form of
religious acknowledgment was "within the limits of acceptability." Id Professor
Marshall also points out that the Burger plurality opinion echoed the Court's
analysis in McGowan, while Justice O'Connor in her concurrence and Justice
Brennan in his dissent "appeared to characterize the issue in symbolic terms." Id
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County is to make the determination of the constitutionality of
governmental displays of religious symbols very fact-specific. The
applicable constitutional doctrine is clear: the display of a particular
religious symbol in the circumstances presented cannot convey to
an objective observer a message of endorsement of religion. If the
display conveys such a message of endorsement, then it has the
effect of advancing religion and is unconstitutional. If the display
does not convey this message of endorsement, then it does not have
the effect of advancing religion and is constitutionally permissible,
despite any "incidental benefit" to religion. Precisely because this
question is to be resolved by the application of settled legal doctrine
and is so fact-specific, it is the kind of question that should be
resolved by the lower courts. The Supreme Court probably will
not be very disposed to review their decisions.
Taking their cue from the results in Lynch and Allegheny
County, the courts are likely to uphold Christmas holiday season
displays that contain a nativity scene, so long as the display also
includes some of the other secular symbols of Christmas. I was
unsuccessful in my efforts to persuade the Sixth Circuit to
invalidate a Christmas display that I claimed was "dominated" by
a nativity scene, arguing that the addition of some of the secular
symbols of Christmas did not alter the message of endorsement of
Christianity conveyed by the "dominant" nativity scene.32° The
court rejected the contention, stating that "dominance" was not the
test, and that looking to the location of the display and the context
of the celebration of Christmas as a national holiday, the display as
a whole did not send an impermissible message of endorsement.3
Likewise, a state supreme court has upheld a "salute to liberty"
display that included a nativity scene along with large Christmas
trees and a "salute to liberty" sign.Y
320. See Doe v. City of Clawson, 915 F.2d 244 (6th Cir. 1990).
321. See id. at 248.
322. See King v. Village of Waunakee, 517 N.W.2d 671 (Wis. 1994).
However, the Third Circuit has recently held that the addition of some secular
figures to an otherwise unconstitutional nativity scene and menorah display on
governmental property did not necessarily cure the constitutional violation.
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Going beyond holiday season displays, we see that the results in
the display of religious symbol cases coming before the lower
courts are very fact-specific and are not always consistent with each
other. Usually, however, the court has held the particular display
to be unconstitutional. The Seventh Circuit has held
unconstitutional a war memorial in a public park that took the
form of a crucifix."' Likewise, the Ninth Circuit found that a
display of large and clearly visible Latin crosses in public parks,
where they had been used as the background for religious
ceremonies, sent a message of endorsement of Christianity and were
unconstitutional. 24 The Ninth Circuit also held unconstitutional
the display of a large Latin cross in a public park, notwithstanding
that the cross had been designated as a war memorial."
ACLU of New Jersey v. Schundler, 104 F.3d 1435 (3d Cir. 1997). The district
court had found that adding a Santa Claus, Frosty the Snowman, and a red sled
to the display had "sufficiently demystified [and] sufficiently desanctified [the]
sacred symbols... to escape the confines of the injunctive order in this case." Id
at 1439. The Third Circuit concluded that the district court's notion of
"demystification" "cannot form the basis of sound constitutional analysis" and
remanded the case with directions to the district court to determine whether the
display, as modified, still conveyed a message of endorsement of religion. See id
at 1452.
323. See Gonzales v. North Lake City, 4 F.3d 1412 (7th Cir. 1993).
324. See Ellis v. City of LaMesa, 990 F.2d 1518 (9th Cir. 1993).
325. See Separation of Church and State Comm. v. City of Eugene, Oregon,
93 F.3d 617 (9th Cir. 1996); Carpenter v. City & County of San Francisco, 93
F.3d 627 (9th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1250 (1997). In Carpenter, a
federal district court in California found that the location of the Mount
Davidson Cross in a wooded and natural wilderness area, where it could not be
seen at night and was only partially visible on a clear day, and its place as an
"integral part of the historical and cultural landscape of San Francisco" meant
that the city was not "send[ing] an unmistakable message that it supports and
promotes the cross' religious message." Carpenter v. City and County of San
Francisco, 803 F. Supp. 337, 350 (N.D. Cal. 1992). On appeal, the Ninth Circuit
held that the display violated the No Preference Clause of the California
Constitution, CAL. CONST. art. I, § 4, which had been interpreted more broadly
than the Establishment Clause. See Carpenter, 93 F.3d at 629-32. Alvarado v. City
of San Jose, 94 F.3d 1223 (9th Cir. 1996), involved an Establishment Clause
challenge to a city's installation and maintenance of a sculpture representing
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In a similar vein, a federal district court has held that displaying
a panel containing the Ten Commandments in a county courthouse
was unconstitutional,"6 while a sharply divided state supreme court
held that the inclusion of a monument containing the Ten
Commandments along with other monuments in a state park near
the capitol was constitutionally permissible' There have also been
conflicting results as to the constitutionality of including a Latin
cross in a governmental seal, with the Seventh, Ninth, and Tenth
Circuits holding that it is unconstitutional, 28 and the Fifth Circuit
finding it constitutional, at least in the particular case.329
Other recent lower court cases have dealt with the matter of
"advancing religion" in a number of contexts. The Seventh Circuit
has held that a nondenominational invocation and benediction
offered at a commencement ceremony of a public university, unlike
the one offered at a high school graduation in Lee v. Weisman,330 did
not have the primary effect of endorsing religion and so, was
constitutionally permissible.3 ' The case involved the
commencement of Indiana University, which was held in the
Quetzalcoatl or the Plumed Serpent of Aztec mythology. See id at 1225-26.
Because the court found that Quetzalcoatl did not have current religious
adherents in the United States, the display was not "religious" for Establishment
Clause purposes and so was not subject to constitutional challenge. See id at
1232.
326. See Harvey v. Cobb County, 811 F. Supp. 669 (N.D. Ga. 1993).
327. See State of Colorado v. Freedom from Religion Found., 898 P.2d 1013
(Colo. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 909 (1996).
328. See Robinson v. City of Edmond, 68 F.3d 1226 (10th Cir. 1995); Ellis
v. City of La Mesa, 990 F.2d 1518 (9th Cir. 1993); Harris v. City of Zion, 927
F.2d 1401 (7th Cir. 1991); City of Rolling Meadows v. Kuhn, 927 F.2d 1401 (7th
Cir. 1991); Friedman v. Board of County Comm'rs, 781 F.2d 777 (10th Cir.
1985).
329. See Murray v. City of Austin, 947 F.2d 147 (5th Cir. 1991). The case
involved the seal of the City of Austin, which was based on the coat of arms of
Stephen F. Austin, after whom the city was named. See id Austin's coat of arms
included a Latin cross, and the Fifth Circuit found that this fact distinguished the
Austin seal from a seal that simply contained a cross. See id at 156-58.
330. 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
331. Tanford v. Brand, 104 F.3d 982, 986 (7th Cir. 1997).
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football stadium and attended by over 30,000 persons. The court
noted that many graduating students did not attend the
commencement, that most persons seated in the stadium did not
stand for the invocation and benediction, and that college students
were more mature than high school students and so, less likely to
perceive the commencement and benediction as an endorsement of
religion. 32
A court cannot require a person convicted of driving while
intoxicated or another alcohol-related offense to attend meetings of
Alcoholics Anonymous as a condition of probation.33 While
required attendance at Alcoholics Anonymous meetings serves the
secular purpose of promoting rehabilitation of alcohol offenders,
the Alcoholics Anonymous program is primarily religious in
nature, and the government cannot in effect "advance religion" by
compelling a person to participate in a religiously-oriented
program. 34 For the same reason, prison authorities cannot require
332. See id. at 985-86. In terms of the institutional behavior of courts, the
Seventh Circuit's decision in Tanford seems strikingly similar to the Fifth
Circuit's decision in Jones v. Clear Creek Independent SchoolDistrict, 977 F.2d 963
(5th Cir. 1992). See supra note 190. Both the Fifth Circuit panel in Jones and the
Seventh Circuit panel in Tanford were clearly unsympathetic to the Supreme
Court's holding in Lee v. Weisman and were pleading for a "little bit of religion
in public life." The views of the Jones panel are set forth at supra note 190. The
Tanford panel emphasized that the university's practice of having an invocation
and benediction at its commencements traced back 155 years and merely had the
effect of "solemnizing public occasions rather than approving particular religious
beliefs." Tanford, 104 F.3d'at 986.
333. See Warner v. Orange County Dept. of Probation, 95 F.3d 202 (2d Cir.
1996).
334. See id at 212. The court in Warner cited Griffin v. Coughlin, 673 N.E.2d
98 (N.Y. 1996), a New York Court of Appeals decision which reached a similar
result. The Griffin court held that an inmate's family's visiting privileges could
not be conditioned on participation in a treatment program that adopts the
"religious-oriented practices and precepts of Alcoholics Anonymous." Id at 99.
Such required attendance at a religiously-based program would also violate the
offender's free exercise rights. See also Doe v. Phillips, 81 F.3d 1204 (2d Cir.
1996). Doe involved a rather outrageous violation of establishment and free
exercise. The prosecutor, investigating a charge that a mother had sexually
abused her son, came to entertain serious doubts about "the reliability of the
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inmates to participate in Narcotics Anonymous or other
religiously-oriented substance abuse programs?3" However, the state
may include Alcoholics Anonymous as one of a number of
authorized self-help programs in which the offender must
participate as a condition of probation, as long as it gives the
offender the choice of participating in an available self-help
program that is not religiously-oriented. 36
As the latter example indicates, and as with regards to the equal
treatment of religion in the receipt of government benefits cases,
the inclusion of the religious with the secular in a law or
governmental action may defeat the claim that the law or
governmental action has the effect of advancing religion. For this
reason, a state law that includes the commission of a crime at a
place of worship among the aggravating factors for sentencing
purposes does not violate the Establishment Clause.33 ' Likewise, it
is well-settled that a requirement that representatives of religious
organizations be included in governmental advisory councils and
the like is fully consistent with the Establishment Clause.338
accusations." Id. at 1206. The woman's estranged husband, who had urged the
son to file the charge, proposed to the prosecutor that the charges be dismissed
if the mother, "a member of the congregation of a local Roman Catholic church
... , would place her hand on a bible in the [c]hurch and swear that she had not
sexually abused her son." Id. at 1207. The prosecutor then communicated the
suggestion to the mother's attorney. The mother, who had denied the charges,
agreed to the proposal. The swearing ceremony took place in the church, in the
presence of the husband, the son who had filed the charge, another son, the
woman's mother and sister, and a priest. The prosecutor held the bible and
recited the oath that the woman was to repeat. The prosecutor then dismissed
the charges. See id. The woman later brought a S 1983 action against the
prosecutor. The court rejected the prosecutor's claim of qualified immunity on
the ground that "no reasonable official could believe for one moment that
forcing an individual to engage in a religious ceremony in a church comports
with the First Amendment." Id at 1212.
335. See Kerr v. Farrey, 95 F.3d 472 (7th Cir. 1996); Griffin v. Coughlin, 88
N.Y.2d 673 (1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 681 (1997).
336. See O'Connor v. California, 855 F. Supp. 303 (C.D. Cal. 1994).
337. See Carter v. Peters, 26 F.3d 697 (7th Cir. 1994).
338. See, e.g., New York State Sch. Bds. Ass'n. v. Sobol, 591 N.E.2d 1146
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However, a different question is presented when the state delegates
law-enforcement authority to a religious organization. A recent
decision by a sharply-divided state supreme court illustrates the
problem?3 9 Here, a state law authorized the attorney-general to
commission as police officers the employees of certain public and
private institutions, including universities. Pursuant to this law, the
attorney-general commissioned as police officers the campus
security officers at a sectarian university. 4° The commissioning of
these security officers as police officers obviously advances a secular
purpose and would not seem to favor religion, as security officers
at non-sectarian universities could also be commissioned.
Nonetheless, the court majority concluded that the Establishment
Clause precluded the state from delegating law enforcement powers
to employees of religious institutions.341
As these cases-and I have chosen only cases decided in the last
few years-indicate, the question of when governmental action
purportedly "advancing religion" violates the Establishment Clause
arises in a number of contexts. It is in this area especially that the
lower courts must apply settled Supreme Court doctrine and
precedent to resolve a myriad of questions, and, for the time being
at least, they are likely to have the final say on the resolution of
those questions.
The analysis of this area of Establishment Clause law concludes
with a discussion of the Supreme Court's decision in Marsh v.
Chambers.342 In Marsh, the Court held that the opening of sessions
of Congress and other legislative bodies with prayer does not
violate the Establishment Clause because this practice was followed
by Congress at the time the First Amendment was adopted. 43
(N.Y. 1992) (state regulations requiring that representatives of religious
organizations be included on advisory councils for school AIDS instruction
programs).
339. See State v. Pendleton, 451 S.E.2d 274 (N.C. 1994).
340. See id. at 276.
341. See id. at 281.
342. 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
343. See id2 at 787-88.
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Marsh is the only post-Lemon case where the Court explicitly
refused to apply the Lemon principles. If it had, it would have been
compelled to declare legislative prayer unconstitutional because it
clearly has the effect of advancing religion in the same manner as
prayer in school or prayer at a high school commencement. For
whatever reason, in Marsh a majority of the Court was persuaded
that it should look to historical context and so uphold legislative
prayer.3" Precisely because Marsh was based on historical
acceptance of the challenged practice rather than on the "law of the
Establishment Clause," and because it is difficult to find any other
example of historical acceptance of a religious practice, Marsh is not
a precedent that is capable of extension. Thus, when the Fourth
Circuit was called upon to determine the constitutionality of
judicial prayer in the courtroom, it had no difficulty in limiting
Marsh to its precise facts and in invalidating judicial courtroom
prayer on the ground that it had the effect of advancing religion.34
Marsh then stands as an anomaly in the Court's Establishment
Clause jurisprudence, and except for the result in the case itself, it
is not a meaningful part of that jurisprudence.
D. Entanglement: Governmental Interference in Religious Matters
The cases discussed in this part of the Article involve the third
Lemon principle of excessive entanglement. This principle means
first that the civil courts may not become involved with matters of
religious doctrine or policy, and must defer to the resolution of
these issues by the highest tribunal of a hierarchial church
authority. Thus, the courts cannot interfere with the decisions of
the appropriate ecclesiastical authority within the church as to what
persons are entitled to serve as ecclesiastical officials.346 Nor may
344. See id at 791. As discussed previously, supra note 289, in 1983 and 1984
the Court appeared to be taking a more "accommodationist" approach in its
Establishment Clause cases.
345. See North Carolina Civil Liberties Union Legal Found. v. Constangy,
947 F.2d 1145 (4th Cir. 1991).
346. See Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696
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they become involved in disputes between church factions over
control of church property, with each group claiming to have the
"true faith." Again, the courts must defer to the determination of
this matter by the highest tribunal of a hierarchial church
organization.3 47 However, where the form of church organization
is congregational rather than hierarchial, the courts may, consistent
with the Establishment Clause, apply general principles of contract
and property law to determine which of the contending factions is
entitled to the church property.48
Second, the excessive entanglement principle may prevent
application of general laws to the activities of religious
organizations. In this context, the excessive entanglement principle
of the Establishment Clause may seem to overlap with the Free
Exercise Clause, but there is a very important difference. The
application of general laws to the activities of religious
organizations would only raise a free exercise concern if that
application significantly interfered with the ability of the religious
organization to carry out its religious function. Under current free
exercise doctrine, that showing seemingly would be very difficult
to make, and the Court has, for the most part, rejected the claim of
a "free-exercise required exemption" from generally applicable
laws.349 The Establishment Clause concern, in contrast, is that the
application of the general law to the activities of the religious
organization would "entangle" the government in the
determination of religious matters that are more properly the
(1976); Gonzalez v. Roman Catholic Archdiocese, 280 U.S. 1 (1929).
347. See Presbyterian Church v. Hull Church, 393 U.S. 440 (1969); Kedroff
v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94 (1952); Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679
(1871).
348. See Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595 (1979). For a recent example of such a
case, see Scotts African Union Methodist Protestant Church v. Conference ofAfrican
Union First Colored Methodist Protestant Church, 98 F.3d 78 (3d Cir. 1996). There
the Third Circuit emphasized that the courts of New Jersey, whose law governed
the dispute, were not concerned about church organization but about whether
the courts could resolve the particular question without becoming entangled in
questions of religious doctrine or governance. See id at 94.
349. See infra notes 387 and 413 and accompanying text.
1410
CONSTITUTIONAL LITIGATION
province of the religious organization. For this reason the
Establishment Clause challenge to the application of general laws
to the activities of a religious organization is more likely to be
sustained.
In National Labor Relations Board v. Catholic Bishop of the City
of Chicago,"' the Supreme Court, invoking the statutory
interpretation principle that where possible a statute will be
interpreted so as to avoid a serious question as to its
constitutionality, held that Congress did not intend that the
National Labor Relations Act apply to the unionization of lay
faculty members at parochial schools.3"' The Court noted that in
Lemon, it had found an "entanglement" between the teaching of the
religious and the secular in parochial schools, and that the Board's
resolution of unfair labor practices at the schools would, in many
instances, involve an inquiry into the good faith of the position
asserted by clergy-administrators and its relationship to the schools'
"religious mission."" 2 Because of these "entanglement" concerns,
the Court concluded that Congress did not intend that the Act
apply to the unionization of lay faculty members at parochial
schools. The Court has also held that Congress did not intend that
non-profit church-affiliated schools be subject to federal
unemployment compensation laws.53 However, the Court saw no
constitutional problem in applying the federal wages and hours law
to a commercial business operated by a religious organization and
staffed by former drug addicts, derelicts, or criminals before their
350. 440 U.S. 490 (1979).
351. See id. at 504-07.
352. See id. at 501. The Court also quoted the following language from
Lemon: "'The substantial religious character of these church-related schools gives
rise to entangling church-state relationships of the kind the Religion Clauses
sought to avoid.'" Id. at 503 (quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 616
(1971)).
353. See St. Martin Lutheran Evangelical Lutheran Church v. South Dakota,
451 U.S. 772 (1981). This decision was based primarily on general principles of
statutory interpretation rather than on a concern with avoiding a serious
constitutional question.
1997] 1411
THE WAYNE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 43:1317
conversion and rehabilitation by the foundation." 4 Nor did the
Court see any constitutional problem in the application of a state
sales and use tax to a religious organization's sale of religious
materials."'
Because Catholic Bishop was decided on statutory interpretation
grounds, it does not serve as a binding precedent with respect to the
application of other federal laws to the activities of religious
organizations. Likewise, because the Court avoided the
constitutional question in that case, it is not a precedent on the
question of whether the application of any law to the activities of
a religious organization violates the Establishment Clause or the
Free Exercise Clause. A number of subsequent lower court cases,
however, have dealt with these questions. The posture in which the
354. See Troy and Susan Alamo Found. v. Secretary of Labor, 471 U.S. 290
(1985). The foundation was a nonprofit religious organization that operated a
number of commercial businesses, including service stations, retail clothing and
grocery outlets, roofing and electrical construction companies, a candy company,
and a motel. The converted and rehabilitated workers received no cash salaries
but were provided with "food, clothing, shelter, and other benefits." Id. at 292.
The district court found that these workers were "employees" within the
meaning of the federal wages and hours law under the "economic reality" test of
employment. See id at 291-92. The Court held that the application of the law to
the foundation's commercial businesses did not implicate the Free Exercise
Clause because the required payments in cash to the workers, which they could
voluntarily return to the foundation, did not in any way interfere with their
religious beliefs. See id. at 303. The foundation's "entanglement" objection to the
record keeping requirements of the law was rejected on the ground that the
routine and factual inquires required by the law "bear no resemblance to the
kind of government surveillance the Court has previously held to pose an
intolerable risk of government entanglement with religion." Id. at 305.
355. See Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Board of Equalization, 493 U.S. 378
(1990); see also Hernandez v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 490 U.S. 680
(1989). The Court held that the Internal Revenue Code's deduction for
contributions to charitable and religious institutions did not include fixed fees
paid for spiritual auditing and training services because the payments were made
in exchange for something of value. The Court noted that disallowing such a
deduction avoided Establishment Clause problems because it avoided the
necessity for the Internal Revenue Service to decide what services and benefits
were religious in nature. See id at 694-98.
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case has arisen has influenced the results in these cases. Where it has
not been previously determined whether the law is applicable to the
activities of a religious organization, the court must first decide the
statutory interpretation question. If the court concludes that the
law does apply to these activities, the court then has to decide
whether the application of the law to the particular activity gives
rise to Establishment Clause or free exercise problems. The
determination of that question may depend on the effect that the
application of the law has on the particular activity. For example,
in a case coming before the Minnesota Supreme Court, the question
was whether the state labor relations board could exercise
jurisdiction over a claim for unionization by lay faculty members
at parochial schools.356 Contrary to the interpretation given to the
National Labor Relations Act by the United States Supreme Court
in Catholic Bishop, the Minnesota Supreme Court held that the
Minnesota Labor Relations Act was intended to apply to the
unionization of lay faculty members at parochial schools.357 Once
that question was resolved, the Establishment Clause question was
simply whether a state-imposed requirement of collective
bargaining, as such, created an "impermissible entanglement"
between government and religion. The Minnesota Supreme Court
had no difficulty in holding that it did not.5 ' The only effect that
the requirement had on the operations of the parochial schools, said
the court, was that they had a duty to bargain about hours, wages,
and working conditions. As the court concluded:
We decline to characterize this minimal responsibility as
excessive entanglement. Allowing lay teachers, almost all of
whom are Catholic, to bargain collectively will not alter or
impinge on the religious character of the school. The first
amendment wall of separation between church and state
356. See Hill-Murray Fed. of Teachers v. Hill-Murray High Sch., 487
N.W.2d 857 (Minn. 1992).
357. See id. at 861-62.
358. See id. at 863-64.
1997] 1413
THE WAYNE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 43:1317
does not prohibit limited governmental regulation of purely
secular aspects of a church school's operation.3"9
In another post-Catholic Bishop case, the Ninth Circuit has held
that Catholic Bishop was limited to the unionization of teachers at
a parochial school, and that the National Labor Relations Act did
apply to the unionization of non-faculty personnel, such as child-
care workers, cooks, recreation assistants, and maintenance workers
at a Catholic school for boys."6 The court also found that the
exercise of jurisdiction over the unionization of these employees
did not violate the Establishment Clause. 61 Because the duties of
these employees were overwhelmingly secular, the Board's exercise
of jurisdiction over them would not involve the Board in the
school's religious mission, nor would there be any governmental
monitoring of the school's religious activities.362
In a similar vein, the Second Circuit has held that the federal
Age Discrimination in Employment Act363 was applicable to age
discrimination claims brought by a lay teacher against his parochial
359. IaR at 864. And citing Employment Division, Department of Human
Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), the court held that this "limited
governmental regulation of purely secular aspects of a church school's
operation," under a generally applicable law, would not violate the Free Exercise
Clause. See id. at 862; see also NLRB v. Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S. 490 (1979). It
will be recalled that in Catholic Bishop, the Supreme Court saw a possible
entanglement problem arising when the Board would be required to resolve a
claim that religiously-based action by a parochial school amounted to an unfair
labor practice. Should such an issue arise in Minnesota, the Minnesota courts
could well hold that in the particular case, the resolution of the claim by the
labor board would violate the Establishment Clause. But this possibility did not
persuade the Minnesota Supreme Court that the Minnesota legislature intended
that the state labor relations law should not apply to the unionization of lay
employees at parochial schools. See Hill-Murray, 487 N.W.2d at 862.
360. See NLRB v. Hanna Boys Ctr., 940 F.2d 1295 (9th Cir. 1991).
361. See id at 1302.
362. See id at 1303-05. Likewise, there was no free exercise violation because
the exercise of jurisdiction over the unionization of these employees would not
interfere with the religious aspects of the school's operations. See id. at 1305-06.
363. 29 U.S.C. 5 621-34 (1994).
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school employer." In holding that the application of the law to
such claims did not violate the Establishment Clause, the court
emphasized that the sole question in an age discrimination case was
whether an employee had been unjustly discriminated against
because of age. 6 No Establishment Clause problem was presented
when the parochial school employer asserted that the employee was
discharged not because of his age, but for religiously-based reasons.
In such a case the court cannot inquire into the plausibility of the
religiously-based reasons. The inquiry is limited to the question of
whether, in fact, the employee was discharged for the asserted
religiously-based reasons or because of his age.366
As these cases indicate, the mere fact that a court or
governmental agency exercises jurisdiction over employment
relations at a parochial school does not necessarily create an
entanglement problem. An entanglement problem only arises when
the court or agency either applies the law to invalidate an action
that was religiously-based or is required to interpret religious
doctrine to resolve the particular dispute. Such a situation occurred
in a case where a Catholic nun who had been denied tenure in the
Canon Law department of the Catholic University of America
brought a Title VII sex discrimination claim against the
university.367 The District of Columbia Circuit concluded that the
Establishment Clause precluded the civil courts from determining
the validity of the claim, both because in so doing they would be
required to evaluate the teacher's scholarship and her teaching of
religious doctrine, and because the inquiry itself would intrude into
the church's ability to make religious judgments about its
364. See DeMarco v. Holy Cross High Sch., 4 F.3d 166 (2d Cir. 1993).
365. See id at 166.
366. See id at 169-70. In this case, the school claimed that the plaintiff was
not discharged because of his age, but because he failed to perform his religious
duties. The court noted that this involved the determination of a factual
question, which could be resolved "without putting into issue the validity or
truthfulness of Catholic religious teaching." Id. at 171.
367. See EEOC v. Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d 455 (D.C. 1996).
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officials. 68
Religious organizations, it may be noted, are not exempt from
all the religious discrimination prohibitions of Title VII 69 Title VII
does contain a "religious entity" exemption, under which religious
organizations and religious schools may limit employment to
persons of their religion." Thus, Title VII applies when a religious
organization or school employs persons of a different religion, such
as when a Catholic parochial school employs a non-Catholic
teacher, or when the basis of the claimed discrimination is not
religion but another ground prohibited by Title VII, such as race or
gender. However, as the discrimination claim against the Catholic
University of America indicates, some applications of Title VII to
employment actions by religious organizations may raise
Establishment Clause and free exercise problems.
A Third Circuit case involved a Title VII religious
discrimination claim brought by a Protestant teacher at a Catholic
parochial school whose contract was not renewed because of her
remarriage to man who had been baptized as a Catholic.371 Under
Catholic canon law, the teacher's remarriage was invalid because
368. See id at 465-66. The court also found that the claim came within Title
VII's ministerial exemption and that it was barred by the Free Exercise Clause.
See id at 460-65. The Catholic University of America is a Vatican-chartered
university, and the Canon Law department is one of three "ecclesiastical
departments" of the university, tenured appointments in which must be
approved by the Vatican. See id. at 457. The court noted that it was not possible
to evaluate the quality of the teacher's scholarship independently of religious
considerations because "there was the inevitable risk that the persons assessing
the scholarship of a particular paper would consider whether her conclusions
were in accord with what the Church teaches or what, in their judgment, the
Church ought to teach." Id. at 466. The court also noted that the trial of her
claim "constituted an impermissible entanglement with judgments that fell
within the exclusive province of the Department of Canon Law as a pontifical
institution." Id. at 467.
369. See 42 U.S.C. 5 2000e-2 (1994).
370. See id The "religious entities" exemption does not violate the
Establishment Clause because it is considered to be precisely tailored to protect
the religious freedom of religious organizations.
371. See Little v. Wuerl, 929 F.2d 944 (3d Cir. 1991).
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she had been divorced and had not obtained annulment of her prior
marriage in the Catholic Church." The school argued that it
would violate the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise
Clause if it was compelled to hire someone, Catholic or non-
Catholic, who had entered into a canonically invalid marriage. 371
The court saw an entanglement problem in that the resolution of
the teacher's claim would involve an inevitable inquiry into the
school's defense that the teacher's beliefs and practices rendered her
unfit to advance the school's religious mission, and noted that the
Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause recognize a
church's interest in managing its own affairs free of government
interference. Because of these serious constitutional questions, the
court construed the exemption permitting a religious entity to
employ "persons of a particular religion" very broadly to cover
conformity with the religious entity's religious beliefs. 75
However, a federal district court in California, observing that
the Ninth Circuit construed the "religious entities" exemption
narrowly, held that Title VII's prohibition against pregnancy
discrimination applied to a fundamentalist Christian school's
termination of a librarian who had become pregnant by a man to
whom she was not married at the time.376 The court held that the
application of Title VII to this claim would not violate the
Establishment Clause because there would be no scrutiny of the
school's religious operationsY If the librarian was fired because of
her pregnancy, there would be a violation of Title VII, and that
would be the end of the matter.7 8
372. See id at 945.46.
373. See id at 946.
374. See id at 947-49.
375. See id at 951.
376. See Vigars v. Valley Christian Ctr. of Dublin, 805 F. Supp 802 (N.D.
Cal. 1992).
377. See id. at 809.
378. See id at 806. The court also found that under current Supreme Court
doctrine, there would be no free exercise violation, as the church was subject to
a law of general application that advanced a clearly secular purpose. See id at 809-
10.
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In my opinion, the application of Title VII to employment
decisions of religious organizations presents an Establishment
Clause problem only where, as in Catholic University ofAmerica,
the resolution of the discrimination claim would require the court
to engage in a determination of religious doctrine. In the more
typical case, where Title VII is invoked to compel a religious
organization to employ a person whose behavior is allegedly
inconsistent with the organization's religious beliefs, the
organization necessarily is asserting that there has been an
interference with the organization's religious freedom, and the
constitutionality of its claim should be analyzed under the Free
Exercise Clause. 79
A third application of the excessive entanglement principle
precludes the government from protecting religiously-based activity
when, in order to do so, it must enforce the requirements of
religious law. This application of the excessive entanglement
principle has been involved in lower court cases invalidating laws
prohibiting the fraudulent sale of kosher food.80 Kosher food is
food that has been prepared in compliance with the Orthodox
Jewish religious rules and dietary laws.381 In order to determine
whether or not particular food has been prepared in compliance
with Orthodox religious rules and dietary laws, government
officials must either apply Jewish religious law or delegate the
determination to Orthodox Jewish rabbis. Either way, there has
been an impermissible entanglement between government and
religion. However, consistent with the Establishment Clause, the
government could prohibit the fraudulent display of the kosher seal
of approval that is placed on food products after they have been
certified as kosher by an Orthodox Jewish rabbi. In such a case, the
379. A discussion of free exercise limitations on the government's ability to
apply employment discrimination law to the employment actions of religious
organizations is beyond the scope of this Article.
380. See Barghout v. Bureau of Kosher Meat and Food Control, 66 F.3d 1337
(3d Cir. 1995); Ran-Day's County Kosher, Inc. v. State, 608 A.2d 1353 (NJ.
1992).
381. See MICHAEL A. FISHBANE, JuDAISM 144 (1987).
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court or agency would only have to determine the factual question
of whether the product had been certified as kosher by an
Orthodox Jewish rabbi. In addition, the law would serve the
secular purpose of preventing consumer fraud by the sale of
products fraudulently labeled as having the kosher seal.
Our review of the cases in this area indicates that the excessive
entanglement principle does not prohibit governmental
involvement with religion and does not prohibit the government
from regulating the activities of religious organizations. What it
prohibits is the kind of governmental involvement with religion or
religious organizations that requires the government to make
determinations of religious doctrine or to evaluate or enforce
religious doctrine. As long as governmental involvement or
regulation does not involve the determination or enforcement of
religious doctrine, it is not violative of the Establishment Clause.
E. Preference for Religion
Because the overriding principle of the Establishment Clause is
that the Establishment Clause commands complete official
neutrality toward religion, it necessarily follows that the
government cannot favor religion over non-religion, and it cannot
favor one religion over another religion.3 While cases where the
government has acted to favor one religion over another are fairly
rare,3 there have been a number of Supreme Court cases where the
382. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 60 (1981); see also Everson v. Board
of Educ., 300 U.S. 1 (1947). As the Court stated in the classic definition of non-
establishment in Everson, "Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set
up a church. Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or
prefer one religion over another." Id at 15. It is for this reason that the courts
cannot take one or both parents' religion or lack of religion into account in
making child custody determinations. See e.g., Osteraas v. Osteraas, 859 P.2d 948
(idaho 1993). But cf Kirchner v. Caughey, 606 A.2d 257 (Md. 1992) (holding that
the conflict between divorced parents over religious beliefs was having a
detrimental effect on the child so as to justify some restrictions on the non-
custodial parent's religious activity with the child).
383. The only Supreme Court case in recent years that falls into this
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Court found an Establishment Clause violation because the
government was expressly giving preference to religion over non-
religion. These cases include the following: a state law providing an
exemption from the state sales tax for religious periodicals, 34 a state
law that gave churches the power to prevent the issuance of a liquor
license to a business that would be located within 500 feet of the
church,385 a state law setting up a special school district embracing
the boundaries of a religious community,386 and a state law entitling
an employee to take off work on the day that the employee
observed as the Sabbath." In this regard, the Establishment Clause
category is Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228 (1982), which involved a state law
requiring charitable organizations to register, but exempting organizations that
received less than half their funds from members. The law was held
unconstitutional as applied to the required registration of a religious organization
that received more than half of its funds from non-members. See id. at 230-32.
The "half the funds from non-members" rule was characterized by the Court as
creating a preference between religions, and so it violated the Establishment
Clause. See id at 255; see also Pielech v. Massasoit Greyhound, Inc., 668 N.E.2d
1298 (Mass. 1996). In Pielech, the Massachusetts Supreme Court invalidated the
"reasonable accommodation" provision of the state anti-discrimination law,
which limited the "accommodation" to practices that would require an
individual "to violate or forgo the practice of his creed or religion as required by
that creed or religion." Id at 1302. The court found that this "accommodation"
preferred employees whose beliefs followed the dogma of an established religion
over other employees who held equally sincere religious beliefs. See id at 1303.
384. See Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1 (1989).
385. See Larkin v. Grendel's Den, 459 U.S. 116 (1982).
386. See Board of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S.
687 (1994). This case has been discussed supra text accompanying notes 50-54.
387. See Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703 (1985). The effect
of the law was to give a preference for religion, as the only employees who could
choose their day off were employees who could say that they observed that day
as their Sabbath. See id There was no requirement that their religion precluded
them from working on the Sabbath or that they used the Sabbath day for
religious purposes. See id I am thus somewhat dismayed at Professor
McConnell's characterization of this law as a "Sabbath protection requirement
in a law pertaining to work days." McConnell, supra note 2, at 707. The law was
in no way precisely tailored to protect the religious freedom of employees whose
religion precluded them from working on the Sabbath. See generally Trans World
Airlines v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63 (1977) (discussing the constitutional
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does not permit the government to prefer religion over non-
religion on the ground that, by so doing, the government is making
an "accommodation" for religion. Stated simply, precisely because
the overriding principle of the Establishment Clause is one of
complete official neutrality toward religion, the Establishment
Clause does not permit any "accommodation" for religion. 88
However, while the Establishment Clause precludes the
government from giving any preference to religion over non-
religion, the overriding principle of complete official neutrality
toward religion also means that the government is not required to
be hostile to religion. This being so, the inclusion of the religious
with the secular in the receipt of governmental benefits does not
necessarily violate the Establishment Clause, and the Court has
gone quite far in upholding the constitutionality of such
inclusions.3" Thus, some of the preferences for religion that the
Court has found unconstitutional could have been sustained if the
benefit involved had also been provided to similarly situated non-
religious groups?' A state can provide a sales tax exemption for all
non-profit periodicals, including religious ones. Zoning laws
frequently prohibit the location of businesses serving liquor near
residences, churches, schools, and similar uses. If a state wants to
enable employees to take off work on the day that the employee
observes as the Sabbath, it can do so by giving all employees the
right to choose a day off from work. Again, what the
Establishment Clause prohibits is a preference for religion over
permissibility of a Sabbath observance law limited in this manner); infra text
accompanying notes 413-17.
388. See supra note 179. ButseeZorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952). The
released time program, justified as an "accommodation," was actually a
preference for religion because released time was limited to out-of-school
religious study, and the program was not designed to protect the "religious
freedom" of the participants. See id at 309-12.
389. See supra Part III.B.3.
390. See, e.g., Rodney K. Smith, Conscience, Coercion and the Establishment
ofReligion: The Beginning ofan End to the Wandering ofa Wayward Judiciary?, 43
CASE W. REs. L. REV. 917, 926-30 (1993); Steffey, Redefining the Modem
Constraints, supra note 170, at 914-18.
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non-religion. It does not, as such, prohibit the government from
including the religious with the secular in the receipt of
governmental benefits.391
A different question is presented when the government takes
action that is precisely tailored to protect the religious freedom of
individuals and religious institutions. While some academic
commentators have contended that the Establishment Clause
precludes the government from preferring religious freedom over
other forms of freedom,392 the Supreme Court has not taken this
391. See generally supra notes 231-35 and accompanying text. Other
components of the "law of the Establishment Clause," however, may prohibit
such inclusion in particular circumstances. The prohibition on direct financial
aid to parochial schools, for example, precludes the government from paying the
tuition for parochial school students, notwithstanding that the government
provides free public education for public school students. It likewise has been
held to prohibit the loan of maps and instructional materials to parochial school
students, although these materials are loaned to public school students.
392. See Lupu, supra note 212; William P. Marshall, The Case Against the
Constitutionally Compelled Free Exercise Exemption, 40 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 357
(1989-90); Sherry, supra note 10; Simson, supra note 112.
In arguing against a constitutionaUy-compelled exemption for religiously-
based conduct under the Free Exercise Clause, Professor William P. Marshall
notes that "the free exercise claim for constitutionally compelled exemptions
leads to a First Amendment jurisprudence that simultaneously calls for special
deference to religion under the Free Exercise Clause and a prohibition of special
deference under the Establishment Clause." (citations omitted). Marshall at 358-
59. Professor Marshall concludes,
By preferring religious belief systems over all others, including
philosophical, moral and political belief systems, this exemption offends
the equality-of-ideas notion that is at the core of constitutional law. For
this reason alone, the argument for constitutionally compelled free
exercise exemptions should be rejected. Rejecting constitutionally
favored treatment for religion will assure that one type of belief system
is not artificially and unalterably fortified to the detriment of another.
Id at 411-12.
Professor Ira G. Lupu attacks efforts by the government to respond
affirmatively to religion-based claims for exceptional treatment that would not
be afforded but for the religious quality of the claims or the religious character
of the institution advancing the claims, and that are not constitutionally required
by the Free Exercise Clause. When the government does this, says Lupu, "it is
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position. This is because the Establishment Clause and the Free
Exercise Clause operate in tandem, and the objective of the religion
privileging religious claims in ways likely to offend constitutional norms and to
reflect poor statecraft." Lupu, supra note 212, at 560. He further contends that
any accommodation for religion-based claims is inconsistent with the principle
of equal religious liberty. "In a regime of equal liberty, the state must treat all
approaches to religion with equal respect." Id at 567. In this vein, he concludes
as follows:
If [special treatment on the basis of religion] is designed to remedy a pre-
existing violation of the Free Exercise Clause or to avoid what would
be a violation of that clause, it is constitutionally appropriate. If there
is no such predicate, the same action violates norms of religious equality
and is impermissible.... Free exercise rights trump Establishment
Clause limits, but free exercise "values" do not, because of the impact
on religious equality and the religious liberty of others that would be
the result of such a general favoring of free exercise interests.
Id at 575-76.
To the same effect, Simson states, "It singles out for favored treatment
religiously motivated actions from among those that employees may feel
compelled to take and that employers may pressure them not to take. It
implicitly states that religious motivations count for more than nonreligious
ones and that religion is preferable to nonreligion." Simson, supra note 112, at
914.
Professor Suzanna Sherry goes so far as to contend that religiously-based
exemptions, even those that the Court has found to be required by the Free
Exercise Clause, are inconsistent with Establishment Clause doctrine because
they amount to a preference for religion.
[A]n effect-arguably the primary effect-of mandating such exemptions
only for those with religious claims is to advance religion, at least in the
sense of encouraging or enabling adherents to practice their religion
while denying to others the right to live by their own philosophical
principles. Thus people are encouraged to base their lives on religious
as opposed to non-religious principles.
Sherry, supra note 10, at 127. Likewise, she contends that
[w]henever government attempts to remedy a de facto discrimination
against religion by granting an exemption to religious objectors it
creates an equally noxious de jure discrimination against nonbelievers.
For the government to grant only religious exemptions sends a message
that religious belief is valued more than nonbelief... and encourages
religious belief.
Id at 142-43.
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clauses, taken together, is to promote religious freedom. Religious
freedom is thus a favored constitutional value, and it would be
inconsistent with the overriding purpose of the religion clauses,
taken together, for the Court to hold that the Establishment Clause
necessarily precludes the government from acting to protect the
religious freedom of individuals and religious institutions.393 The
constitutional distinction then is between governmental action that
has the purpose and effect of favoring religion over non-religion,
which is unconstitutional, and governmental action that has the
purpose and effect of protecting the religious freedom of individuals
and religious institutions, which may be constitutionally
permissible.394
393. See McConnell, supra note 2, at 718. As Professor Michael W.
McConnell has noted,
In the context of their purposes and intellectual history, the Religion
Clauses are complementary provisions guarding against two equal and
opposite threats to the autonomy of religious life. The Establishment
Clause guarantees that the federal (and after incorporation, state and
local) government will not give official status or preference to any
religion or religions, and the Free Exercise Clause guarantees that it will
not interfere (without sufficient justification) with the beliefs and
practices of any religion. In other words, decisions about whether and
what religious practices to engage in will be left to individual citizens
and their churches.
Id
394. A number of academic commentators have strongly advocated the
proposition that the Establishment Clause permits the government to take action
to "accommodate" religious freedom. Foremost among them is Professor Michael
W. McConnell. Professor McConnell states,
Accommodation refers to government laws or policies that have the
purpose and effect of removing a burden on or facilitating the exercise
of a person's or an institution's religion. The key difference between
legitimate accommodation and impermissible "establishment" is that the
former merely removes obstacles to the exercise of a religious
conviction adopted for purposes independent of the government's
action, while the latter creates an incentive or an inducement (in the
strong form a compulsion) to adopt that practice or conviction.
McConnell, supra note 2, at 686. Professor McConnell notes that the issue of
accommodation arises both under the Free Exercise Clause and the
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In order for the governmental action to be constitutionally
permissible, it must be shown to be precisely tailored to protect the
religious freedom of individuals or religious institutions. First, the
action must be directed toward obviating an interference with
religious freedom. An interference with an individual's religious
freedom occurs when the individual is prevented from doing
something that his religion requires, such as a member of the
Native-American church being prohibited from using peyote in a
religious ceremony,3 9 or where someone is compelled to do
something that the religion prohibits, such as a Sabbatarian being
Establishment Clause, and that while the Court's current position is that
accommodations are not generally required under the Free Exercise Clause, they
are permissible under the Establishment Clause. See id. at 687. He defends
accommodations as a "commonsensical way to deal with the differing needs and
beliefs of the various faiths in a pluralistic nation." Id. at 694; see also Greene,
supra note 113; Gary C. Leedes, Court-Ordered Exemptions to Secure Religious
Liberties, 21 U. RICH. L. REV. 335 (1987); Steffey, Redefining the Modern
Constraints, supra note 170.
Greene asserts,
A legislative exemption for religion is not necessarily an affirmation of
the truth of the religious faith involved. Rather, the exemption might
be based on the secular ground of respect for the dilemma that would
be faced by certain members of the community were they forced to
choose between obeying the commands of law and obeying those of a
separate font of authority. In short, the exemption might be enacted not
because of religious faith but because of toleration for a belief that
happens to be based on faith.
Greene, supra note 113, at 1625-26. Leedes states that
even when laws appear to treat everyone alike, each unique individual's
integrity as a moral actor is threatened if the law compels him to
disavow his religious scruples. It is not necessarily an establishment of
religion when a particular individual's religious needs are
accommodated. It is often unjust, unfair, and cruel to punish persons
who sincerely believe in the necessity of their act.
Leedes at 357-58. According to Steffey, "In practice, however, the Court has
found only one justification [for a nonsectarian religious classification]
acceptable: removal of a barrier to religious exercise or a burden on religious
practice." Steffey, Redefining the Modern Constraints, supra note 170, at 911.
395. See infra note 425 and accompanying text.
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required to work on Saturday.396 An interference with the freedom
of a religious institution occurs when the law prevents the
institution from carrying out its religious function, such as a law
prohibiting the institution from employing members of its religion
in the religious activities of that institution.
Regarding the permissibility of government action to protect
the religious freedom of individuals and religious institutions, it is
irrelevant whether the interference with religious freedom amounts
to a Free Exercise Clause violation. Of course, where the Court has
concluded that the interference does amount to a Free Exercise
Clause violation, the Court necessarily determines that the resulting
exemption from an otherwise applicable law does not amount to an
unconstitutional preference for religion.397 Sherbert v. Verner39 and
related cases illustrate this point.'" In Sherbert, the Court held that
a denial of unemployment compensation to a Sabbatarian who
refused Saturday work and to a person who, on religious grounds,
refused to work in weapons production violated the Free Exercise
Clause.' Precisely because this denial of unemployment
compensation violated the Free Exercise Clause, the free exercise-
required exemption did not amount to an unconstitutional
396. See infra notes 398403 and accompanying text.
397. See Simson, supra note 112, at 913. Professor Simson has noted,
As the Court regularly has assumed, the establishment and free exercise
clauses are most sensibly interpreted as coexisting with one another:
One clause does not require what the other forbids. Under this view of
the relationship between the two clauses-a view virtually compelled by
their juxtaposition and common roots-a purpose of complying with the
Free Exercise Clause cannot reasonably be found to be incompatible
with the Establishment Clause. Instead, it stands apart from the types
of purposes prohibited by the Establishment Clause as a distinct variety
of purpose permissible under the clause.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
398. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
399. See Frazee v. Illinois Dep't of Employment Sec., 489 U.S. 829 (1989);
Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136 (1987); Thomas v.
Review Bd. of Indiana Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707 (1981).
400. See Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 403-06.
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preference.' °t Concern about a possible unconstitutional preference
for religion in this circumstance was necessarily subsumed in the
Court's analysis of the free exercise claim, and the Court came
down on the side of the free exercise claim. 4°2
Most interferences with religious freedom, however, are not
violative of the Free Exercise Clause.4°3 But the government's
power to take action to protect the religious freedom of individuals
and religious institutions is not circumscribed by the Free Exercise
Clause.4° Rather, the government may take such action unless
401. See id. at 409-10.
402. See id. at 410. As the Court stated in Sherbert,
In holding as we do, plainly we are not fostering the
"establishment" of the Seventh-Day Adventist religion in South
Carolina, for the extension of unemployment benefits to Sabbatarians
in common with Sunday worshipers reflects nothing more than the
governmental obligation of neutrality in the face of religious differences,
and does not represent that involvement of religious with secular
institutions which it is the object of the Establishment Clause to
forestall. Nor does the recognition of the appellant's right to
unemployment benefits under the state statute serve to abridge any
other person's religious liberties.
Id at 409 (citations omitted).
403. In some cases, a private entity may have caused the interference, such
as where a private employer requires a Sabbatarian to work on that person's
Sabbath. More significantly, the Supreme Court's recent free exercise
jurisprudence, especially the holding in Employment Division, Department of
Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), indicates that relatively few
interferences with religious freedom will violate the Free Exercise Clause. There
the Court held that the Free Exercise Clause does not require that the
government exempt religiously-based conduct from neutral and generally
applicable criminal laws. See id at 876-82.
404. See McConnell, supra note 2, at 708-12. Professor McConnell quotes
Justice Brennan's observation in Texas Monthly v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 18 n.8
(1989), to the effect that, "'[W]e in no way suggest that all benefits conferred
exclusively upon religious groups or upon individuals on account of their
religious beliefs are forbidden by the Establishment Clause unless they are
mandated by the Free Exercise Clause.'" McConnell, supra note 2, at 708-09.
Further, "[tihis repudiates the position, sometimes found in the literature, that
the political branches have no discretion to institute accommodations that are
not constitutionally compelled by the Free Exercise Clause." Id. at 709 (footnote
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precluded from doing so by the Establishment Clause. The cases
hold that the government is not precluded from doing so by the
Establishment Clause as long as it does so in a manner that is
precisely tailored to protect the religious freedom of individuals and
religious institutions. If the governmental action satisfies this
requirement, it does not constitute a preference for religion in
violation of the Establishment Clause, even though it has the effect
of preferring religious-based activity over other kinds of activity
and of providing a religiously-based exemption from generally
applicable laws.4°5
This proposition is best illustrated by the Supreme Court cases
dealing with Title VII's "religious entities" and "reasonable
accommodation" provisions. Under the "religious entities"
exemption, religious organizations are exempted from Title VIl's
religious discrimination prohibition with respect to employing
individuals of the same religion to carry out the work of the
organization." In Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church
of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos,4°7 the Court
omitted).
405. See John H. Garvey, An Anti-Liberal ArgumentforReligious Freedom,
7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 275 (1996). Professor John H. Garvey cogently
argues that "the best reasons for protecting religious freedom rest on the
assumption that religion is a good thing." Id at 291. As he states:
The religious justification is also the reason many-perhaps
most-religious believers claim the right to freedom today. It enables
them to perform their religious duties, and to avoid religious sanctions.
It allows them to pursue the truth, as God gives them to know the
truth. And no other course could bring them closer to God. Finally, the
religious justification is the only convincing explanation for the split-
level character of free exercise law. Sometimes religious believers and
nonbelievers are treated alike, but sometimes the law protects only
religious believers. This is not something that we can explain by appeals
to consent and fairness. It violates the canon of reciprocity. The only
convincing explanation for such a rule is that the law thinks religion is
a good thing.
Iad
406. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1 (1994).
407. 483 U.S. 327 (1987).
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unanimously held that this exemption did not violate the
Establishment Clause as applied to an organization's non-profit
secular activities." 8 The Court first noted that the government may
in some circumstances accommodate religious practices without
violating the Establishment Clause and that the limits of
permissible accommodation were not co-extensive with the
noninterference mandated by the Free Exercise Clause. As it stated,
"there is ample room under the Establishment Clause for
'benevolent neutrality which will permit religious exercise to exist
without sponsorship and without interference. ' "' The Court then
pointed out that it was a permissible legislative purpose to alleviate
significant governmental interference with the ability of religious
organizations to define and carry out their religious missions, and
that a law was not unconstitutional simply because it allowed
churches to advance religion, which is their very purpose.410
Finally, the Court concluded that there was no constitutional
objection to the exemption singling out religious entities for a
benefit. The court stated, "Where, as here, the government acts
with the proper purpose of lifting a regulation that burdens the
exercise of religion, we see no reason to require that the exemption
come packaged with benefits to secular entities."411
408. See id at 339. The church operated a gymnasium, open to the public,
and required that its employees be church members in good standing.
409. Id at 334 (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 669 (1970)). In
Texas Monthly, the Court stated that "we in no way suggest that all benefits
conferred exclusively upon religious groups or upon individuals on account of
their religious beliefs are forbidden by the Establishment Clause unless they are
mandated by the Free Exercise Clause." Texas Monthly, 489 U.S. at 18 n.8.
410. See Corporation ofthe Presiding Bishop, 483 U.S. at 335-36.
411. Id. at 338. Justice Brennan, concurring, said that while the exemption
should ideally be limited to the organization's religious activities, a court's
determination of whether a particular activity was "religious" or "secular" would
require ongoing governmental entanglement in religious affairs and could chill
the organization's religious activity. See id. at 343-44. Justice O'Connor,
concurring, suggested that the exemption might be unconstitutional as applied
to the organization's profit-making enterprises and emphasized that this question
was not before the Court here. See id. at 349; see also McConnell, supra note 2,
at 731.
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Title VII's prohibition against religious discrimination requires
that employer's make a "reasonable accommodation" for an
employee's religious beliefs, as long as this can be done without
undue hardship on the conduct of the employer's business.412 In
Trans World Airlines v. Hardison,413 the Court interpreted
"reasonable accommodation" very narrowly by holding that an
employer was not required to accommodate a Sabbatarian's effort
to avoid Saturday work where this would require the employer to
disregard the seniority system established by the collective
bargaining agreement.414 Had the employer been required to do so,
"the privilege of having Saturdays off would be allocated according
to religious beliefs."41 In the absence of clear statutory or legislative
history to the contrary, the Court was unwilling to construe the
law to "require an employer to discriminate against some
employees in order to enable others to observe their Sabbath."416 As
Hardison indicates, in the employment context, an effort to protect
one employee's religious freedom may impose substantial costs on
Professor McConnell suggests that the failure to provide for such an
exemption might itself be violative of the Establishment Clause. He states,
If it were not for this accommodation, the government would become
deeply entangled with religiously sensitive church decisions. The
government would have to determine why a church fired or refused to
hire a particular person, which would entail discovery into internal
church governance, and it -vrould have to determine whether the
particular function is one for which religious affinity is a legitimate
qualification, which would entail second-guessing the church's
understanding of its religious mission. There is a strong argument that
invasive and entangling regulation of this sort violates the Establishment
Clause. To exempt religious institutions from some form of regulation
protects the separation of church and state. In this sense, institutional
religious accommodation strongly reinforces, and may be required by
the Establishment Clause.
Id
412. See infra text accompanying notes 413-28.
413. 432 U.s. 63 (1977).
414. See id at 84.
415. Id at 85.
416. Id at 84.
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other employees, and therefore, a narrow interpretation of
"reasonabje accommodation" was necessary in order to prevent a
resulting preference for religion over non-religion.
417. See EEOC v. ilona of Hungary, Inc., 108 F.3d 1569 (7th Cir. 1997)
(offering an example of a "reasonable accommodation" required by Title VII). In
that case, two Jewish employees of a skin care salon were denied permission to
take off work on Yom Kippur, the holiest Jewish holiday. See id, at 1572-73.
Because the employees had made the request two weeks in advance, the employer
could have reassigned or rescheduled previously-booked appointments and so,
would have suffered no hardship at all in permitting the employees to take this
day off. See id at 1576. Permitting them to take this one day off during the work
week would have imposed no costs at all on other employees. See id But cf.
Chalmers v. Tulon Co. of Richmond, 101 F.3d 1012, 1021 (4th Cir. 1996)
(holding that an employer was not required to make a "reasonable
accommodation" for an employee's proselytizing other employees and criticizing
their personal lives which damaged working relationships).
Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703 (1985), stands in stark
contrast with the narrow accommodation required by Title VII as interpreted
in Hardison. In Thornton, the Court struck down a state law allowing employees
to take off work on the day that they observed as their Sabbath on the grounds
that it could impose substantial costs on other employees who would have to
work on weekends in their stead. See id at 708-10. In addition, there was no
requirement that the employees who chose to take that day off were precluded
by their religion from working on the Sabbath. See id For both of these reasons,
the law was not precisely tailored to protect the religious freedom of employees
whose religion precluded them from working on the Sabbath. If the law was
limited to those employees whose religion precluded them from working on the
Sabbath, not very many employees would be able to claim its benefits, and
correspondingly, the law would not be likely to impose substantial costs on
other employees. See also Lupu, supra note 212, at 593; Steffey, Redefining the
Modern Constraints, supra note 170, at 915-16.
In commenting on the result in Hardison, Professor Lupu has noted that the
Court's narrow interpretation of Title VII's "reasonable accommodation"
requirement was "explicable in light of the principle of equal associational
liberty." Lupu, supra note 212, at 593. He says that this requirement "has always
been at war with the basic theory of Title VII," in that all of Title VII's "other
prohibited discriminations reflect a focus on status rather than conduct choices."
Id. In addition, he states that "the greater the workplace accommodation of
religious practice, the greater is the forced subsidy of observant employees by
employers and fellow employees." Id.
In discussing Thornton, Steffey states that "even if the regulation was justified
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In most of the cases where the government has acted to protect
the religious freedom of individuals and religious institutions, the
government's action does not impose substantial costs on others.41
as one that relieves a burden on religious exercise, the law was nevertheless
constitutionally infirm because it made insufficient provision for the competing
interests of the employer and other employees by imposing an undue burden on
third parties." Steffey, Redefining theModern Constraints, supra note 170, at 915-
16. See generally supra note 287.
418. During the time when the federal government imposed compulsory
military service on young men, the law contained a conscientious objector
exception. Those who were conscientiously opposed to participation in all war,
on the basis of religious training and belief, were exempt from compulsory
military service and were permitted to perform alternative civilian work instead.
50 U.S.C. App. 5 456 (1994). The granting of conscientious objector status to
some men resulted in others being drafted for military service in their place, and
in this sense, the religiously-based exemption imposed very substantial costs on
others. The Supreme Court interpreted "religious training and belief" very
broadly to include ethical and moral beliefs that imposed a duty on the
individual to refrain from participating in war. See, e.g., Welsh v. United States,
398 U.S. 333 (1970); United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965). However, the
effect was still to grant an exemption for religiously-based objection over
objection that was politically, sociologically, or philosophically based. The
exemption only extended to those whose beliefs caused them to be opposed to
participation in all wars, not those whose beliefs drew a distinction between
"just" and "unjust" war. By its broad interpretation of "religious training and
belief," the Court was able to set aside the criminal convictions in the cases
before it and so never had to directly confront the question of whether the
religious-based exemption constituted an impermissible preference for religion
over non-religion. But cf. Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971).
In Gillette the Court indicated that had it been faced with that question, it
likely would have upheld the religiously-based exemption. It noted that "the
legislative materials show congressional concern for the hard choice that
conscription would impose on conscientious objectors to war, as well as respect
for the value of conscientious action and for the principle of supremacy of
conscience." Id at 452. The Court also noted, "Quite apart from the question of
whether the Free Exercise Clause might require some sort of exemption, it is
hardly impermissible for Congress to attempt to accommodate free exercise
values, in light with 'our happy tradition' of 'avoiding unnecessary clashes with
the dictates of conscience.'" Id at 453 (quoting United States v. Macintosh, 283
U.S. 605, 634 (1931) (Hughes, CJ., dissenting)). Gillette squarely presented the
question of whether Congress could constitutionally limit the exemption to
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Where the government does not deny unemployment
compensation to a Sabbatarian who refuses Saturday work, for
example, the costs of this accommodation are borne entirely by the
government itself. So too, an exemption for Sabbatarians from
Sunday closing laws merely equalized the competitive situation for
Sabbatarians and non-Sabbatarians. Both were required to close
their businesses for one day, the Sabbatarian on Saturday and the
non-Sabbatarian on Sunday.419 Similarly, federal labor relations law
exempts persons who have religious objections to joining unions
from being compelled to pay union dues or representation fees,
provided that the employee pays the same amount to a "substituted
charity."4 0 The "substituted charity" provision has been held to
constitute a "reasonable accommodation" for the employee's
religious beliefs under Title V." 421
There are a number of recent lower court cases upholding
governmental actions designed to protect the religious freedom of
individuals and religious institutions. Usually these actions involve
religiously-based exemptions from generally applicable laws.
Sometimes they favor a single religious group, but where this is so,
it is because only that group has demonstrated that compliance with
the law would substantially interfere with its religious freedom.
those who objected to participation in all wars, and the Court held that it could.
It accepted the government's argument that it was not possible to determine
what constituted a religiously-based objection to participation in a particular war
and that fairness concerns militated against recognizing this kind of exemption.
See id at 454-60. For a strong criticism of this decision, see CHOPER, supra note
14, at 128-31. Compulsory military service was ended in 1972 and is not likely
to reappear, so the Gillette decision may be of limited significance.
419. There appeared to be no question that the Sabbatarian exemptions were
constitutional. See, e.g., Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961);
Commonwealth of Kentucky v. Arlan's Dep't Store, 357 S.W.2d 708 (Ky. 1962),
appeal dismissed, 371 U.S. 218 (1962). In Braunfeld, the Court held that such an
exemption was not required by the Free Exercise Clause and noted that a
number of states did provide such an exemption, stating that "this may well be
the wiser solution to the problem." Braunfeld, 366 U.S. at 608.
420. See 29 U.S.C. § 169 (1994).
421. See, eg.,Tooley v. Martin-Marietta Corp., 648 F.2d 1239 (9th Cir. 1981).
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These cases include the following: an exemption from social
security self-employment taxes for members of religious sects that
have tenets opposed to participation in the social security system
and that provide reasonable support for their dependent
members, a zoning law exception that permitted non-profit day
care facilities and nursery schools to operate in church buildings
located in residential neighborhoods,4' an exemption from the
federal Eagle Protection Act to permit members of Native-
American tribes to use eagle feathers for religious purposes,424
422. See Droz v. Commissioner of IRS, 48 F.3d 1120 (9th Cir. 1995). The
exemption extends only to self-employed taxpayers. In United States v. Lee, 455
U.S. 252 (1982), the Supreme Court held that the imposition of social security
taxes on an Amish employer who had failed to pay his own taxes and failed to
withhold the taxes from the wages of his Amish employees did not violate the
Free Exercise Clause. See id. at 261. The plaintiff in Droz claimed that he had
religious objections to paying the social security self-employment tax; however,
he was not entitled to assert the objection under the law because he was not a
member of a recognized sect. The decision in Lee foreclosed his free exercise
claim. Droz, 48 F.3d at 1123. The court in Lee commented on the self-employed
exemption, stating that it provided for a narrow category which was readily
identifiable, in that "self-employed persons in a religious community having its
own 'welfare' system are distinguishable from the generality of wage earners
employed by others." Lee, 455 U.S. at 260-61. The plaintiff's Establishment
Clause challenge in Droz was based on the argument that exemption favored one
religion over another. Droz, 48 F.3d at 1122. The court rejected the challenge,
saying that the exemption was for an organization that had its own welfare
system and so did not discriminate between religions based on religious beliefs.
See id at 1124.
423. See Cohen v. City of Des Plaines, 8 F.3d 484 (7th Cir. 1993). The
exemption was contained in a zoning law that permitted churches in areas zoned
as single-family residential. See id at 486. The law was challenged by the owner
of commercial day-care facilities who wanted to operate in residential
neighborhoods. See id at 487. The city justified the exemption as being related
to avoiding entanglement with the decision making processes of a religious
organization. In upholding the ordinance, the court relied heavily on the
Supreme Court's decision in Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of
Jesus Christ ofLatter-Day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987). See Cohen, 8 F.3d
at 490-92.
424. See Rupert v. Director, United States Fish and Wildlife Serv., 957 F.2d
32 (1st Cir. 1992). The exemption was challenged by a member of an "all-race"
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exemptions from substance abuse laws for the use of peyote in the
religious ceremonies of Native-American tribes,4 an exemption
from the federal Humane Slaughter Law for Jewish religious
slaughter and the religious slaughter of other faiths that use the
severance of carotid artery method of slaughter,426 and an
exemption for Amish buggies from the requirement that slow-
moving vehicles display a special emblem.427
church that follows Native-American religious customs, including the ceremonial
use of eagle feathers. See id at 33. The court avoided the religious preference
claim by focusing on the sovereignty of Native-American tribes and their special
relationship to the federal government. See id at 34-35.; cf. Morton v. Mancari,
417 U.S. 535 (1974).
425. See Peyote Way Church of God v. Thornburgh, 922 F.2d 1210 (5th Cir.
1991); Olsen v. Drug Enforcement Admin., 878 F.2d 1458 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
Again, the exemption was challenged in these cases, not by ordinary drug users,
but by other groups seeking to use peyote for religious purposes. And again, the
courts relied on the tribal sovereignty and special relationship justification to
avoid the preference between religion claims. If the exemption had been for use
by all religious groups, as opposed to ordinary drug users, there would be no
question that the exemption did not violate the Establishment Clause. During
Prohibition, there was an exception for the use of wine in religious ceremonies,
and it cannot be doubted that the Court would have upheld this ceremonial use
exception against Establishment Clause challenge. See also Laycock, supra note
100, at 1003.
Professor Laycock notes that exemptions such as these are fully consistent
with "substantive neutrality" toward religion. As he states:
To prohibit the consumption of alcohol, without an exception for
religious rituals, is to flatly prohibit important religious practices. Such
a prohibition would discourage religious practices in the most coercive
possible way-by criminalizing it. Many believers would abandon their
religious practice; some would defy the law; some would go to jail. Such
a law would be a massive departure from substantive neutrality.
Id
426. See Jones v. Butz, 374 F. Supp. 1284 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). Although this
case is not of recent origin, it is included because it illustrates very clearly the
kind of precisely-tailored exemptions that are permissible under the
Establishment Clause.
427. See State v. Hershberger, 462 N.W.2d 393 (Minn. 1990) (holding that
such an exemption was required by the state constitution and that the exemption
did not violate the Establishment Clause).
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It is not disputed even among the most ardent "separationists"
that the government may, consistent with the Establishment
Clause, take actions to protect the religious freedom of individuals
who are subject to governmental control. A public school system
may try to protect the religious freedom of public school students,
by respecting religious prohibitions against immodest dress or not
appearing naked in the presence of others, and not require these
students to wear gym clothes or to shower.428 Likewise, the military
and the prison system may try to accommodate the religious needs
of persons under their control, by providing them with chaplains,429
releasing them for religious services, excusing them from uniform
requirements,43° and enabling them to observe dietary restrictions.
In summary, the Establishment Clause permits the government
to take action that is precisely tailored to protect the religious
freedom of individuals and religious institutions. This means that
the government can voluntarily take many actions that it is not
required to take by the Free Exercise Clause.
As long as the purpose and effect of the governmental action is
to protect individual and institutional religious freedom, as opposed
to "accommodating religion" generally,43' and as long as the action
428. Moslem students must say prayers during the school day, and it should
be permissible for the public schools both to excuse the students from class so
that they can say these prayers and to provide a private place for them to do so.
This is the practice of the Dearborn, Michigan school system, which enrolls a
large number of Moslem students.
429. See Katcoff v. Marsh, 755 F.2d 223 (2d Cir. 1985) (rejecting an
Establishment Clause challenge to the military chaplaincy).
430. Congress by statute has overturned the regulation upheld in Goldman
v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986), so as to permit the wearing of religiously-
required headgear by military personnel. See 10 U.S.C. § 774 (1994).
431. The law invalidated in Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703 (1985),
which gave employees the right to take off work the day that they designated as
their Sabbath, is an example of a law that "accommodated religion generally"
because it gave a preference to employees who chose their day off for religious
reasons. Therefore, it was unconstitutional. If the law had permitted employees
who were precluded by their religion from w~orking on the Sabbath to take the
day off, the law would have the purpose and effect of protecting the religious
freedom of individuals. The question would then be whether the law was
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is precisely tailored to that end," it does not amount to a
preference for religion and thus is consistent with the
Establishment Clause.
IV. CONCLUSION
In this writing, I have attempted to bring the perspective of
constitutional litigation to an understanding of the Establishment
Clause. When the Establishment Clause is approached from this
perspective, I submit that it is not at all difficult to understand the
"law of the Establishment Clause" or the Supreme Court's
application of it.
The "law of the Establishment Clause" consists of four
elements: (1) the overriding principle that the Establishment Clause
commands complete official neutrality toward religion, (2) three
operative principles-the three elements of the Lemon test, (3) a
number of subsidiary doctrines, and (4) the Court's precedents in
what I have identified as the five major areas of Establishment
Clause litigation. It is the "law of the Establishment Clause" that is
used by litigating lawyers and by the courts-including the Supreme
Court-to resolve the Establishment Clause issues that arise in
practice.
I have discussed at length the application of the "law of the
Establishment Clause," by the Supreme Court and by the lower
courts in recent years, in the five major areas of Establishment
Clause litigation. I submit that, contrary to the "conventional
wisdom" of academic commentary, the "law of the Establishment
Clause" is fairly well-settled, and that most of the Establishment
Clause issues arising today are fairly peripheral and involve the
application of settled doctrine and precedent to the facts of
precisely tailored to achieve that objective.
432. See Trans World Airlines v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63 (1977). As Hardison
makes clear, in determining whether the action is precisely tailored to that end,
it is relevant to consider the costs that the action imposes on other persons.
Where it does impose such costs, as in Hardison, the justification must be quite
strong.
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particular cases.
The ongoing academic debate regarding the proper
interpretation of the Establishment Clause and its function in our
constitutional system will no doubt continue apace. I hope that in
this Article I have been able to provide some understanding of the
meaning of the Establishment Clause and of how it operates in
practice to protect the religious freedom of the American people.
